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‘Who am I?’ is one of the most basic, famous and reemerging 
questions in philosophy. It introduced many different quests – such as 
those that ask what we are made of, to which kind of being we belong, 
what is most essential to us, what is our purpose, how we ought to 
behave, and which changes in one would or would not cause one’s 
death. I will focus on this latter question and examine what, in spite of 
all the psychological and physical changes we undergo, makes us 
identify ourselves as one numerically identical person throughout 
time. What makes me gather that I, now 27, was once a child 
organizing for safer traffic? Is there something in me that remained 
the same and makes me assume that I am still numerically the same 
entity, in spite of the differences between me, now, and this child, then? 
This question echoes two major questions in the long-standing 
debate about the numerical identity of persons: (1) the metaphysical 
question ‘what constitutes this numerical identity?’ and (2) the 
epistemological question ‘how do we know that we are numerically 
identical with a past or future being?’ For John Locke – who, at the 
end of the seventeenth century, engendered an intense discussion on 
the constitution of diachronic personal identity with his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (Locke 1996 [1690]) – these two 
questions were inextricable. In a response to Christian philosophers, 
who assumed that what makes us who we are, must be our immaterial 
soul (which can survive our corporeal decay and death), Locke argued 
that this makes little sense, because these soul misses characteristics 
that could make us experience that it is present in someone, and so, 
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could give us the knowledge that this someone is the particular person 
to whom this soul belongs (Locke 1996, II.xxvii.14). Someone could 
say that he is Socrates, but we would have no means to verify this, just 
as I would not know if I am now still the same as I was a moment 
before. This is why Locke suggests another necessary and sufficient 
criterion for the preservation of the numerical identity of a person. 
 Locke defines a person as 
“a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times 
and places” (Ibid, II.xxvii.9). 
He continues that this person does this 
“only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, 
and as it seems to me essential to it: it being impossible for anyone 
to perceive without perceiving, that he does perceive. When we see, 
hear, smell, taste, feel meditate, or will anything, we know that we 
do so…and by this everyone is to himself, that which he calls 
self”(Ibid). 
Locke concludes that someone remains the same person as long as his 
consciousness, through which he is conscious of his sensations and 
thoughts at this moment, still makes him aware of what he experienced 
earlier: 
“as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past 
action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person” (Ibid, 
II.xxvii.9). 
The latter has often been interpreted as meaning that we have to 
remember what we did earlier, in order to really be the person who did 
this earlier. Locke provoked this interpretation. In his further 
discussion of personal identity, he emphasizes that persons are moral 
beings and that what constitutes persons, must therefore also 
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constitute them as moral beings. He then argues that our 
consciousness of what we did, aka our memory, is constitutive of 
persons as moral beings, because it allows them to feel that they did 
something, and, so, to feel responsible for it (Ibid, II.xxvii.20). In this 
passage Locke indeed identifies our consciousness of having done 
something with our memory, but this is not the case in the passage, 
quoted earlier (Ibid, II.xxvii.9) where he first identifies persons. There, 
Locke writes that for one to be a particular person, the consciousness 
with which one is conscious of one’s own consciousness, now, must be 
the same as the consciousness with which one was conscious of one’s 
earlier consciousness. This means that we must still be conscious of 
the earlier event. However, still being conscious of something is not 
necessarily the same as having a memory of something. 
It remains unclear how we can determine whether the 
consciousness, through which we recall earlier events, is identical to 
the consciousness that made us conscious of these events when we first 
experienced them. Just as Locke asked what would make a soul into 
the same soul, we can ask Locke what would make a consciousness into 
the same consciousness. Yet, Locke was convinced that we feel or know 
when we still have the same consciousness as an earlier person, and he 
saw this as evidence in favour of his suggestion that a person is the 
same person as long as he has the same consciousness. Contrary to a 
mysterious soul, my consciousness allows me to feel that I feel 
something, and, so, that I am a particular self that can feel things. 
Consciousness is then both what makes us recognize ourselves as 
particular persons, and what constitutes us as these persons. 
Locke’s different insights concerning the person can be 
distinguished from one another. It is true that persons typically 
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consider themselves as one particular and diachronically existing 
entity. It is further likely that our capacity to consider ourselves as 
particular, diachronically existing entities, on the one hand, and the 
facts (1) that we are conscious of a great part of our consciousness and 
(2) that we have memories, on the other hand, are not independent of 
one another. However, this does not imply that these three forms of 
being aware of ourselves are identical. It is possible that we could not 
think of ourselves as being particular, diachronically existing entities, 
if we would not be aware of our consciousness, or would not have any 
memories, but this does not mean that our consciousness of being one 
diachronic entity is a consciousness of being consciousness, or, by 
extension, a consciousness of all that we have been conscious of. I will 
separately analyze in what our consciousness of being one 
diachronically identical entity consists, and what the elements are that 
allow for this consciousness. 
The publication of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
immediately generated further discussion. Part of the debate focused 
on the details of Locke’s ‘memory’ criterion for personal identity. 
Joseph Butler argues that it would be wrong to say that the fact that a 
person still remembers his past proves that he is still the same, since 
we will only say that a person remembers something, when he actually 
did what he seems to remember. If not, we would not call it memory. 
According to Butler (1975 [1736], p. 100), remembering something 
presupposes that you were the person who did what you now 
apparently remember. Hence, it cannot first make it the case that you 
are this person. Thomas Reid agrees with Butler. He adds that even if 
memory can merely testify, and not constitute, personal identity, we 
would have to amend what Locke said about it. Reid judges that the 
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claim that we can only be a person, whose actions and thoughts we 
remember, is too strong. According to Reid, I can be one particular 
person, as long as there is a continuous chain of memories between me 
and that person. Reid (2010 [1785], Essay 3, chapter 6, pp. 147-148) 
offers the example of the general who can be said to have been a 
particular child who stole apples, even when he does not remember to 
have done so. For this, it suffices that the general remembers having 
been an officer, and that this officer remembers having stolen apples 
as a child. 
Other philosophers – amongst whom Leibniz, Hume and Kant are 
most famous – did not so much focus on Locke’s ‘memory’ criterion, as 
they developed their own thoughts on personal identity, in response 
to Locke and the Christian philosophers that preceded him. In his New 
Essays on Human Understanding, Leibniz (1981 [1704]) replied directly 
to each of Locke’s paragraphs on personal identity. Like Locke, Leibniz 
looks at how we know that we have been a particular person. However, 
contrary to Locke, he does not judge that only the consciousness of 
our own consciousness gives us access to such knowledge. Leibniz 
observes that we sometimes know that we have done something, 
merely because others witnessed us doing this and told us about it 
(Leibniz 1981, II.xxvii.9). From this, Leibniz concludes that our body, 
as well, must have a role in what makes us stay the same person over 
time (Ibid). He concludes this because those who say that they know 
that we have done something, only saw that we did this; they have no 
immediate access to our consciousness of consciousness. They can only 
surmise that the person who did something then, and still has the same 
body, must be the same person. 
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Hume (1978 [1739]), in his turn, questioned if there is any such 
thing as a self with a diachronic existence, for which we can seek to 
determine the criteria of persistence. He notes that when he tries to 
observe this self through introspection, he finds no such entity. He is 
aware of certain sensations and thoughts, but he does not have an 
impression of one and the same self that has all these sensations and 
thoughts (Hume 1978, I.iv.6, p. 254). In an attempt to explain what 
makes us have the idea that we are one self, if not an impression of this 
self, Hume suggest that this may be caused by our observation of 
resemblances and the imagination of causal links between certain 
thoughts (Ibid, p. 260-261). Hume suggests that we are tempted to 
think that the reason for the occurrence of these resemblances and 
causal links would be given, if there is one and the same self that has 
these thoughts. So, our observation of sensations and thoughts could 
make us imagine that there is a persisting self. However, this self 
remains a fiction. We feign it. There is not one impression that 
corresponds with it. 
Kant approached the question of numerical personal identity 
differently. In the third paralogism of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
(1998 [1781], A361-A366) does not search for an observable 
numerically identical self, in order to determine whether it exists, what 
constitutes its identity, or what constitutes our knowledge of this 
identity. Instead, he admits that our thoughts and unity of 
consciousness refer to a subject which has them, but adds that this ‘I’ 
remains formal: we do not know anything about it, other than that it 
is the subject of these thoughts and unity of consciousness. Every 
thought has a thinker, and sometimes we hear and see something 
simultaneously, which presupposes that these perceptions are had by 
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the same perceiving subject. Yet, we cannot assume more about this 
subject. It is the subject of this thought, or united thoughts only, not 
a specific personality or other substance that remains the same. 
Herewith, Kant also criticizes Descartes (2004 [1639]), Locke’s 
predecessor, who stated that, given that there is thinking, there must 
be a thinking thing, and immediately concluded from this that this 
thing must then be an immaterial substance constituting a particular 
person. 
The debate above was revived during the second half of the 
twentieth century. Philosophers, mainly from the analytical tradition, 
started to fiercely debate over what constitutes the numerical identity 
of persons; whether our idea of what constitutes this identity 
corresponds with reality; what is special about self-consciousness, self-
knowledge, and self-reference; and to what the ‘I’ in self-reference 
refers. Psychological reductionists, such as Derek Parfit (1984), return 
to Locke and Reid, in as far as they hold that the numerical identity of 
what we call persons is constituted by psychological continuity, made 
up of memory and other psychological links. At the same time, they 
return to Hume, by saying that a self does not truly exist. According 
to psychological reductionists, the self is nothing but a series of 
psychological relations. 
The opposing camp of contemporary philosophers stresses the role 
of the body in the constitution of the numerical identity of persons. 
They do so for a variety of reasons. Some refer to the importance of 
our subjective point of view on the world – which is determined  by 
the positioning of our body – for the constitution of our feeling of being 
a particular individual (Naomi Eilan 1995). Others argue that the body 
must be important for this constitution because it is needed for us to 
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be living human-beings (Olson 1997, Snowdon 1995) or because we 
could not be rational beings without it (Baker 2000). Philosophers like 
P.F. Strawson (1959), Saul Kripke (1972), Bernard Williams (1973b), 
David Wiggins (1976), and John McDowell (1997) attribute a more 
complicated role to the body, which comes closer to what Leibniz had 
in mind. They argue that, as a material and continuous entity, the body 
may not tell us anything about a person’s personality, yet, it allows us 
to point to persons and to re-identify them in the spatio-temporal 
world in which we live. 
A third group of contemporary philosophers focusses on a more 
transcendental self, such as Kant discussed, i.e. a self that is implied, 
but about whose characteristics we may not know much. Vendler 
(1984), who mainly tries to reinterpret Kant in this regard, is one of 
them. Wittgenstein (1958), Shoemaker (1963, 1968) and Evans (1982), 
who observe that we can correctly refer to ourselves, without thereby 
identifying ourselves through certain characteristics, can also be 
assigned to this group. The self about whom they write, is not 
necessarily the subject of a thought or unity of consciousness, as is the 
transcendental self of Kant. Yet, just like the self that Kant described 
in his third paralogism, it remains formal: we refer correctly to it, 
without knowing anything particular about it. 
 
Rather than immediately determining what must metaphysically 
constitute the diachronic identity of persons, or how we, step by step, 
get to know whether we are identical to a person from the past, I will 
examine how we factually ascribe numerical identity to ourselves and 
others, and subsequently analyze what causes us to ascribe personal 
identity in this way. The factors that have a role in how we factually 
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ascribe personal identity, may be, but are not necessarily essential to 
its metaphysical constitution. We also do not need to consciously 
derive from them that we are one particular person. They may just 
function as background assumptions that allow us to ascribe personal 
identity as we do. After having determined how we ascribe numerical 
identity to persons, I will describe which kind of image of the self 
corresponds to the way in which we ascribe numerical identity to 
persons. 
More specifically, in the first chapter, I will demonstrate how 
distinct philosophers assume that what makes us numerically identical 
must coincide with one, or more elements, which preserve our 
qualitative identity to the extent to which these qualities are important 
for us and characterize our particular personality. I argue that this 
assumption is incorrect: we sometimes judge that we are still 
numerically the same, even when we have changed substantially, 
qualitatively speaking. What constitutes the numerical identity of a 
person does not have to have a crucial, obvious role in the constitution 
of his typifying character. 
After distinguishing the question of what constitutes the numerical 
identity of a person from what constitutes his qualitative identity, I 
explain, in the second chapter, why the psyche to which we typically 
attribute an important role in the constitution of the qualitative 
identity of persons cannot, on its own, constitute their numerical 
identity. I mention which characteristics of our body, considered as 
mere continuous material entity, render it more suitable to constitute 
this numerical identity. I also illustrate how we factually judge that 
persons remain numerically the same, as long as their one particular 
(continuous) body is capable of producing consciousness. 
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In the third chapter, I discern my approach of the role of the body 
in the constitution of personal identity from those of animalism and 
the constitution view. Contrary to protagonists of animalism and the 
constitution view my question is not what makes us stay the same 
throughout time ontologically speaking, but what makes us consider 
ourselves as the same diachronically existing being. Again, in 
opposition to defenders of animalism and the constitution view, I do 
not assume that, if the body has a role here, this must be because it is 
intrinsically important for a person’s identity. 
After establishing that we identify persons as numerically the same 
through one particular body that is still capable of producing 
consciousness, and after elaborating upon the specific role that the 
body could then have in this identification, I analyze which factors 
make us identify a person by his body. In the fourth chapter, I, in this 
regard, describe the role of material bodies and persons as primary 
particulars. In the fifth and sixth chapter, I show how the self-
consciousness, which we often judge to be crucial for the preservation 
of personal identity is, in fact, informed by our idea that we, as persons, 
have just one particular physical history, which is that of one 
continuous material body. I show how this is the case for our episodic 
memory in the fifth chapter, and for our sensations and thoughts about 
ourselves as mental selves, in the sixth. 
In the seventh and last chapter, I examine, to which kind of self we 
refer when we re-identify a person as numerically the same by his 
body. I argue that this self is a formal self. It is a self, to whom we refer, 
according to rules, and about whose character we do not need to know 
anything and cannot know anything definitive. Yet, while this self is 
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formal, it still determines how we think of ourselves as more 
substantial selves, i.e. as specific personalities. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
WHAT CONSTITUTES OUR NUMERICAL 
IDENTITY? 
 
I. PERSONAL IDENTITY AS A NUMERICAL IDENTITY 
 
To ask what constitutes a person’s numerical identity, is to ask 
which elements have to stay in place for someone to remain 
numerically identical. These elements do not a priori have to 
guarantee his qualitative identity. Just as objects, persons may change 
qualitatively while still remaining numerically the same. Like a chair 
can remain numerically the same chair, even when it gets painted or 
loses a leg and thus changes qualities, a man can shrink with age and 
become more conservative, all the while we will say that this young 
and old man are one and the same person who has evolved over the 
years. 
Still, philosophers who set out to discover the constitutive factors 
of our (idea of) numerical identity, have mostly come up with elements 
that make us qualitatively identical. In this chapter, I will sketch how 
this is the case for three prominent philosophers: John Locke, Derek 
Parfit and Bernard Williams. I will argue that their analysis is led by 
the thought that we must see the meaning and value for a specific 
personality of whatever could potentially constitute its personal 
identity. In the remainder of this dissertation, I will distance myself 
from this thought; separate the question of what constitutes our idea 
of numerical identity from that of what constitutes our idea of what 
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qualitative identity consists of; and examine whether elements which 
may, at first sight, not seem of importance to our personalities, could 
still constitute our idea of numerical personal identity, and why this 
would be the case. 
 
 
1. John Locke 
 
1.1 Locke defines the person 
 
John Locke gave a major impulse to the philosophical discussion 
about what constitutes diachronic personal identity. Before answering 
this question, he considers it necessary to define what a person is. 
Locke defines the person as  
“a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and 
can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different 
times and places” (Locke 1996, II.xxvii.9). 
Locke continues that this being only does this  
“by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking…it 
being impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving, that he 
does perceive” (Ibid). 
According to Locke, it is also this consciousness alone which 
constitutes our diachronic identity: 
“[n]othing but consciousness can unite remote existences into the 
same person” (Ibid, II.xxvii.23). 
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1.2 Locke’s insight 
 
A closer look at this claim reveals two interesting insights and a 
confusion of Locke’s. Locke’s first insight is that we first have to define 
what a person is, before we can find out what constitutes his numerical 
identity. Centuries later Geach (1967) explained why this is the case 
(without thereby referring to Locke). There is no such thing as an 
abstract or general numerical identity. Therefore we cannot tell what 
constitutes such mere numerical identity. What constitutes numerical 
identity, depends on of what we wish to determine the numerical 
identity. To determine what constitutes the numerical identity of a 
particular, we must therefore first know to which kind this particular 
belongs, as well as what makes it into a particular token within this 
kind (i.e. of what distinguishes it from other tokens of this kind). This 
needs to be clarified, so as to focus our attention. Clarifying this first 
does not lead to a circularity in the determination of what makes 
someone stay numerically the same. What makes something stay 
numerically the same may differ from what makes something belong 
to a certain kind, or what makes a token distinguish itself from the 
other tokens of that kind. It may, for example, be necessary to be born 
out of persons, so as to belong to the person kind; to have a separate 
body, so as to distinguish yourself from other tokens of the person 
kind; and to be psychologically continuous (say to only gradually and 
partially change in character and lose memories) so as to stay a 
numerically identical person. Still, you would first have to determine 
what a person is and so direct your attention to a particular kind of 
entity, before you could examine what constitutes his numerical 
identity. 
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Locke’s second insight is less obvious and has been less accounted 
for in the contemporary debate on personal identity. It consists in his 
idea that persons are beings which can consider themselves as 
diachronically existing beings and that they can do so in a rather 
formal, or empty, way. Locke came to this statement by – just as he 
did for other ideas – seeking to both classify, as well as examine the 
origin of our idea of personal identity. 
As we saw Locke classifies the person as 
“a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times 
and places” (Locke 1996, II.xxvii.9). 
Locke concludes that this idea must be given to us by our own 
consciousness of being conscious: 
“which [i.e. the considering of itself as itself] it does only by that 
consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and it seems to 
me essential to it: it being impossible for anyone to perceive without 
perceiving, that he does perceive” (Ibid). 
What is interesting here, is that Locke initially refrains from making 
further claims about the nature of this self. Locke defines that a person 
must be conscious of its own diachronic being, but explicitly denies 
that this being must be a particular substance: 
“not being considered in this case, whether the same self be 
continued in the same, or diverse substances” (Ibid). 
According to Locke, personal identity is merely constituted by the 
consciousness of consciousness and reaches as far 
“as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action 
or thought” (Ibid). 
Again:  
CH 1: What Constitutes Our Numerical Identity? 
[17] 
“For it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself 
to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be 
annexed only to one individual substance, or can be continued in a 
succession of several substances. For as far as any intelligent being 
can repeat the idea  of any past action with the same consciousness 
it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any 
present action; so far it is the same personal self. For it is by the 
consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is 
self to itself now, and so will be the same self  as far as the same 
consciousness can extend to actions past or to come…” (Locke 
1996, II.xxvii.10). 
And once more:  
“Self is that conscious thinking thing (whatever substance made up 
of whether spiritual, or material, simple, or compounded, it matters 
not) which is sensible, or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of 
happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that 
consciousness extends” (Locke 1996, II.xxvii.17). 
Herewith, Locke both follows and criticizes Descartes. Locke observes 
that we become aware of ourselves through our consciousness of being 
conscious, as Descartes remarked earlier: 
“Mais qu’est-ce donc que je suis? Une chose qui pense, qui doute, 
qui conçoit, qui affirme qui nie, qui veut, qui ne veut pas, qui imagine 
et qui sent” (Descartes 1956, 2nd med. §9). 
“il ne se peut pas faire que lorsque je vois, ou…lorsque je pense voir, 
que moi qui pense ne soit quelque chose” (Ibid, § 16). 
Yet, as we saw, Locke does not conclude from this that this ‘I’ is an 
immaterial substance, contrary to Descartes: 
“…lorsque je considère mon esprit, c’est-à-dire moi-même en tant 
que je suis seulement une chose qui pense, je n’y puis distinguer 
aucunes parties, mais je me conçois comme une chose seule, et entière” 
(Descartes 1956, 6th med. § 33, my italics). 
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In his initial refusal to further specify what the self-conscious self is 
like, Locke is, in his turn, a predecessor of Kant. Just as Locke, Kant 
argues that there is no indication that this ‘I’ of self-consciousness is a 
substance. Kant went even further than Locke by stating that this ‘I’ 
which has a diachronic existence in our own consciousness or inner 
time, is hereby not granted such existence in an outer intersubjectively 
shared time: 
“…we cannot judge even from our own consciousness whether as 
soul we are persisting or not, because we ascribe to our identical 
Self only that of which we are conscious; and so we must necessarily 
judge that we are the very same in the whole of the time of which 
we are conscious. But from the standpoint of someone else we 
cannot declare this to be valid because, since in the soul we 
encounter no persisting appearance other than the representation 
‘I,’ which accompanies and connects all of them, we can never make 
out whether this I (a mere thought) does not flow as well as all the 
other thoughts that are linked to one another through it” (Kant 
1998, A 364). 
While Locke admitted that the ‘I’ of which we become aware in our 
consciousness of being conscious is not one particular substance, he 
did hold that this consciousness of consciousness constitutes our 
diachronic identity, i.e. a person. According to Locke, distinct 
instances of thoughts are had by the same person as long as they are 
had by the same consciousness of consciousness: 
“ ‘tis plain consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it 
be to ages past, unites existences, and actions, very remote in time, 
into the same person, as well as it does the existence and actions of 
the immediately preceding moment: so that whatever has the 
consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to 
whom they both belong” (Locke 1996, II.xxvii.16). 
As I will discuss later, it is not clear what should be in place for this 
consciousness to be the same. But the idea of such same consciousness 
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allowed Locke to say that an experience and a memory of this 
experience can be ascribed to the same person, given that the same 
consciousness of consciousness which made this person aware of the 
first experience, is what later makes him recall this experience. In 
contrast with this, Kant denies that there is an indication that the ‘I’, 
to which different instances of consciousness of consciousness refer, 
remains in some cases the same ‘I’ over (outer) time. 
I agree with Kant that there is nothing in the ‘I’ to which every 
conscious act refers that makes it identical to an ‘I’ to which another 
conscious act refers. Yet, later in this thesis, I will return to the formal 
consciousness which we do have of being one diachronic self, and hereby 
acknowledge a seldom recognized insight of Locke. Without accepting 
a priori that this consciousness is solely constituted by our 
consciousness of consciousness as stated by Locke, I will examine if we 
have a formal idea of being a diachronic self and, if so, how this formal 
consciousness of being a diachronic self comes about, as well as what 
this says about our idea of being a diachronic self. 
 
 
1.3 Locke’s confusion: it is not because consciousness is 
typifying for persons that it alone constitutes 
numerical identity 
 
With this in mind, we can return to Locke’s application of his first 
insight to the case of persons. How does Locke define them as kind, 
token and numerically identical entity? 
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In defining persons as kind, Locke distinguishes them from man as 
a human organism, as well as from other substances which have to be 
continuous to remain. According to Locke, persons are selves which 
are, in this moment, conscious of themselves, through their awareness 
of being aware, and, at a later point in time, through their memory of 
what they experienced before. Following this view, persons can stop 
and resume their existence. We should not say that they are there 
during a deep, unconscious sleep, but we can say that they are the same 
persons as before the sleep, if they, after the sleep, remember what they 
did before (Locke 1996, II.xxvii.10). This is not the case for human 
organisms and other substances: their existence has to be continuous. 
Discontinuity means the end of the organism or substance. 
According to Locke, persons and human organisms also differ from 
one another, in as far as a person’s continued existence does not require 
that he lives through just one particular vital organism with a certain 
shape. A person could, in principal switch bodies. By contrast, a 
particular man or human organism cannot suddenly start living 
through the body of another man or non-human organism. 
A last crucial difference, drawn by Locke, between human 
organisms and persons is that a human organism stays a human 
organism, even if its intelligence level drops beneath that of many 
animals, just as an animal stays an animal, no matter how intelligent 
it is; whereas a person only stays the same person as long as he thinks 
in a similar way as he used to do. A prince could start to live through 
the body of a cobbler and still be the prince, because he thinks in a way 
identical to how this prince used to think. But if a prince-shaped person 
no longer has the thoughts and way of behaving as he used to have, 
then he is no longer this prince-person (Ibid, II.xxvii.15). 
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Following Locke, persons are also moral beings. Their awareness 
of what they do, allows them to later recognize that they performed 
certain actions and take responsibility for these by accepting their 
consequences, be it reward or punishment (Ibid, II.xxvii.18). 
In his analysis of persons as individual token-persons, Locke 
demonstrates how the same self-consciousness which is required to 
belong to the person-kind, also distinguishes persons from one 
another. He first excludes some other possibilities. The immaterial 
soul cannot individuate persons, because we do not know anything 
about this soul and it therefore does not provide us with a 
characteristic which could individuate a person (Ibid, II.xxvii.14). 
Bodies too fail to individuate persons. For, if we would notice that the 
person, now connected with the body of a former cobbler, has the 
behaviour and memories of a former prince and vice versa, then we 
would no longer identify the prince and the cobbler by their bodies. 
Instead, we would say that the prince and the cobbler must have 
changed bodies (Ibid, II.xxvii.15). Locke considers self-consciousness 
to be a better candidate for the individuation of persons. It allows 
persons to experience that they differ from one another: they 
experience their own experiences as theirs and because they have the 
immediate consciousness that their experiences are theirs, they also 
remember them as theirs. 
So far, Locke’s analysis of a person as kind and token is particular, 
but acceptable. The problem in his analysis, with which I wish to deal 
here, lays in his quick transition from his idea of what a person is, as 
kind and as token, to his conclusion about what constitutes the 
numerical identity of persons. In the first substantial paragraph on 
personal identity in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke 
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1996, II.xxvii.9), this transition is immediate and without further 
justification. From the thought that a person as kind is “a thinking 
intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself 
as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places,” and the 
idea that a person as token individuates itself from others by 
“perceiving…that he does perceive,” Locke immediately concludes 
that this same consciousness which typifies him as kind, and 
individuates him as token, must also constitute him as diachronically 
existing, numerically identical entity: “as far as this consciousness can 
be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches 
the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then.” Here, 
Locke assumes that, what constitutes the numerical identity of a 
person, must be of clear importance for the qualitative character of this 
person as kind and as token. 
I disagree. It is not because consciousness is a very important 
quality of persons, as kind and as token, that this same consciousness 
constitutes the person’s numerical identity. Say that we agree that 
diachronic self-consciousness is both necessary for someone to belong 
to the kind ‘person’ and for a person to be distinguished from other 
persons. Say that we also agree that distinct experiences can be 
assembled as mine by my coconsciousness – I experience them as mine 
and so remember them as mine. Even then, it would be too quick to 
conclude, as we saw Locke do above, that this coconsciousness alone 
constitutes diachronic identity. Other possibilities are that 
(1) coconsciousness is not a sufficient condition for the constitution 
of diachronic self-consciousness – coconsciousness itself might be 
constituted by, to coconsciousness external, reference points, or it may 
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have to make us aware of an event at which we were physically present, 
to count as real coconsciousness; 
(2) coconsciousness is not a necessary condition for diachronic self-
consciousness – the latter may for instance be constituted by our 
reliance on testimony rather than on information coming ‘from the 
inside’1; 
(3) our numerical identity is not constituted by our most important 
quality – perhaps consciousness is what we value most in persons, yet 
another of their properties which we do not value as such constitutes 
their numerical identity. 
I will elaborate on these possibilities in the subsequent chapters of 
this dissertation. Here, my aim was merely to point out how Locke 
ignores these possibilities – a fact which seems to be caused by his 
valuation of a particular quality in persons. In an answer to his 
historical predecessor Descartes, who distinguished divisible, 
extended matter from indivisible, unextended thinking, and to the 
subsequent Christian thinkers, who assumed that the substance of this 
thinking must be an immaterial soul, Locke singled out consciousness 
as the most typifying characteristic of a person, which can unify him 
even if he is not a substance. Locke’s focus on the typifying character 
of this consciousness, as well as on the apparent capacity of our 
consciousness to unify ourselves, makes him look no further for 
constitutive elements of our numerical identity. 
Another proof of Locke’s association of what constitutes personal 
identity with what we find important in persons is his quick 
identification of our diachronic self-consciousness that he first 
                                                 
1 Cfr. Leibniz’ critique of Locke in Leibniz 1981, 236 §9. 
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described in rather formal terms, with a consciousness of a very 
particular personal history, whose existence justifies our moral and 
juridical judgments. While Locke first describes a person as “a…being 
that…can consider itself as itself” (Locke 1996, II.xxvii.9), and does 
not define further in what this self-consciousness consists, except that 
it is a consciousness of being “the same thinking thing in different 
times and places” (Ibid), he later means to demonstrate that our moral 
and juridical judgments are justified because they take into account 
that we are only the same self as long as we are conscious of this self.2 
This latter consciousness is a consciousness of having been a particular 
personality, who had specific thoughts and performed specific actions. 
It is no longer a rather formal awareness of being the same self, 
without knowing more about this self. Instead, this consciousness 
consists in a set of specific memories of having a particular history. We 
only punish people for those actions that they remember doing. This 
justifies our punishment. For, if we would punish people for something 
they do not remember doing, it would be to them as if we punished 
them for something someone else did.3 Locke makes it appear as if his 
analysis of what constitutes the numerical identity of persons comes 
first and the fact that our moral behaviour is justified because it takes 
this constitution into account only second.4 However, this is hard to 
                                                 
2 “In this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and 
punishment; happiness and misery, being that, for which everyone is concerned for 
himself…” (Locke 1996, II.xxvii.18). 
3 “…to punish Socrates waking, for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking 
Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of right, than to punish one twin 
for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing” (Locke 1996, II.xxvii.19). 
4 “In this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and 
punishment; happiness and misery, being that, for which everyone is concerned for 
himself…” (Locke 1996, II.xxvii.18, my underlining). 
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maintain. First, Locke mentions that the term person is “a forensic 
term appropriating actions and their merit; … [which] belongs only 
to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery” 
(Locke 1996, II.xxvii.26). Further, Locke only starts describing the 
consciousness of consciousness, which is necessary to be a person, as 
the memory of having a particular history, when he considers the person 
as moral entity who has to be able to ascribe specific actions to 
himself.5 From this we can derive that Locke’s interpretation of the, 
for personal identity, constitutive consciousness of consciousness, as a 
form of a memory, is influenced by his idea that we are moral entities. 
In the end, Locke’s thought of what constitutes personal identity is 
influenced by his idea that persons are accountable beings.  
I still agree with Michael Ayers (1996, pp. 266-268), a major 
interpreter of Locke, that Locke contends that personal identity is 
constituted by an ontological relation, i.e. coconsciousness, and not 
just by some kind of moral and legal bound that makes us take 
responsibility for ‘ourselves’, just as such bound can make us take 
responsibility for things which do not belong to our person, say our 
children or house. But the elements which Ayers cites to demonstrate 
that this relation is first and foremost ontological, I take to illustrate 
how what Locke proposes to be the ontological relation that 
                                                 
5 Locke first interprets this consciousness of consciousness as memory, eleven 
paragraphs after he first mentioned its role in the constitution, and only two 
paragraphs after he describes the person as a moral being, in the middle of further 
considerations about this being as moral: “suppose I wholly lose the memory of some 
parts of my life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never 
be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same person…? To which I answer, that 
we must here take notice what the word I is applied to, which in this case is the man 
only….human laws not punishing the madman  for the  sober man’s actions, nor the 
sober man for what the madman did, thereby making them two persons…” (Locke 
1996, II.xxvii.20, my underlining). 
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constitutes personal identity is influenced by his idea that we are moral 
beings. Ayers mentions how Locke’s “explicit identification of 
consciousness of the past with memory or recollection …[and] his 
quasi-Cartesian explanation of ‘consciousness’ in terms of the 
necessary self-consciousness of mental operations” show that “[i]t is 
memory in a straight-forward sense which for Locke both ties past 
actions to the present” (Ayers 1996, p. 267). This memory is supposed 
to excite “such moral concern as the acknowledgement of guilt” (Ibid) 
and show that “[c]onsciousness is distinct from conscience, and prior 
to it” (Ibid). I argue that Locke identifies coconsciousness with 
memory because he assumes that the ontological relation which 
constitutes a person, must also constitute him as a moral entity. If this 
were not the case, Locke could have interpreted consciousness 
differently. 
We have then found one other indication of the fact that Locke 
assumes that the numerical identity of persons must be constituted by 
an element which also constitutes him as a particular qualitative being. 
A last evidence in this regard, is Locke’s quick switch from the term 
‘personal identity,’ which he had been using, and refers to the 
numerical identity of persons, to the term ‘personality’, which refers to 
the person as a particular character, in the following quote: 
“punishment is annexed to personality, and personality to 
consciousness” (Locke 1996, II.xxvii.22). Herewith Locke wishes to 
demonstrate that the ontological element which constitutes personal 
identity, also constitutes us as moral entities. But by using the term 
‘personality’ instead of ‘personal identity’ Locke does not so much 
illustrate that we are rational in making sure that the person we punish 
is ontologically the same as the person who committed the personal 
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acts, as he conveys his own assumption that an ontological numerical 
identical person is a particular personality who is a particular 
qualitative and moral being, in as far as he has done and thought 
specific things, and is still conscious of these, or still remembers these. 
 
In the subsequent paragraphs, I turn to the contemporary 
philosophical debate on personal identity. Just like Locke, the two first 
protagonists and opposing parties in this debate, Derek Parfit and 
Bernard Williams, offer fine and new insights on the matter, yet still 
end up confounding criteria for the numerical identity of persons with 
those for their qualitative identity. This covers up their first insights. 
I will highlight what Parfit and Williams say in this regard. This 
should further clarify what it means to search for (our) criteria for the 
numerical identity of persons. It will also give a short overview of the 
two major positions in the contemporary debate on personal identity. 
 
 
2. Derek Parfit 
 
2.1 “Identity is not what matters” 
 
Derek Parfit’s thought on personal identity can be captured in one 
of his own phrases: “identity is not what matters” (Parfit 1984, pp. 215-
217, 224-225, 241, 245, 255, 273-275; 1995, pp. 29, 33-34, 44; 2007 
passim). He attaches both an ontological and a moral meaning to this 
expression. 
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The ontological claim is that a particular person is not one 
determinate being who is either there or not there. A person is not at 
all times fully identical to its past selves. Instead, it is connected to 
them to a greater or lesser degree. According to Parfit, identity is thus 
not crucial in the metaphysical make-up of persons. In this matter, it 
matters not. 
With regard to our attitudes or moral, Parfit judges that what we 
really value (or ought to value as rational beings) in our personal 
survival is in fact not that we survive, i.e. that our identity is preserved. 
Even in our apparent valuation of the continuation of our personal 
identity, identity is not what matters. 
I will elaborate on Parfit’s ontological claim first and return to his 
moral claim in the subsequent paragraph. 
 
 
2.1.1 The metaphysical constitution of persons: identity is not 
what matters 
 
With regard to personal identity, Derek Parfit is a constitutive 
reductionist (Parfit 1995, p. 16; 1999). Constitutive reductionists are 
metaphysical reductionists, not conceptual reductionists. They claim 
that persons are not separately existing entities over and above their 
physical and/or psychological continuity, even though we may not be 
able to get rid of the term ‘person’ when we want to give a complete 
description of the world. 
Another way to state what constitutive reductionists hold is the 
following. They claim that, what makes different experiences belong 
to one person, is not the fact that they belong to a single separately 
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existing entity. Rather, what makes experiences intrapersonal should 
be explained in terms of other facts, such as the fact that they are 
psychologically continuous with one another or the fact that they are 
associated with a single body. 
A metaphysical non-reductionist, on the other hand, claims that 
persons are separately existing entities over and above their physical 
and psychological continuity. An example of a metaphysical non-
reductionist would be someone who identifies persons in accordance 
with their soul and does not take this soul to be fully constituted by 
any combination of further entities. 
With regard to personal identity there are two major kinds of 
constitutive reductionists. Some reductionists, like Bernard Williams 
(1973b), argue that a person stays the same person as long as there is 
a certain degree of physical continuity. Other reductionists, like Derek 
Parfit, hold that a person stays the same as long as there is a certain 
degree of non-branched psychological continuity. Parfit (1984, p. 216) 
claims specifically that 
“[w]e are not separately existing entities, apart from our brains and 
bodies, and various interrelated physical and mental events. Our 
existence just involves the existence of our brains and bodies, and 
the doing of our deeds, and the thinking of our thoughts, and the 
occurrence of certain other physical and mental events. Our identity 
over time just involves (a) relation R – psychological connectedness 
and/or psychological continuity – with the right kind of cause, 
provided (b) that this relation does not take a ‘branching’ form, 
holding between one person and two different future people.” 
With “our existence,” Parfit (1984, p. 202) means our factual 
existence, not what is principally necessary for a person’s existence. 
According to Parfit, we factually live through one body, but could in 
principle continue to live through another body. With our “identity 
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over time,” he means “what this identity necessarily involves, or 
consists in” (Ibid). “Psychological connectedness” consists of direct 
psychological links (Ibid, p. 206), such as those between an intention 
and the acting on this intention, or an experience and the memory of 
this experience. “Psychological continuity is the holding of 
overlapping chains of strong connectedness” (Ibid). Psychological 
connectedness is a matter of degree. There can be more or less direct 
psychological connections between different person-stages (i.e. the 
same person at different moments). According to Parfit, this degree 
has to be sufficient for us to still speak of the same person (Ibid). 
However, a person can still be called numerically identical to a person 
at an earlier stage, when there is no direct psychological link between 
these two person-stages. This is the case, when he is psychological 
continuous with this person or, in other words, when there are enough 
overlapping chains of psychological connectedness between the 
different person-stages that lead back to the first person-stage of this 
person. “The right kind of cause” would for some be a normal cause 
(Ibid, p. 207), such as a natural character change during the teenage 
years of a person, as opposed to an artificially produced character 
change, say by tampering with the brain. For Parfit, any cause will do 
as the right kind of cause (Ibid, p. 208). The condition “that this 
relation does not take a ‘branching’ form” is there to allow for the 
numerical identity of a person. One person can never be numerically 
identical to two distinct persons. If A is numerically identical with B 
and C, then B and C would have to be numerically identical with one 
another. If they are two different branches of a basic stream of 
psychological continuity, this is impossible: they will each develop 
another history and so not be numerically identical. 
CH 1: What Constitutes Our Numerical Identity? 
[31] 
It is worth a note that Parfit’s idea of what constitutes psychological 
unity – i.e. a series of sufficient psychological connections between 
specific thoughts, experiences and behaviour – is specific and not the 
only way to conceive of this unity. Parfit sees the unity of 
consciousness as a grand total of particular thoughts, experience and 
behaviour which are united by memory or meaningful psychological 
links such as those between intention and action. This does not yet 
explain how we integrate what we hear, see, smell, etc. – another 
instance of unity of consciousness still discussed by phenomenologists 
and analytic philosophers.6 Neither does it say anything about the 
more formal form of self-consciousness, mentioned above, which we 
also have of being one diachronically existing entity, and which we 
cannot just assume to be constituted by an awareness of our specific 
psychological history. In subsequent chapters, I will return to how the 
unity of consciousness, which Parfit describes, and the formal self-
consciousness relate to one another, and what this can mean for how 
our idea of personal identity is constituted. Here, I constrain myself to 
explaining how the nature of psychological unity, as conceived by 
                                                 
6 About these phenomena, Parfit says that they belong to one state of 
consciousness, which implies that they belong to one subject, but not that they 
belong to one person (Parfit 1984, pp. 248-252). According to Parfit, one cannot 
maintain that all these experiences are united, as long as one person can say ‘they 
are mine’. This would ignore the fact that persons sometimes have a divided mind. 
These persons have different streams of consciousness, which are in themselves 
united, but through which they are not aware of the other stream. Explaining the 
unity in these respective streams of consciousness, by saying that they are both mine, 
would make them into one, and ignore the possibility that “in having each of these 
two sets of experiences, I am unaware of having the other” (Ibid, p. 249). I will return 
to the possibility that one person has different streams of consciousness. It is real 
and, for instance, the case for epilepsy patients, whose right and left hemisphere are 
operationally split, to minimize to impact of their seizures. These patients can 
become aware of something through their right hemisphere, of which the 
consciousness produced by their left hemisphere remains unconscious. 
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Parfit, proves – again according to Parfit – that identity is not what 
matters in the ontological analysis of persons. 
A first evidence for Parfit, in this regard, is the fact that 
psychological connectedness, which suffices to constitute personal 
‘identity,’ is a matter of degree. Parfit reasons as follows. When there 
has to be a sufficient degree of psychological connectedness between 
person-stages so as to attribute them to numerically the same person, 
but there is no precise number which indicates how many connections 
constitute a sufficient degree, we may in some cases not know whether 
certain person-stages belong to the same person or not. Parfit (Ibid, 
pp. 213-214, 233) says not to worry about these borderline cases. 
While we in these cases cannot decide whether two person-stages are 
to be attributed to the same person or not, we still know everything 
there is to know about these cases. We know which ontological 
elements and relations we have in front of us. Given that identity is 
never a further fact than a sufficient degree of these relations, knowing 
that identity is involved, would not add anything to our ontological 
knowledge of the world. In our ontological analysis of this case 
identity is not what matters. Moreover, if we for one reason or another 
choose to decide whether or not numerical identity is still involved in 
these borderline cases, then identity would still not matter. The choice 
would be arbitrary (Ibid, p. 241). An identity arbitrarily attributed is 




CH 1: What Constitutes Our Numerical Identity? 
[33] 
2.1.2 The unimportance of personal identity: identity is not what 
matters in our concern to survive 
 
Parfit’s phrase ‘identity is not what matters’ does not only say 
something about his view on the nature of personal identity (which 
proves to be reducible to a set of other relations). It also summarizes 
his view on the importance of personal identity. Parfit (1984, pp. 261-
263, 272, 279, 309; 1995, p. 15; 2007) denies that the continuation of 
our unique personal existence is what really matters in our concern for 
survival. He argues that, when we think about it rationally, we will see 
that all we should really care about when we care about survival (be it 
our own or that of someone else), is the continuation of psychological 
continuity (1984, pp. 215, 216, 262, 263, 272, 292, 313; 1995; 2007). 
Parfit reasons that the psychological characteristics of someone 
provoke our love for and attachment to him in the first place. If the 
memory of this person is maintained and the character that typifies 
him only changes gradually, then we can expect that he will continue 
to pursue the projects that are important to him and to us.7 
                                                 
7 More than twenty years after having published Reasons and Persons, Parfit 
(2007) admitted that this reasoning was too hasty and that he should distinguish our 
desire to merely survive from our desire to survive in what we consider to be a good 
way. He repeats that we can wish for a survival, in which psychological continuity is 
preserved because of the reasons here mentioned, but he admits that we can also have 
an interest in survival tout court. According to Parfit (2007) we want others to survive 
because of their specific qualities, while our desire to personally survive is not 
necessarily based on, or reducible to, a wish that some of our projects or qualities do 
not go extinct. We can just not want to die. This is an interesting line of thought, 
which I will explore further in this dissertation. However, here it only deserves a 
footnote, because it does not profoundly change Parfit’s thoughts about what matters 
in survival. He continues to defend that personal identity is not what matters in our 
survival because persons can be reduced to a set of other relations. 
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There are several reasons why this psychological continuity does 
not imply identity. The first is that the unity of consciousness, which 
is constituted by this psychological continuity, does not stay identical, 
but can be present to a greater or lesser degree (1984, pp. 231, 298-
299; 1995). There can be more or fewer memories, bigger or smaller 
changes in character or knowledge, more or less acting on previous 
intentions, etc.. Secondly, Parfit contends that this psychological 
continuity could, in principle, branch, split like an amoeba, or be 
downloaded from the current brain and nervous system and then again 
be uploaded in one or more other bodies (1984, pp. 245-248, 254-260, 
262, 266, 269-270, 299-302). In each of these scenario’s, distinct 
concurrent beings, which find themselves at different places and are 
psychological continuous with one previous being, would come into 
existence. In spite of their continuity with one previous being, these 
beings would not be numerically identical with one another. 
 
 
2.1.3 Parfit’s claims regarding the nature and importance of 
personal identity are different, but related 
 
Parfit (D Parfit April 8th 2010, personal communication) insists that 
his claims about the nature of personal identity should be 
distinguished from his claims about its importance. The former view 
is supposed to merely follow from his reductionism and argument for 
reductionism and in no way to be determined by his view of what 
matters in personal identity. 
However, Parfit (1984, p. 216) explains that if someone accepts his 
claims about the nature of personal identity, rational thinking requires 
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him to also accept his claims about the importance of personal identity: 
if we do not hold that persons are separately existing entities, but 
instead that they can be reduced to some physical matter and 
psychological continuities which continue in degrees, then we should 




2.2 Parfit’s insight 
 
Even though Parfit argues that psychological continuity really is, 
and should be, what we value when we seem to value identity, he does 
not make the same mistake as Locke. While Parfit recognizes that we 
consider psychological states and continuity to be important for the 
beings whom we call persons (1984, pp. 215, 216, 262, 263, 272, 292, 
313), he denies – in contrast with Locke – that these states and 
continuity also constitute the numerical identity of persons. He even 
explains why we are, in fact, mistaken when we think to here be 
concerned with a certain identity (cfr. the matter of degree and 
branching). Herewith, Parfit clearly distinguishes the question of the 




                                                 
8 Parfit also explicitly draws this distinction. See, for example, Parfit 1984, pp. 
201-202, Parfit 1995, pp. 13-14 and Parfit 2012. 
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2.3 Parfit’s confusion 
 
However, Parfit only distinguishes the questions of numerical and 
qualitative identity at that very moment, i.e. at the moment where he 
identifies the qualities that we value in a person and explains why these 
qualities are no guarantee for the numerical identity of a person. He 
confounds them in the remainder of his discussion of personal identity 
where he assumes that if something is to constitute personal identity, 
this must be a quality that is of clear importance and value to the 
person. This becomes clear when he does not truly consider an 
alternative for psychological continuity as a potential constituent of 
the person. 
This is, for instance, illustrated by his discussion of a human being 
who changes gradually, psychologically speaking (Parfit 1984, pp. 
231-233). Parfit claims that this being could no longer be the same 
person at the end of the spectrum of psychological changes. Here, he 
assumes that it is the psyche, clearly important for a person and his 
qualitative identity that also constitutes him as a numerically identical 
person. With regard to the same case, Parfit says that a person cannot 
become a different person, if only some of his memories fade, or 
characteristics change (Ibid). Hereby, he assumes that such small 
changes are not important enough to a person, so as to change his 
identity. 
Parfit further confounds the questions of numerical and qualitative 
identity, when the fact that the set of psychological relations that 
constitutes the person is not determinate, makes him conclude that 
personal identity is not determinate (Parfit 1984, p. 279; 1995, pp. 21-
22). This is also the case when he derives, from the same fact, that we 
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should not care about identity when we care about survival (Parfit 
1984, pp. 261-263, 272). Parfit does not consider that another element, 
which is not (or less) important for the qualitative identity of a person, 
could constitute personal identity and make it determinate.  
Parfit does shortly examine whether the body could help constitute 
the person, but he only seriously considers the potential role of the 
brain (Parfit 1984, pp. 204, 253-255, 269-271, 284) in as far as it helps 
constitute the psyche, which characterizes the person as type and 
token. 
In all these cases, Parfit assumes that only qualities that we value 
in persons can constitute personal identity and make it determinate. 
He concludes that if the psychological continuity which we value in 
persons cannot constitute numerical identity, then personal identity 
cannot be what matters – be it ontologically, or to us personally. He 
does not consider that something that we at first sight do not value 
that highly in a person could potentially constitute his numerical 
identity. By not taking this possibility into account, Parfit in fact lets 
his view of the nature of personal identity be determined by what he 
takes to be important for our survival. 
By concluding that personal identity, as such, cannot matter truly, 
Parfit fails to account for the fact that we can wish to survive, even 
when we do not know whether we will continue to have any of the 
qualities which we currently value in ourselves.9 So, he for instance 
fails to account for the existing wish of some persons never to have 
euthanasia done to them, regardless of in which living state they may 
                                                 
9 Parfit (2007) actually discovers this later, but does not revise his metaphysical 
positions because of it. I think that he should. 
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one day find themselves. These persons are concerned about the 
potential future being who would be numerically identical to them, not 
about a being who would have the same qualities as those they value 
now in themselves. 
In the following chapter, I will examine whether elements, other 
than the ones we value most in persons, could help constitute our idea 
of their numerical identity and, if so, which elements these could be. 
Here, I foremost wish to point out that there is one sense of ‘identity 
is not what matters’ for which Parfit does not account. There is a 
possibility that our idea of personal identity is constituted by 
something that we do not value and therefore not by what matters 
(most) to us. Given the fact that Parfit explicitly mentions different 
interpretations of the idea that identity is not what matters to us, it is 
quite surprising that he does not consider this one. Just as Locke, 
Parfit immediately assumes that we are only prepared to say that a 
person stays numerically the same, as long as he does not lose a specific 
set of those qualities that we value most in a person. This makes Parfit 
not truly consider that the elements constitutive of the qualitative and 
numerical identity of persons may differ. 
 
 
3. Bernard Williams 
 
Bernard Williams is the other major protagonist in the 
contemporary debate about personal identity. Like Parfit, Williams, at 
one point, draws attention to the fact that the preservation of the 
numerical identity of a person and the preservation of qualities, which 
characterize a particular personality, do not always go hand in hand. 
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He uses a thought-experiment to illustrate this (Williams 1973b, pp. 
51-52). In this thought-experiment, Williams asks us to imagine that 
someone will torture us. He sketches different set-ups for this torture. 
We should think about whether we would personally fear this torture 
in all cases. In a first scenario, the torturer tells us in advance that we 
will lose the memory of the prediction of the torture before the actual 
torture. Later, he adds that we will in fact lose all our memories before 
the torture. In a third script, he says that after losing all our memories 
and before the torture, we will get the impression that we had a 
different past than we actually had. There is a twist in a last scenario, 
where the torturer tells us that these new impressions that we will 
have, will be of events that will already have been experienced by 
another person. Williams predicts that we will fear the torture in all 
these cases and that we will in every case think that we are the ones 
who would be tortured. The fact that we lose all our memories and get 
other apparent memories instead does not change this. From this, 
Williams concludes that we behave as if our numerical identity is not 
constituted by psychological characteristics and continuity, but 
instead by one particular body. 
Yet, like Parfit, Williams soon forgets what is special in this finding. 
He forgets that we can identify a person as numerically the same by 
means of her body as token, even though this body does not capture 
anything about the particular character of a person; i.e. even though it 
does not capture anything about what we often consider to be relevant 
about a person. This becomes clear in his analysis of a second thought-
experiment. 
In this thought-experiment, Williams asks us whether, when we are 
in love with someone, we would be as happy to continue our lives with 
CH 1: What Constitutes Our Numerical Identity? 
[40] 
her exact duplicate (Williams 1973c, p. 81). According to Williams, 
the answer here is ‘no.’ From this, he justifiably concludes that the 
body is crucial for the identity of our beloved. We only consider her as 
our beloved as long as she has the same material history. Williams 
correctly remarks that we, in this case, follow a person through a body-
token and not through a body-type (Ibid). If it would be the body-type 
of our beloved that made us attached to her, then we should be as 
happy to continue our lives with her duplicate: this duplicate has 
exactly the same type of body as our beloved has.  
However, from this second thought-experiment, Williams wrongly 
concludes that it is not “a deep metaphysical error” to say that loving 
a person and loving a body is basically the same (Ibid). From the fact 
that we identify a person through her body, Williams derives that this 
body must also be what we value most in her. This is not necessarily 
the case. We may identify someone as numerically the same, yet no 
longer like her because she changed qualitatively. In this case, we 
would value other characteristics higher than the body, which 
constitutes her numerical identity. And even when part of our love for 
someone stems from the particular history that we shared with her – 
a particular history that no duplicate, but only a being materially 
continuous with her can have –, her material continuity as such need 
not be what we love in her. We may love her because she was mentally 
there for us in the past. In this case, we could judge that she was only 
there mentally, because she was there physically. So, we could 
recognize that the real foundation of her numerical identity is physical, 
all the while, what we value in this person, are her mental qualities, for 
which her physical composition and history allowed. 
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In a likely and more favorable reading, Williams’s way of 
formulating things is just unfortunate. By saying that it is not a deep 
metaphysical error to say that loving a person and loving a body is 
basically the same, he may just mean that, in order for a particular 
person (for instance, whom we have loved for three years and 
counting), to still be there, she must be materially continuous with that 
particular person, whom we fell in love with three years ago. He may 
mean that in order for someone to still be the same, she must have the 
same body. If asked about it, he could regret expressing this by saying 
that we in this case just love a person’s body, and reformulate it by 
saying that, what we here love, is the same person, who can only be 
the same, if she also has the same body. This would be in line with 
what he tried to make clear with the other thought-experiment: we can 
consider ourselves and others as the same person, as long as we have 
the same body. Unfortunately, he used another, more ambiguous, 
formulation that expresses the occurring confusion that, what 
constitutes the numerical identity of persons, must be something that 
we value in them. Throughout this chapter, I have tried to show that 
this thought, in its turn, can lead to the mistaken idea that the 
numerical and qualitative identity of persons must necessarily be 
constituted by the same elements. 
 
 
II. WHAT I WILL DO 
 
In what follows, I will continue to distinguish the question of what 
constitutes the numerical identity of persons from that of what 
constitutes their qualitative identity. I will examine whether there are 
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elements constitutive of our numerical identity of which the relevance 
for our qualitative identity is not immediately evident. 
Before embarking upon this exploration, it is important to say 
something about the kind of exploration to which it belongs. It is not 
a phenomenology in the Husserlian or Kantian sense. I do not in the 
first place describe an experience of personal identity as it is always or 
cannot but be experienced. Neither will it be a primordially conceptual 
analysis. Above all, it will be an anthropology. I wish to analyze and 
describe how we factually think about diachronic personal identity.
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CHAPTER 2:  
THE MENTAL FAILS TO CONSTITUTE 
DIACHRONIC PERSONAL IDENTITY 
 
My reason for separating the questions of what constitutes the 
numerical and qualitative identity of persons is twofold. I mentioned 
the first in the previous chapter: numerical and qualitative identity are 
distinct. We know that objects can be qualitatively identical, while not 
being numerically identical, as well as that one object can remain 
numerically identical while changing qualitatively. This is the case for 
persons as well: identical twins look alike, but are not numerically the 
same; and a conservative grandfather can be numerically identical to, 
though not qualitatively identical with, a young revolutionary man of 
50 years earlier. Given the distinction between the numerical and 
qualitative identity of persons, we cannot presume that their 
constitutive elements are the same. Secondly, it has proven to be 
difficult to demonstrate that elements constitutive of the qualitative 
identity of persons also constitute their numerical identity. This makes 
it interesting to investigate whether the numerical identity of persons 
cannot have other constituents.  
In this chapter, I will describe some of the difficulties that 
philosophers, such as Derek Parfit and David Hume, encounter in 
trying to justify that relations that have a crucial role in upholding a 
person’s qualitative identity, also constitute his numerical identity. I 
will subsequently formulate an alternative proposal as to what could 
constitute a person’s numerical identity. 
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I. NON-BRANCHED PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY 
 
Relations, such as those of memory and resemblance, between 
different instances and expressions of a person’s psyche, have a major 
role in the constitution of her qualitative identity. The less a person 
remembers, behaves in concordance with the same predictable 
character, and cherishes the same wishes and projects, the harder it is 
for us to recognize her as the same character or, in other words, as 
qualitatively the same person as before. This is, for instance, illustrated 
by our perception of an elderly person who does not only forget more 
and more, but who is also angry for reasons and in ways we never 
witnessed before. About him we may say that it is hard to relate to him 
as we used to, since not much seems left of the character we once loved. 
Yet, while memory and the resemblance of psychological character can 
make or break the qualitative identity of a person, we cannot extend 
this and say, as Parfit did, that psychological connections constitute 
the numerical identity of a person – not even if one specifies, like Parfit, 
that this requires a sufficient degree of continuously overlapping 
chains of psychological connections, as well as that this continuous 
stream does not branch. In the remainder of this section, I will explain 
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1. There is insufficient evidence for us to believe in the 
existence of psychological continuity 
 
To defensibly claim that psychological continuity constitutes our 
idea of the numerical identity of a person, we should perceive either 
this psychological continuity, or elements that make us believe that 
this psychological continuity exists. Yet, as David Hume already 
observed, there is neither a real connection between all the 
impressions, thoughts and behaviour that we ascribe to one self, nor is 
it clear which other relation or apparent relation between these 
psychological elements could make us think that there is such real 
connection. Let’s retrace Hume’s reasoning here. 
In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume wonders why our 
imagination forms the idea that we have one diachronic identity.10 
                                                 
10 This is, in fact, a controversial claim. There are two main interpretations 
regarding the aim of Hume’s account of personal identity, as well as his subsequent 
problem with this account. Don Garrett (1981) and Susan Mendus (1980) hold that 
Hume tries to determine what selves are, and then finds out that there is a problem 
with his ontological description of these selves. Galen Strawson (2011) is convinced 
that Hume is more interested in the working of our imagination and cannot find out 
what gives someone the idea that he is both a synchronically unified and 
diachronically existing self. Although both Hume’s section on personal identity and 
its appendix begin with some ontological claims about the self and the mind, his text 
validates the latter interpretation. Hume examines how, given certain ontological 
facts, the imagination still forms the idea that we are a self with a synchronic unity 
and a diachronic existence. I will underline his quotes to illustrate this. The italics 
are Hume’s. 
The ontological facts are that selves “are nothing but a bundle or collection of 
different perceptions” (Hume 1978, I.iv.6, p. 253), and that the mind “is a kind of 
theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance” (Ibid, I.iv.6, 
p. 254), but that “[t]here is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in 
different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and 
identity” (Ibid, I.iv.6, p. 254). 
What follows is this question: “What then gives us so great a propension to 
ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest 
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Two observations lead up to this question. First, Hume notices that 
some philosophers have the idea that each of us is a self who persists 
through time (Hume 1978, I.iv.6, p. 251). Secondly, he assumes that all 
ideas are derived from impressions. He looks for the impression of this 
persisting self, but cannot find it. For Hume, the mind “is a kind of 
theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance” 
(Ibid, p. 254), but in which he can find “no simplicity … at one time, nor 
identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to 
imagine that simplicity and identity” (Ibid). We do, indeed, have many 
unrelated thoughts and they change constantly. From these 
observations, Hume’s question follows: if there is no such impression, 
how then does the idea of being a persisting self originate? Hume 
continued to believe that we must derive this idea by seeing something 
in our psychological content. This is shown by his assumption that our 
idea of being a diachronically existing entity must stem from our idea 
that there is identity in our perceptions: “What then gives us so great 
a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to 
suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence 
                                                 
of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro’ the whole course of our lives?” 
(Ibid, I.iv.6, p. 253)  
In his appendix, Hume, again, first addresses an ontological question: “Is self the 
same with substance?” (Ibid, Appendix, p. 635) He says that this question does not 
really make sense, because, with regard to the mind, we have, in any case, no evidence 
of self or substance distinct from the particular perceptions. Hume has no problem 
with this answer of his: “So far I seem to be attended with sufficient evidence.” (Ibid). 
He only worries about how the imagination then forms the idea of a self: “But having 
thus loosen’d all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle 
of connexion, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real 
simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective”. (Ibid) A bit 
later, he says “the thought alone finds personal identity” (Ibid) Again, he explains 
what makes him despair: “But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the 
principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness” 
(Ibid, pp. 635-636). 
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thro’ the whole course of our lives” (Ibid, p. 253, my italics)? Hume 
initially answers his own question by saying that there are different 
relations, which are not themselves relations of identity, but the 
perception of which can make us feign that there is an identical object 
– in this case, a self. He identifies these relations as those of 
resemblance, causality and contiguity (Ibid, pp. 254-260), but specifies 
that it is evident that contiguity does not have a part in the 
constitution of our idea of personal identity. According to Hume, the 
observation of resemblance and the assumption of causality suffice for 
this particular constitution (Ibid, p. 260). 
How do they give us the idea that we are one identical subject with 
an uninterrupted existence? According to Hume, resemblance and 
causality are such relations that they spontaneously make our mind 
associate distinct perceptions with one another (Ibid, p. 254). When 
we have a perception that resembles an earlier one, this makes us 
automatically think of this earlier perception. When we perceive 
something that might be a consequence of something earlier perceived, 
this earlier event automatically comes to our mind again. Hume states 
that, because these spontaneous associations make us think back so fast 
from a later, to a distinct earlier perception, we often ignore the small 
differences between these perceptions and take them to be similar 
(Ibid). As images resemble the object they are images of (Ibid, p. 260), 
we subsequently take them to be images of the same object. When we 
realize that there was, in fact, a difference between the perceptions we 
confounded with one another, we try to justify our thought that these 
perceptions were of the same identical object by feigning that there is 
either a specific, or still unknown mysterious, connection between 
what we have perceived that must make these perceptions, perceptions 
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of one object (Ibid, pp. 254-255). Our idea of identity is, in these cases, 
a fiction, because it does not correspond to an impression of a real 
identical object, but is something we feign to justify our thought that 
qualitatively different perceptions are perceptions of one identical 
object. As far as the fiction of personal identity is concerned, Hume 
attributes a major role to memory in its production and discovery. He 
says that memory produces this fiction, because it produces the 
resemblances between perceptions, which makes us think that they are 
completely similar and must thus be of the same object: 
“suppose we cou’d see clearly into the breast of another, and observe 
that succession of perceptions, which constitutes his mind or 
thinking principle, and suppose that he always preserves the 
memory of a considerable part of past perceptions; ‘ tis evident that 
nothing cou’d more contribute to the bestowing a relation on this 
succession amidst all its variations. For what is the memory but a 
faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? And 
as an image necessarily resembles its object, must not the frequent 
placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, 
convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and 
make the whole seem like the continuance of one object” (Ibid, pp. 
260-261)? 
Hume then assumes that we confabulate personal identity when we 
experience something of which we later also have memories. The 
reason is that these experiences and memories seems so similar that 
this makes us imagine that they must be of the same object, i.e. of the 
same perception. According to Hume, our memory further discovers 
personal identity, because it allows us to recall two distinct ideas and 
so to imagine that there is a causal link between them and that they 
must thus belong to one mechanism (Ibid, p. 261). This explains why 
we can judge that a person is still numerically the same, even when his 
character changed. We could recall an event that made him change 
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character and so still think of him as the same person. Once memory 
lets us discover that a person can be the same, even though we have a 
different perception of him, as long as the difference in his appearance 
can be explained by a cause that made him change, this can also make 
us imagine that we were a person of whom we no longer have any 
memories (Ibid, p. 262). For this, it suffices that we imagine that there 
are causal links between how we are now and how we were then. How 
we think and behave now, could be explained by how we thought then, 
and by what we experienced in between. 
Yet, in the appendix of his treatise, Hume rightfully admits that 
something is missing in his analysis of the constitution of our idea of 
personal identity, if it is to be an analysis of what constitutes our 
numerical diachronic identity: it does not explain what motivates the 
imagination to connect certain impressions in such a way that this 
makes us assume that there is one persisting self (Ibid, Appendix, pp. 
635-636). The fact that we perceive resemblances or assume causality 
between different impressions does not really explain this, because we 
also assume that all these impressions could occur without being 
related to one another (Ibid, p. 634 and p. 636). It is not because I have 
an impression at time 2 that resembles an impression at time 1, or 
could have been caused by an impression at time 1, that my impression 
at time 2 depends on my impression at time 1. I could have the latter 
impression without having the former. Something more is needed to 
make us think that these two events are indeed connected to one 
another. But in what this something more could consist, remains 
unclear. 
There is nothing in the propositional content of thoughts that 
refers uniquely to one person. In principle, different persons can have 
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the same thought, propositionally speaking. Nor do the different 
thoughts one has necessarily induce each other: one specific thought 
can lead to many different thoughts, or just not induce another 
thought at all. 
Following one self through his character alone is impossible for 
similar reasons. First, different persons can have the same character. 
Secondly, it is not possible to entirely predict how one character will 
develop and thus to derive from one or more character traits which 
past or future person someone is numerically identical to. We are not 
cartoon figures who stick to a specific role. There are different possible 
ways for us to develop ourselves and we can suddenly do something 
unexpected. 
Nor are there other promising psychological relations that could 
themselves, either connect all the thoughts and conscious experiences 
we ascribe to ourselves, or give us the impression that they are 
connected in this way. The often suggested relation of memory is no 
such relation. We ascribe more experiences to ourselves than we can 
ever reach through memory. We, for instance, say that we were once 
a baby, dreamt a dream to which we no longer have access, or fainted. 
All the while we had experiences as a baby, in dreams, and moments 
before we fainted, which we never remembered – not even right after 
we had them. 
The feeling of mineness of experiences has also been suggested as 
an aspect of our experiences that can make us ascribe a particular set 
of experiences to one self. Every experience which someone feels to be 
his, would then be his. The Danish philosopher Erich Klawonn (1987) 
held that this feeling is what individuates us. He argues that if we 
imagine that we step into a machine and two completely similar 
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persons step out of the machine, of the similar persons, we would claim 
to be the one with whom we share the feeling of mineness. In other 
words, according to Klawonn, I would be the one who experiences his 
experiences as his, just as I now experience my experiences as mine. 
Klawonn’s reasoning is problematic. It leaves a question 
unanswered. How could one compare the feeling of mineness one once 
had with the feeling of mineness one currently has and, from this, 
derive whom of the two duplicates one is? Such a conclusion cannot be 
based on this feeling alone, since the feeling of mineness of experiences 
is the same for both duplicates. All subjects, whom we call mentally 
healthy, experience their experiences as their own. Both duplicates will 
thus experience their experiences as their own. But that would be all 
that there is to it. This feeling does not have any other particular 
colour that is identical to, and individuates, the feeling of mineness I 
had before stepping into the machine. My feeling that my experiences 
are mine does not feel different than how the same kind of feeling feels 
to others. I can, therefore, not ascribe an experience to one self or even 
to myself, just because it felt like being the subject’s, in a similar way 
to how my feelings now feel like they are the subject’s, i.e. mine. It is 
no solution to say ‘as long as I still experience a feeling as mine, it is 
mine’ – and to so avoid having to compare two distinct feelings of 
mineness, i.e. a current and an earlier one. For, as I described above, 
we ascribe experiences to ourselves to which we no longer have access, 
not even through memory. If I cannot access them, I can neither access 
their taste of being mine. 
Given that it remains unclear in what psychological continuity 
could consist, we cannot defensibly maintain that the observation of 
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real or apparent psychological continuity constitutes our idea of being 
one diachronic self. 
 
 
2. Our impressions, thoughts and behaviour do not all 
belong to one continuous psychological stream 
 
Apart from it being difficult to see in what the psychological 
continuity, which would constitute personal identity, could consist, 
psychological connectedness and continuity are not what we should be 
looking for, when we examine where our idea of personal identity 
comes from. The claim that a psychological continuity made of an at-
all-times sufficient degree of interconnected psychological connections 
is necessary, and, with the criterion of non-branchedness added, 
sufficient for the constitution of numerical personal identity does not 
account for how we actually ascribe personal identity. In real life, we 
are prepared to consider a being as one numerically identical person, 
even when he has thoughts that are in no way connected to one 
another and that can thus not belong to one psychologically 
continuous chain. We constantly have such thoughts. One example 
can be that of a person in mourning who suddenly sees something 
funny that makes her laugh. Her observation of whatever was comedic 
is then in no way connected to the thought that makes her mourn. Still, 
we attribute both the sadness and the comic experience to the same 
person. We do so without feeling that we should, in principal, check 
whether there are other psychological links between the person who 
laughs and the one that mourned just a moment ago. 
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3. We attribute numerical identity to persons with 
branched streams of consciousness 
  
Lastly, non-branching psychological continuity is not what we 
should be looking for either, when we examine what makes us re-
identify someone as numerical identical. Parfit reasons that the 
numerical identity of a person is lost as soon as his earlier stream of 
consciousness branches (Parfit 1984, pp. 256-257). If branch B and C 
branched off A, they would start to consist of distinct experiences and 
thus not be identical to one another. Consequently, we can neither say 
that they are identical to the original stream A, with which they are 
psychological continuous. For, if B is identical to A, and C is identical 
to A, then B and C would have to be identical to one another, but this 
is not the case. Locke, too, claimed that the consciousness, with which 
we remember something now must be the same as the consciousness, 
with which we first experienced the event (Locke 1996, II.xxvii.9, p. 
138). Yet, two problems arise here. 
First, it is unclear how psychological elements themselves could 
guarantee that a certain psychological continuity will not branch. 
Parfit admitted that they cannot. According to Parfit (1984, pp. 199-
200), we could theoretically copy one psychological history, transfer 
this to two different bodies and then let them each further develop in 
their own way, giving rise to two different entities. Parfit also refers 
to the real case of split brain patients. These are patients, of whom the 
connection between their hemispheres was cut and whose 
consciousness produced by the one hemisphere subsequently has no 
access to the consciousness produced by the other. One could say that, 
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what Parfit calls ‘psychological continuity’, branched here: there was 
one psychological ‘continuity’ before the cut and two branches of this 
‘continuity’ after. If psychological continuity cannot guarantee non-
branching and non-branching is a criterion for personal identity, then 
there must be another element than psychological continuity itself that 
helps to constitute personal identity. 
This is, however, not the conclusion that Parfit draws. He maintains 
that personal numerical identity only stays preserved when there is an 
unbranched psychological continuity, which is made up of a sufficient 
degree of psychological connections and does not add another element 
(outside of the psychological realm), which would have to prevent this 
continuity from branching. Instead, he argues that the continuation of 
personal identity is not what really matters to us when we want 
someone to survive. What we value in a person’s survival are the 
continuation of his projects and character, which his psychological 
continuity makes predictable (Parfit 1984, pp. 261-263, 271). Given 
that this psychological continuity never guarantees non-branching 
and thus numerical identity, it would be rational for us just to care 
about the continuation of a psychological stream, regardless of a 
numerical identity, which it in, any case, does not guarantee. I disagree 
with Parfit’s conclusions in this matter. First, identity does matter to 
us. We sometimes have the wish to finish projects ourselves, as well as 
the wish that others live long enough to personally witness how one 
of their dreams comes true. Secondly, Parfit’s assumption that non-
branched psychological continuity is what we look for, when we 
examine what could constitute personal identity, is mistaken. This is 
also the second problem with advancing non-branched psychological 
continuity as a criterion for the numerical identity of persons. In 
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reality, we do attribute branched streams of consciousness to one self. 
This emerges, for instance, from the experiments that Gazzaniga 
performed on split brain patients. 
In the beginning of the fifties of the previous century, R.W. 
Sperring and Ronald E. Myers discovered, how when the cerebrum is 
surgically divided by cutting the corpus callosum connection between 
the two hemispheres, the brain seems to contain two separate spheres 
of consciousness. When one performs tests on a subject with such a 
brain, one can see how the left hemisphere processes information, to 
which the right hemisphere has no access, and vice versa. Michael 
Gazzaniga (1967) gives some clear examples of this in ‘The Split Brain 
of Man.’ Together with Sperring, Gazzaniga examined this 
phenomenon in human subjects, whose connections between the two 
hemispheres were cut in a (successful) attempt to reduce the impact of 
an epileptic seizure. They first presented ten of these patients with a 
ray of light which passed through their left visual field (where the 
information is processed by the right hemisphere), and through their 
right visual field (where the information is processed in their left 
hemisphere) (Gazzaniga 1967, pp. 24-25). The patients reported that 
they saw light flashes when these passed through their right visual 
field, yet denied that they saw them when they passed through their 
left visual field. At first sight, it might seem as if these patients are 
partially blind, but this proved not to be the case. In fact, the patients 
also saw the flashes in their left visual field. When asked to point them 
out, they could. They were just unable to verbally report them, because 
the information about these light flashes was processed by their right 
hemisphere, while their ability to speak is mainly governed by their 
left hemisphere. The following situation then presents itself: when 
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light flashes appear in the patient’s left visual field, he may verbally 
deny that he sees them, while pointing them out. There then appear to 
be two separate streams of consciousness: one, in which there is 
awareness of the flashlights and the will to point them out, and 
another, in which there is no awareness of the flashlights and the will 
to deny that any flashlights are seen. 
The relevant point of this phenomenon for what I previously said 
is what follows. When these patients are confronted with their 
radically opposing answers, they try to explain them in such a way 
that they can still appropriate them both. One case, described by 
Gazzaniga, (1967, p. 29) is that of a woman whose right hemisphere 
made her chuckle after it made her see that the experimenters suddenly 
let a nude appear in her left visual field. She would never say that she 
saw this nude, because her left hemisphere, which is the one that allows 
her to say anything, did not make her see this nude. When the 
experimenters asked this woman why she chuckled, she therefore 
hesitated for one moment, but then said ‘because of this funny 
machine’, indicating a machine that was shown in her right visual field. 
The hemisphere which makes her say that this machine is funny, in 
fact, never made her experience this machine as funny. Still, the lady 
assumes that she thought that this machine was funny, seemingly 
because she assumes that the body, which chuckled, was hers and that 
she must thus have been chuckling about something. Split brain-
patients then seem to appropriate experiences because they were 
processed by one body that they consider to be theirs, not because they 
have an inner mental access to them, and regardless of whether this 
implies that they are the subject of multiple branched streams of 
consciousness. 
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This is confirmed by another case described by Gazzaniga (Ibid, p. 
27), in which the experimenter asked a patient, who processed a red 
light flash with his right hemisphere, what the light flash was like. The 
patient had to use his left hemisphere to answer verbally, but this 
hemisphere had not processed the light flash. So the patient guessed 
and said that the light flash was green. His right hemisphere made him 
hear what he just said and realize that this was wrong. As a 
consequence the patient frowned. Now, the patient’s left hemisphere 
made him observe this frown. As a result, the patient corrected himself 
and said ‘no, I saw a red light.’ Here again, the patient did not ascribe 
an experience to himself because he had an inner, private mental access 
to one unified stream of consciousness, but rather because he observed 
a meaningful reaction of a body he considers to be his. 
If psychological connections, which are important for the 
qualitative identity of persons, cannot constitute numerical personal 
identity by forming a continuous and unbranched chain, which would 
be necessary to constitute the diachronic and unique existence of this 
one person, one or more other elements must help constitute our idea 
of such an identity. In the remaining part of this thesis, I will argue 
that our body, considered as mere material token, has an important 
role in this constitution: we only call those persons numerically 
identical who live through one continuous body. In the remaining part 
of this chapter, I give some first factual evidence in support of this 
thesis; enumerate some elements that make the body – compared to 
psychological continuity – into a more evident constituent of the 
numerical identity of persons; and indicate, in which kind of self-
consciousness we could indeed identify a self through its materially 
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continuous body. The coming chapters will further extricate the here 
just briefly forwarded thesis. 
 
 
II. A ROLE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF OUR NUMERICAL 
IDENTITY FOR OUR EXISTENCE AS MATERIAL 
ENTITIES 
 
1. Factual evidence 
 
There is factual evidence that supports the claim that we judge that 
persons who live through one continuous body are numerically 
identical. For instance, if a never-convicted World War II Nazi officer 
is now discovered, but he happens to have amnesia and he happens to 
be a very kind person now, then we may choose to no longer legally 
convict him for the crimes he committed as a young officer. Still, 
newspapers and biographers of the person retrieved will write that he 
once was a Nazi officer and now suffers from amnesia.  All that links 
him to this officer is the body he has now: it developed out of the body 
of the Nazi officer, i.e. it is materially continuous with it. Apparently, 
in biographies (and autobiographies alike), we include, as actions in the 
subject’s life, everything done with the consciousness produced by a 
body continuous with his current body; even, and often especially, that 
which is foreign to his general way of behaving. This does not change 
when the current subject can no longer identify himself with these 
actions, or no longer remembers them. Family members of amnesia 
patients can treat these according to a similar logic. The personality 
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of some amnesia patients changes in such a way that some relatives 
decide to no longer communicate with them. They stop rendering 
visits to a person who they no longer recognize. Still, these same 
relatives would notify their acquaintances of the fact that their mother, 
or a particular person with the name ‘X’ died, when this amnesia 
patient died. They then assume that the person they once knew and 
loved was somehow still there until her last breath – even if she was, 
at that point, just materially continuous with the person she was before 
and no longer psychologically similar or connected to this earlier 
person. Other examples indicate that the same can be the case when 
we attribute identity to ourselves. When my mother shows me a 
beautiful painting that, according to her, I made as a child, I can feel 
proud of it, as well as regret that I have lost a talent I once had. I then 
acknowledge that I once was this painter, even if there is no 
psychological connection between my current self and the earlier 
painter. I can acknowledge that I am a person, on the basis of the 
testimony of others who witnessed, from the outside, how I was 
physically present at a particular past event. Just like this, I can 
acknowledge, on the basis of video-images, that I have broken a vase 
when I stumbled drunk into the house, even if I had a blackout soon 
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2. Characteristics of the body that render it suitable to 
constitute the numerical identity of persons 
 
The body also has certain characteristics that render it more 
suitable than the psyche to function as a criterion for the numerical 
identity of a person. A first advantage of the body, in this regard, is 
that it is clearer in what its continuity exists. At one particular time, it 
is always at one particular place and, if you trace it, there are no gaps 
between these places. Even if you are not always aware of this body or 
its place, you know that it is somewhere. A machine could track it 
constantly and tell you where it was at any given time. At any one 
moment in time, all its actual parts are physically connected to one 
another, meaning that they are either immediately attached to one 
another, or through other cells, which are themselves part of the body. 
Throughout time, some cells of the body die, while others are 
generated. Yet, if we would film the body uninterrupted with 
microscopic cameras, we would see that every cell it has, developed 
from, or is kept alive by, other cells which are part of the body, i.e. by 
cells that are themselves organically and physically connected to the 
other cells of the body. I mention ‘or are kept alive,’ to allow for the 
possibility that transplanted tissue or organs can also become part of 
one continuous body. A former, or later, body part can, at one point, 
be organically and physically separated from a physical body, of which 
it is a part at other times, but it is only part of one continuous body for 
as long as it is still physically attached to it and organically kept alive 
by other parts of it. Of course, our observation of physical continuity 
may be fallacious. We can think that we observe physical continuity 
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because we see a particular body now, at a place very close to the place 
where we saw a similar body one moment ago, all the while the second 
body did not really develop from the first, but just seems to do so 
because it came into existence soon after, at a place nearby. In this case, 
the appearance of continuity would still explain why we think to 
observe continuity and so assume identity. We visually perceive the 
contiguity of this body: we do not actually see its continuity (in 
principle we could be confronted by different quick body flashes and 
just think that we perceive continuity), but we can follow an at-least-
seemingly continuous body (when we keep our eyes open, we do not 
see it disappear and come back again and we see how it only displaces 
itself to an extent, which we take such a body to be capable of 
performing in a particular time). Thus, our impressions can make us 
think that we have a same continuous body in front of us. 
A second reason to find it more credible that our bodily continuity 
is crucial in our attribution of numerical identity to persons than is our 
psychological continuity, is that this accounts better for the fact that 
we ascribe unconnected thoughts to the same self. If we attribute 
numerical identity to a person as long as he consciously lives through 
the same continuous body – it being unimportant what he is conscious 
of –, then he could still be the same self even if some of his thoughts 
seem to emerge from nowhere and not be connected to any other 
thoughts he has. 
Thirdly, if we say that a person stays numerically the same, as long 
as he lives through one continuous body, this concords with the 
phenomenon that we can ascribe two different streams of 
consciousness to one self. The fact that bodies, too, can split (cfr. 
identical twins), or branch (cfr. Siamese twins), does not endanger 
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their suitability for being a crucial criterion for the numerical identity 
of persons. The non-branch requirement for the preservation of the 
numerical identity of persons would still be respected. When a human 
body that generates the life of conscious being branches, or a fortiori 
splits, we see the resulting entities as two different persons. One could 
discuss what counts as branching in this case, but there seems, at least, 
to be a clear consensus that analyses the obvious example regarding 
this topic, namely, that of Siamese twins. We consider these twins to 
be two persons, when they are blessed with two heads and respective 
thought-producing brains. However, when the newborn does not have 
two heads, but only more than the usual limbs, we will judge that there 
is just one baby and that his twin brother never was or died. Still, it is 
the branching of the body, and not of the psyche, which here makes us 
consider the conscious being in front of us as two persons, rather than 
one. If a certain and critical mass of the body branches into two 
physical branches, which each still generate consciousness, we judge 
that we have two persons in front of us. Whereas the same is not the 
case when a one headed human being verbally denies, but, through 
writing, confirms that he saw something. We then have two branches 
of consciousness, but still assume that there is only one person. So, if 
a consciousness-producing body branches in a certain way, we assume 
that there are two persons, whereas if consciousness branches, we can 
still assume that there is one person. If we then logically hold that 
what constitutes numerical identity cannot branch or split without 
destroying this numerical identity – per definition only attributed to 
one entity –, only the body, and not consciousness, can function as this 
constitutive element. 
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If the continuity of our bodies is indeed key in the constitution of 
our idea of what the numerical identity of a person consists in, then 
Hume could incidentally appeal to his own discourse to resolve the 
problem with his initial account of the origin of our idea of personal 
identity. 
As we saw, Hume wondered why we assume that particular 
resembling impressions belong to one person and why we think that 
there should be a causal link between particular perceptions. This is 
unclear, because of the combination of the facts that (1) we do not 
perceive a real connection between these impressions and (2) we could 
have every one impression without a particular other. It will be 
explained, says Hume, if our perceptions would “either inhere in 
something simple and individual” (Hume 1978, Appendix, p. 636), or 
if the mind did “perceive some real connexion among them” (Ibid). 
These references to something real may surprise one, since Hume’s 
question is here not whether there really is a self, but instead how we 
get the idea that we are diachronic selves. It is not immediately evident 
why Hume expects that something real may have a part in the genesis 
of this idea. After all, he was the one who made us skeptical about 
whether our ideas correspond to something real. Hume (Ibid, I.i.6, pp. 
1-7) argued that we can, at most, find out whether a particular idea 
corresponds to a specific impression and shows, with the case of 
identity, that even this does then not always prove to be so. According 
to Hume, some ideas, like those of identical objects and subjects, are 
clearly fictions to which no particular impression corresponds, but 
which originate after an association of different perceptions (Ibid, pp. 
254-255). There does then not seem to be a role for something real in 
the origination of these ideas. 
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Yet, Hume’s reference to the real could be explained in the 
following way. We may understand conceptually what it would mean 
for our perceptions to reside in something real or to have a real 
connection between them. This understanding could then make us 
associate specific perceptions with one another. This interpretation 
does not deny Hume’s skepticism. For it is still possible that when we 
get the impression that this real entity or connection is there and we 
associate those perceptions which reside in this apparent entity, this 
entity does not in fact exist. Our impressions might mislead us about 
the reality of this entity, all the while our thought that it might be real, 
may make us associate those impressions with one another which seem 
to reside in this entity. 
With this insight, Hume could turn to a phenomenon which he 
observed, but subsequently deemed of no importance for the 
constitution of our idea of diachronic selves,11 i.e. that an observation 
of contiguity can make us think that something has a diachronic 
identity. Contiguity, for Hume, is the nearness in time and place of 
objects that can make us think that they are identical, and so, 
continuous. Hume did not see how this could be of relevance for the 
constitution of a self that he most likely considered to be a mental 
entity. Yet, our perception of almost the same bodies, close to each 
other over time, could make us think that there is one real particular 
body. This conception of one apparently real entity could then make 
us associate those impressions with one another which seem to be 
produced in or through this body. The latter association of certain 
                                                 
11  “And here ’tis evident we must confine ourselves to resemblance and causation, 
and must drop contiguity, which has little or no influence in the present case” (Hume 
1984, I.iv.6, p. 260). 
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impression could in its turn make us think that there must be one 
person who has all these impressions. If, at first sight, unimportant 
elements for the qualitative identity of a person can constitute their 
numerical identity and the contiguity of the body appears to have a 
role in the constitution of our idea of being a diachronic self in the way 
just described, then Hume could find the real connection he was 
looking for in the apparent continuity of the body. This apparent 
continuity or ‘contiguity’ is real because it is there, regardless of our 




3. A conception of a self which corresponds with tracing 
it through its body 
 
If the non-branched material continuity of a body that generates 
consciousness is indeed a crucial criterion for the numerical identity of 
a person, then what a person is like may not have a role in our 
acknowledgment that he is a particular self. This would be in line with 
Hume’s findings that we do not derive the idea of being one self from 
the observation of resemblance or causality between thoughts. Our 
idea that we are diachronically existing beings could precede these 
observations.  
In what follows, I will argue that one of our ideas of being a self is 
indeed rather formal. I can work with the idea that I am one diachronic 
entity without first having to think about which particular one 
character I have. One example of this is the reference I make to myself 
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in an ordinary conversation. When I talk to a person and say ‘I think 
this,’ I can correctly refer to myself without first having to think about 
which character this ‘I’ has. 
Our formal idea of being a diachronic self comes about through a 
self-consciousness that is not regularly mentioned in the discussion 
about the constitution of personal identity. Contrary to the 
consciousness mostly referred to, it is a consciousness of one self that 
does not come about through a reflection on the contents of one’s own 
consciousness. I argue that our ascription of numerical identity to 
persons is an ascription of identity to them as formal selves and occurs 
as long as they are (dispositionally) conscious beings living through 
one materially continuous body. Here are some examples to support 
this claim. When someone asks me how old I am, I usually answer 
without hesitation. If I have to think a little, I think about my previous 
birthday and then remember that this was my 25th, or I remember the 
fact that this is the last year that I will be able to purchase youth tickets 
for the train and that this is so because I am 25. Here, I reason about 
myself, while no particular image of this self crosses my mind. I do not 
think about which character I have or which thoughts I have had. I 
just take it that I have been here since the day I was born and that I 
am as old as my body is. Another example is the following. We save 
money on our name, which gives a bank clerk the right to later return 
it to us. This clerk does not identify us by our face or smell, as an 
animal might recognize another animal. He identifies us by our first 
name (which is a sign for us, but not a pictogram), the name of our 
parents, and our place and date of birth. All of this does not only 
require that we are selves, but also that we have the idea that we are a 
diachronically existing self and deal with other such selves. Yet, here 
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again, we just work with the idea of being a particular self, without 
therefore first having to think or be convinced that this self has a 
specific character. If we would reflect on our behaviour, then we would 
see that we, in this case too, assume that we are the same as long as we 
are bodily continuous: we expect assurance from the bank clerk that 
we get our money back. He should check whether the person who 
requests it is physically identical to us, not whether he or she thinks 
like we used to do. It is true that there is a rule that gives the clerk the 
right to allow that our heirs manage our account when we are no 
longer lucid. Yet, even this confirms that we follow ourselves through 
our bodies: heirs are the persons who were appointed as heirs by the 
lucid self which was connected to the body to which now only a self 
with amnesia is connected. They are not appointed by a self who now 
thinks how I used to think. These examples illustrate how we can think 
of a self in a rather empty way, as well as that we identify this self 
through a particular body. 
 
 
4. What is next? 
 
I have now analyzed why our thoughts, feelings and psychological 
behaviour cannot constitute the numerical identity which we factually 
ascribe to a person. I have also given initial plausibility to the idea that 
our acknowledgment that we live through one continuous body may 
have a part in the constitution of our idea of what makes a person 
numerically identical. I gave some examples of how we factually 
attribute numerical identity to persons, mentioning characteristics of 
the body that make it suitable as constitutive element for this identity. 
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I further illustrated that we – amongst other conceptions of the self – 
work with a rather formal concept of a self that could be tracked by 
tracing the body it lives through. 
Until now, nothing radical should be concluded from the above. So 
far, we can only conclude that, if persons were essentially mental, it 
would be hard to identify and re-identify them. This would be easier, 
if having one materially continuous body is part of what characterizes 
them. So far, I only considered the pragmatic advantage of the body in 
identifying and re-identifying persons. In the fourth chapter, I will 
argue for the further claim that, given that persons are particular re-
identifiable entities, they cannot merely be mental entities, but must 
have a material body. 
Before arguing for this further claim, I will use the third chapter to 
elaborate on the specifics of my examination of the role that the body 
may have in the constitution of our numerical identity. Contrary to 
some other theories that attribute a role to the body in the constitution 
of persons, I will not argue that our body has a role in this constitution 
because we are embodied subjects, who feel and act intelligible through 
their respective bodies. I support this idea, but will not elaborate on it 
in this dissertation. Instead, I will analyze what the function is of the 
body in the constitution of our numerical identity, when we consider 
it as mere material entity or token. A second difference between my 
approach of the role of the body for personal identity and those of many 
others is that I do not wish to demonstrate what the body tells us about 
who we are. I will not argue that the body is meaningful and can tell 
us who we are as kind, or as particular person. I will argue that the 
body has a crucial role in how we ascribe numerical identity of persons, 
but this will not imply that the body gives a specific sense to this 
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persons. The body will prove to allow people to develop a specific and 
meaningful character, but the meaning which persons have for us, is 
not had by this body. 
In the fourth, fifth and sixth chapter, I will examine what could 
explain the role of the material body in the constitution of our 
numerical identity, if not an apparent importance of this body for 
someone’s personality. I will analyze which are the properties of 
material bodies and of our self-consciousness that incite us to identify 
a self through a body. 
In the seventh and last chapter, I elaborate on which image of the 
self arises, when we really follow a particular self through a particular 
body. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
THE ROLE OF THE BODY HERE 
CONSIDERED 
 
In the previous chapters, I have distinguished the question of what 
constitutes the numerical identity of a person from that of what 
constitutes his qualitative identity. I suggested that the body qua 
material token may have an important role in the former constitution. 
This is a specific stance that differs from other theses forwarded about 
the role of the body in the constitution of personal identity. While this 
role has been extensively discussed by philosophers working in 
distinct fields, this is less the case for its role qua material token. 
Below, I will distinguish my discussion of the role of the body in the 
constitution of (our idea of) personal identity from those of animalists 
and protagonists of the constitution theory. The goal is not to 
enumerate all theories concerning the role of the body in the 
constitution of personal identity – there are many more –, but instead, 
to bring out some special characteristics of my discussion of this role 
of the body, as well as of this body as material token – the aspect of the 
body that I consider. I first sketch what the animalistic theory, as 
developed by Eric Olson and Paul Snowdon, as well as the constitution 
view of Lynne Rudder Baker entail. Subsequently, I enumerate three 
of the major differences between the functions of the body that are 
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Snowdon shortly explains the animalistic position as follows: 
“There is no real controversy…over the claim that certain 
continuities to do with an animal’s body are sufficient for the 
persistence of the animal. If the body of an animal remains intact 
and sustains the processes we call ‘life’, the animal in question has 
survived. Animalism seems to imply that such conditions are 
sufficient for our survival” (Snowdon 1995, p. 71). 
Olson more clearly puts that, according to animalists, 
“no sort of psychological continuity, with or without further 
physical qualifications, is either necessary or sufficient for us to 
persist through time” (Olson 1997, p. 4). 
Animalists claim that 
“…all human people are animals. We are what Locke called ‘men’. 
You are not merely intimately connected in some way with a human 
animal. The claim is not that your body is a human animal, or that 
you are ‘constituted by’ an animal. That living primate sitting in 
your chair right now is you: you are numerically identical with an 
animal” (Ibid, p. 17). 
Since 
“psychological continuity is neither necessary nor sufficient for a 
human animal to persist through time….the animal that survives 
the loss of its mental properties is you, if you are an animal, and so 
you can persist without psychological continuity of any kind” (Ibid). 
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Animalists admit that 
“[p]erhaps we cannot properly call that vegetating animal a person, 
since it has none of those psychological features that distinguish 
people from non-people (rationality, the capacity for self-
consciousness, or what have you)” (Ibid). 
But they say that 
“[i]f so that simply shows that you can continue to exist without 
being a person, just as you could continue to exist without being a 
philosopher, or a student, or a fancier of fast cars” (Ibid). 
 
 
2. The constitution view 
 
Lynn Rudder Baker, protagonist of the constitution theory, agrees 
with the animalists in that the body has its part in the constitution of 
a person: “…a human person is constituted by a human body” (Baker 
2000, p. 3). According to Baker a human person is “necessarily 
embodied” (Ibid, p. 6). This means that “one could not exist without 
having some body or other; but it does not follow that one must have 
the body that she in fact has” (Ibid, p. 6). 
However, “constitution cannot be understood as identity” (Ibid, p. 
27) and Baker precisely differs from animalists in her claim that “a 
human person is not identical to the body that constitutes her” (Ibid, 
p. 3). According to Baker, persons are not identical to animals because 
they have some properties that are not animal properties. Persons can 
have these properties because they have a first-person perspective, 
which animals do not have: “We human persons are animals in that we 
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are constituted by animals, but, having first-person perspectives, we 
are not ‘just animals.’ We are persons” (Ibid p. 4). 
Following Baker, the persistence condition of a person depends on 
the continuation of this first-person’s perspective:  
“If the Constitution View is correct, then what I am most 
fundamentally is a person, a being with a first-person perspective; 
and I would cease to exist if that first-person perspective were no 
longer exemplified. As a human person, according to the 
Constitution View, I am constituted by a human body; even so, my 
continued existence depends on the continuation of my first-person 
perspective” (Ibid, p. 6). 
What is this first-person’s perspective and which unique person 
properties does it allow for? In Baker’s vocabulary, having a 
perspective is not the same as having a first-person’s perspective. 
“Many nonhuman animals have perspectives (determined perhaps by 
the positions of their sensory organs – e.g., eyes that are the sources 
of their visual fields)…” (Ibid, p.  21). Yet, only persons have a first-
person’s perspective, which means that they have “a conception of 
[themselves] as being the source of the perspective” (Ibid, p. 21). To 
have such conception, “it is not enough to distinguish between first 
person and third person…” (Ibid p. 64). Animals, which are not 
persons, can make this distinction. A dog, for instance, feels whether 
it is he, who is angry, or rather the other dog: he might bite in the first 
case and walk off with his tail between his legs in the second. To have 
a first-person’s perspective “one must also be able to conceptualize the 
distinction, to conceive of oneself as oneself” (Ibid, p. 64). 
The fact that a first-person’s perspective is unique to persons has as 
a consequence that 
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“…persons are the only beings with the ability to ask the question 
‘What am I?’” (Ibid, p. 6) “A person [also] has causal powers that a 
body would not have if it did not constitute a person. For example 
[those of] using a passport, voting in local elections, and being 
responsible for a prisoner” (Ibid, p. 109). 
An additional unique property to beings with a first-person’s 
perspective is 
“what we might call ‘interiority’. By ‘interiority’, [Baker means] 
those aspects of ourselves that we can report but that are not 
directly observable by others. …Any individual who has ever 
imagined himself or herself in some nonpresent circumstances has 
an inner life…..To imagine oneself receiving an award or being 




II. THREE DIFFERENCES 
 
There are three major differences between these accounts of the 
role of the body in the constitution of the person and my discussion of 
this role in this dissertation. (1) In contrast with animalism and the 
constitution view, I am more interested here in what constitutes our 
idea that we are diachronically existing persons, than in what makes 
that we are these ontological entities. (2) Secondly, contrary to 
animalists and defenders of the constitution view, I do not highlight in 
which respects our body has a role in the constitution of our personhood 
(by making us alive or conscious). Instead, I examine what could be 
the role of our body in the constitution of our (idea of) personal identity 
if we consider this body as pure material token – an aspect of the body 
whose importance for the constitution of personhood is not apparent. 
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(3) Lastly, I do not merely consider how (our idea of) personal identity 
can, in part, be constituted by our body as an ontological entity, but 
also by this body as a bearer of meaning. 
 
 
1. Ontological theories 
 
Animalism and the constitution view are ontological theories.12 
They intend to say something about what things are. Olson (1997) 
defines us as a specific kind of living organism. Baker (2000) argues 
that we have some person, animal and material properties. In contrast 
with this, I seek to determine what makes us assume that someone is 
still the same person, rather than what, ontologically speaking, makes 
a person the same person. 
One of the consequences of this distinction between our respective 
research questions is that I can, just like Olson, hold that we are 
animals (and that many of our ideas about persons express this), while 
I can, in contrast with Olson, at the same time indicate that we rather 
identify a person through his body (considered as material object), 
which sustains our life functions, than we follow ourselves through 
these life sustaining functions themselves. This could be so, in spite of 
                                                 
12 “All of these major competitors – Immaterialism, Animalists, and my own 
Constitution View – are competing ontological answers to the question ‘What am 
I?’ They are ontological answers because each competitor purports to say what most 
fundamentally I am (and you are) and to give conditions under which I (and you) 
continue to exist” (Baker 2000, p. 5). 
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the fact that we would not be the same self, if our metabolism and other 
life-sustaining functions came to an end. 
Another consequence of my diverging research question is the 
following. Olson and Baker hold that we can find out what the 
meaning of a person is by looking at his intrinsic characteristics.13 In 
contrast to this, I contend that a person’s meaning is not solely 
constituted by what is internal to him. Persons are capable of 
establishing part of their meaning – i.e. of what they are – through a 
reference to something external to them. So, even when persons are 
not identical to their material bodies, these bodies may have a role in 
their constitution. An example. A conscious person could realize that 
it is his body that usually makes other people recognize him as the 
same person. This can prompt him to seek a connection between 
certain mental experiences, which occurred to whatever conscious 
being lived through this body: he may, for example, be interested to 
see whether there is a relation between the thought that a thirty-year 
                                                 
13 At one point, Baker seems more nuanced than this. She writes: “…once we see 
that a thing can have relational properties, essentially, we are freed from supposing 
that if x and y differ in primary kind, then there must be an actual physical intrinsic 
difference between x and y….What grounds a difference in primary kind is difference 
in essential properties, whether intrinsic or relational” (Baker 2000, p. 196). 
However, in fact, she reduces these relational properties to intrinsic properties: 
“Rivers and aggregates of H2O have different essential properties and hence are of 
different kinds….the constituted thing differs from the qualitatively similar 
constituting thing because of this: There is some intrinsic property… that the 
constituted thing has essentially but the constituting thing has accidentally, or vice 
versa. And this difference in essential properties grounds the difference in primary 
kind” (Ibid, p. 171). 
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old with this body has now and the thoughts that the teenager with 
this body had some fifteen years ago. When looking for and expecting 
such a connection, he is likely to find one. This may change and 
strengthen his sense of identity. He may never have come to this sense 
of identity, if he did not have the idea that others followed him through 
his material body. 
The fact that we often recognize someone through his material 
body may not only have an effect on how we conceive of our own 
identity. It could also have an effect on how we conceive of someone 
else’s personal identity. Specifically, it could have as effect that when 
the being who lives through a particular human body suddenly 
establishes another character than the being who lived through this 
body before, or when this being, contrary to this previous being, does 
not seem to have any mental capacities, we will not immediately say 
that we now have to do with another person. Instead, we may try to 
interpret this second being’s words in the light of what we know about 
the first being’s life: we could wonder whether this second person is 
saying what the first person said, because the first person had a brain 
hemorrhage; we could also try to find out whether the first being 
perhaps already fostered a hidden anger, which the second being now 
exuberantly expresses. In the case where the second being, contrary 
to the first being, does not seem to have any mental capacities, many 
of us may, nevertheless, not easily let go of him. When we are used to 
identify persons through their bodies, we may think that the being in 
front of us is in fact the person we knew earlier, even when other 
characteristics typical of a, or the same, person are lost. 
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With regard to the ontological analysis of personal identity, my 
view may, at first sight, seem to be more related to the animalism of 
Olson and Snowdon, than it is to Baker’s constitution view. Indeed, I 
repeatedly stress the role of the body in the constitution of our (idea 
of) personal identity. As seen in the previous chapter, I also point out 
some difficulties with more psychological accounts of personal 
identity. However, when I emphasize that the body has a role in the 
constitution of our (idea of) personal identity, I do not wish to decline 
that a first-person’s perspective equally has a part in this constitution. 
Looking at how we typically talk about persons, and so express how 
we think about persons, there are at least two cases which support that 
a first person’s perspective, as defined by Baker, is important for the 
constitution of personal identity. 
(1) Consider two human beings shortly before their passing away. 
One of them is in a vegetative state: he breathes and his heart beats, 
but he has no idea of being a self. The second being has a first person’s 
perspective. She makes all kinds of outrageous claims about who she 
is, none of which align with the reality the person associated with this 
human being was conscious of earlier. After their passing away and in 
commemorating the person previously connected to the corpse we 
now greet, we will, in the first case, say that he was, in fact, already 
gone for a while, whereas we will say, in the second case, that she had 
become unrecognizable at the end of her life. The remaining first-
person’s perspective of the human being in the second case makes us 
assume that the person who we always associated with this human 
being was still there, in spite of the fact that her character changed. 
(2) We make a clear distinction between a person who suffers from 
locked-in-syndrome and is fully conscious, albeit he has no means to 
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express this, vis-à-vis a comatose human being in a vegetative state. 
When we remove their respective breathing aids, the conscious state 
of the first person will make us call this murder, whereas the 
unconscious state of the second being will make people differ over 
whether she has been murdered or not. 
This is why I refrain from saying that persons are just human 
animals, as Olson and Snowdon claim, and will instead defend that a 
person is (considered as) the same person as long as his same 
continuous body produces consciousness. 
Yet, my view on personal identity does not exactly coincide with 
Baker’s view either. Baker holds that we could, in principle, survive 
when there is no spatio-temporal continuity of body: 
“Although I am doubtful that such a procedure is empirically 
possible, I do not want to take issue with the point that … 
psychological continuity does not require continuity of body or of 
matter of any sort. It is thus possible that there is psychological 
continuity throughout an interval during which there is no 
spatiotemporal continuity of body” (Baker 2000, p. 126). 
If having a continuous first-person’s perspective falls under 
psychological continuity, this means that, according to Baker, we 
could survive without spatiotemporal continuity of body. I will defend 
the opposite: a person is (considered as) the same person as long as the 
same continuous body produces consciousness. According to the 
account which I will develop, the spatiotemporal continuity of the 
body is thus as indispensable for the survival of a particular person, as 
is the presence of consciousness. 
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2. The role of what matters in constitution 
 
The second difference between my account of personal identity vis-
à-vis those of Snowdon, Olson and Baker is the following. Promoters 
of animalism and the constitution view alike take it for granted that 
what makes us us14 (Olson 1997), or what makes a human person a 
human person15 (Baker 2000), ought to be something that is itself 
fundamental and important to this being.16 
For Baker, this is the first-person’s perspective. As we saw, a first-
person’s perspective for Baker is not just a point of view. Animals that 
                                                 
14 “When does one begin? I do not mean when human life begins, or whether an 
embryo or fetus is a human being. My question is when you and I began to exist” 
(Olson 1997, p. 90, my italics). Olson also doubts that any philosopher studying 
philosophy has meant to ask whether someone is still the same person. He says that 
even if they asked this, they actually meant to ask whether someone is still you (Ibid, 
p. 25). 
15 “‘What am I’ and ‘What is a person?’ – are distinct questions…..What I am 
most fundamentally is a person….A person…is a being with a first-person 
perspective. But the kind of person that I am is a human person, necessarily 
embodied” (Baker 2000, p. 6). 
16 “According to the Constitution View, what is ontologically most important 
about human persons is that they are persons. According to the Animalist View, by 
contrast what is ontologically most important about human persons is that they are 
animals” (Baker 2000, p. 147, my italics). 
Or: “…on the Constitution View, our unique characteristics and what we care 
deeply about depend squarely on what we fundamentally are: persons” (Ibid, p. 163). 
Again: “It is a signal virtue of the Constitution View that it directly connects 
what is most important to us and about us to what we most fundamentally are” (Ibid, 
p. 164). 
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are not at the same time human persons may have a point of view. A 
cat, for example, has the intuition that she is situated at a particular 
place. This makes her jump in the right direction and exactly as far as 
needed to catch a mouse. Since cats are not persons, a point of view 
cannot serve as a distinguishing characteristic of personhood. 
However, a first-person’s perspective can serve as such a 
distinguishing characteristic – at least as far as Baker is concerned. She 
defines a first-person’s perspective as the idea that someone can have 
of being a self. A first-person’s perspective manifests itself when 
someone experiences herself as herself.17 Two instances of the 
manifestation of this perspective are the following. (1) Someone may 
have the thought ‘I look awful today.’ (2) She may also have the 
thought ‘I don’t feel well today.’ This person does not just see 
something awful, nor does she just feel nauseous. She has the 
additional thought that there is a subject with this look and feeling, 
and that this subject is not another person, but she herself. In Persons 
and Bodies, Baker (2000) repeatedly emphasizes that this first-person’s 
perspective is fundamental in the constitution of human persons, 
because it is important for human persons.  
“However the first-person perspective came about, it is unique and 
unlike anything else in nature, and it makes possible much of what 
matters to us. It even makes possible our conceiving of things as 
mattering to us” (Baker 2000, p. 163, my italics). 
                                                 
17 “So, although the dog has a first-person point of view, the person knows that 
she has a first-person point of view. She conceives of herself as the origin of a 
perspective and in doing so adds consciousness of unity to the unity of consciousness 
(that a dog has). Call the unity of consciousness underwritten by a first-person 
perspective ‘strong unity of consciousness’” (Baker 2000, p. 162). 
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“The first-person perspective allows us, at least to some extent, to 
be self-conscious about our goals and to decide which ones to 
pursue and how to pursue them….animals have no control over 
their goals; but…we, unlike the rest of the animal kingdom, have a 
certain control over (some of) our goals…” (Ibid, p. 14). 
Further, “[o]nly a being with a first-person perspective can have a 
grip on the fact that she even has a character or that she has habits 
at all. Only a being with a first-person perspective can evaluate 
herself, find herself wanting, and try to change herself in various 
ways” (Ibid, p. 15). 
Again: “Let me …canvass a number of things…that are 
pretheoretically our important features and then show how they are 
made possible by the first-person perspective…. 
In the first group are cognitive abilities that we have only because 
we have first-person perspectives: (1)…we are the only beings who 
know that we are going to die…only a being with a first-person 
perspective could know that she – she, herself – was going to die 
eventually….(2) We can envisage many alternative possibilities for 
our own futures. To imagine oneself in this or that situation 
requires conceiving of oneself as oneself, in the first person, not as 
someone who fits a description or is picked out by a third-person 
demonstrative…(3) Only beings with first person perspective could 
make sense of the ancient dictum ‘Know thyself’…. 
In the second group are practical abilities that we have only because 
we have first-person perspectives. (1) We can have life projects and 
plans; we can choose our ideals and assess our desires and try to 
change them to conform better to our ideals. One can try to rid 
oneself of a desire only if one can conceive of one’s desire as one’s 
own, and to conceive of one’s desire as one’s own is to have a first-
person perspective. (2) We do not simply act in accordance with 
laws of nature. We also follow rules and even make up rules for 
ourselves….(3) We can decide what matters to us (within 
limits)….(4) We can ask, ‘What am I? Who am I? What kind of life 
ought I to lead?’” (Ibid, pp. 159-160, my italics) 
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These kinds of observation are also what fuels Baker’s criticism 
against animalism. She reproaches animalists for not taking persons 
seriously (Ibid, pp. 218-222). 
 
Notwithstanding this critique, animalists equally rule that 
everything that constitutes a particular kind must be judged by us as 
important for this kind. The latter is a precondition for the former: 
according to the animalists, something can only constitute a particular 
kind, if we judge it to be important for this kind. 
At first sight this may not seem to be the case. Olson, for instance, 
mentions that he has 
“tried to divorce numerical identity from those relations of practical 
concern that are traditionally thought to go along with our identity: 
whose actions we are accountable for, how we ought to be treated 
over time, and (perhaps) who deserves our prudential concern” 
(Olson 1997, p. 70). 
He also says that 
“the consequences the Biological Approach has for ethics would be 
… surprising, for it would entail that those practical relations did 
not coincide reliably with psychological continuity. I could be 
responsible for something I did at an earlier time even if I am no 
longer psychologically continuous with myself as I was then. And I 
might fail to be responsible for actions done by someone who had 
my brain and my psychology, which I can remember and feel 
responsible for” (Ibid, p. 71). 
At first sight then, Olson seems to distinguish what preserves 
numerical identity from what typically matters to us in this 
preservation: just as Parfit (1984), he points out that what we really 
care about when we seem to care about the survival of a person – i.e. 
the continuation of his projects, character, thoughts – does not itself 
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guarantee numerical identity, and he demonstrates that what seems to 
be important for the continuance of a person’s numerical identity – i.e. 
psychological continuity – is, in fact, not always preserved when his  
numerical identity is preserved. 
Still, Olson assumes that, what constitutes a kind, must be of 
intrinsic importance to this kind. As other animalists, Olson reasons 
that, since a certain organization between elements is clearly necessary 
for the maintenance of life, and we judge that the continuation of life 
is important for an organism, this life and this organization must be 
ontologically constitutive of an organism. This becomes clear when he 
explains why “you are the organism that began to exist roughly 
fourteen to seventeen days after conception” (Ibid, p. 91). According 
to Olson, this is so because this is “when the cells that develop into the 
fetus (as opposed to the placenta) become specialized and begin to 
grow and function in a coordinated manner” (Ibid, p. 91). 
“Until the end of the second week after fertilisation, the cells are all 
alike, or omnipotent: they do not have specialized tasks, and each 
can be the ancestor of any kind of human cell. Most of those cells in 
fact develop into the placenta and other supporting structures and 
not into the embryo proper. Each functions independently of the 
others, metabolizing and dividing at its own rate. If you separated 
the cells into two clumps, you would end up with identical twins; 
and if you put the separated cells back together – before they begin 
to specialize, at any rate – only one human being will result. In fact, 
the cells can be rearranged arbitrarily without affecting the 
eventual outcome” (Ibid, p. 90). 
So, according to Olson, you are not a fertilized egg, because this 
egg is not yet by itself (i.e. intrinsically) important for you, as the fetus 
that may grow into a person. It does not make you breathe and 
metabolize. It does not make you into an individual. So, it does nothing 
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that is of intrinsic importance to you. At most, it creates your external 
conditions – such as the beginning of the placenta – through which you 
can later come into being. 
Contrary to what is the case for Baker and Olson, my research aim 
is not to find those elements that are in themselves constitutive of 
personal identity. Instead, I examine which elements factually have a 
role in the constitution of our idea of what constitutes personal 
identity. Subsequently, I attempt to explain why we attribute such 
constituting role to these elements. This explanation is not necessarily 
a justification. We may turn out to treat elements as important for this 
constitution that are neither intrinsically important for the 
constitution of personal identity, nor for personhood, merely because 
they are typically close to something that is necessary to this 
constitution. We would then attribute it with constituting power 
through mere association. 
 
 
3. The body as symbol 
 
This brings me to a third difference between my treatment of the 
role of the body for the constitution of personal identity and those of 
Baker and Olson. Contrary to Baker and Olson, I stress how the body 
can become a symbol of the person and examine what the role of this 
symbol can be in the constitution of (our idea of) personal identity. 
As far as the body is concerned, Baker and Olson are interested in 
whether, and how, natural properties of the body are properties of one 
animal or person. Baker (2000), for instance, says that there is not only 
a body that is heavy, but also a person who is derivatively heavy, 
CH 3: The Role of the Body Here Considered 
[87] 
because her body is non-derivatively heavy. Olson claims that you 
survive as long as your brainstem and midbrain organs remain intact 
(Olson 1997, p. 116), for they regulate the life-sustaining functions of 
an organism (Ibid, p. 45), such as its breathing, circulation of blood and 
metabolism (Ibid, p. 16). So, according to Olson, you go where your 
whole brain goes (Ibid, p. 45).18  
I recognize that certain natural characteristics of the body have a 
role in the constitution of (our idea of) what a person is and that there 
are such characteristics whose presence can make a person stay the 
same. Yet, in addition, I wish to highlight that the body, in part, gets 
its role in this constitution, because it becomes a symbol of the person. 
Let me illustrate this difference in approach by referring to one of 
Snowdon’s defenses against the claim that persons are something over 
and above animals. Snowdon concedes (Snowdon 1995, p. 82) that 
some people will, in certain cases, say that the person is departed while 
looking at her remaining living organism. This may happen when they 
visit a comatose patient in a vegetative state. Here, the person and the 
animal do not, at first sight, seem to coincide. However, Snowdon 
counters the conclusion to which this case seems to lead by quoting 
another aspect of the case. He asks us to imagine what we would think, 
if the vegetative state, in which the patient has sunk, would make the 
doctor tell us that the family member, whom we are looking for, is no 
longer in the hospital. Snowdon predicts that we would find this 
                                                 
18 Note that Olson does not hold that you go where your cerebrum goes. 
According to Olson, you could survive without your cerebrum, as long as the part of 
the brain that controls your life-sustaining functions stays preserved. To hold that 
you follow your cerebrum is to assume a psychological criterion for your survival: 
the cerebrum makes your mental performances possible (Olson 1997, p. 18, 21, 44). 
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statement premature. He concludes that, after all, we still see the 
comatose patient as a person, i.e. as one of our family members.  
I follow Snowdon thus far. However, contrary to Snowdon, I would 
not explain this case by saying that we still consider this comatose 
patient as our family member because he is still the same living 
organism. Instead, I would say that this artificially breathing organism 
retains the value of our family member because our family member has 
lived through it for such an extensive time. This organism does not 
leave us indifferent, because it has harboured our family member. We 
associate this organism so much with our family member that we 
would perceive a disrespectful treatment of this body as disrespectful 
behaviour towards this person. The organism gets the value of the 
person because we associate it with the person and because it becomes 
a symbol for this person, not because it is the person. 
Olson is somewhat aware of the possibility that an organism could 
become a symbol of a person. This becomes clear when he wonders 
whether there can be a similarity between how an organism can, in 
some cases, receive its meaning or value and how a statue does: 
“My question in the Vegetable Case is whether the human 
vegetable that results when your cerebrum is destroyed is strictly 
and literally you, or whether it is no more you than a statue erected 
after your death would be you. Do you come to be a human 
vegetable, or do you cease to exist and get replaced by a vegetable, 
much as you might be replaced by a statue” (Olson 1997, p. 9)? 
However, Olson denies that this is the case: 
“…there is another kind of continuity to be considered. Your life-
sustaining functions are not disrupted when you lapse into a 
persistent vegetative state... Nor is this simply ‘bodily’ continuity. 
When you die, you may leave behind a corpse that preserves your 
gross anatomical structure and is made of the same matter as you 
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were recently made of. But the human vegetable in our story is 
related to you in a far more interesting way than any corpse could 
be. The vegetable, but not the corpse, has inherited your biological 
life” (Ibid, p. 11). 
If one would, contrary to Olson, not immediately choose for the 
ontological view on this case, and if one would not dismiss the 
symbolic view on this case, one could explain why some people will be 
more inclined than others to call a comatose patient in a vegetative 
state a person. There is no strict boundary that determines whether 
something will still receive the symbolic value of something else 
through its association with this something else. Also, the symbolic 
sensitivity of persons may differ. The clothes of a famous person may 
get value because he wore them. The same goes for the car with which 
he drove. But what with the road on which he drove? For some of his 
fans, this will not have a special value, for others it may.19 
 
My regard for the symbolic value that an organism may get makes 
me differ from both Olson and Baker on yet another point. 
Olson holds that “[t]here could not be non-people who were 
exactly like people but for their persistence conditions” (Olson 1997, 
p. 108). Baker similarly contends: “…on the Constitution View, it is 
impossible that something could be psychologically just like a person 
without really being a person” (Baker 2000, p. 197). I disagree. I hold 
                                                 
19 This was also recognized by Kripke: “… my characterization has been far less 
specific than a real set of necessary and sufficient conditions for reference would be. 
Obviously the name is passed on from link to link. But of course not every sort of 
causal chain reaching from me to a certain man will do for me to make a reference” 
(1972, p. 93). 
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that our idea of people entails that all living creatures that are 
produced and born by people are people. 
Baker explicitly denies this: 
“To suppose that any product of natural selection must be 
understandable in wholly biological terms is to commit what used 
to be called the ‘genetic fallacy’: the fallacy of assuming that where 
something came from determines what it is. I am interested here in 
what we are, not in where we come from” (Ibid, p. 18). 
Yet, if a person gives birth to a severally disabled baby, we will still 
hold that this baby belongs to the class of people. If a chimpanzee gives 
birth to a very smart and human looking baby, we will call it an 
extraordinary chimpanzee. To determine whether babies belong to the 
class of people or not, we do not look at their characteristics, but at 
their origin. If the origin does not guarantee specific characteristics, 
this can only be so because we so often see people come forth from a 
specific origin, that we must associate them with such an origin. This 
origin then gets its meaning through association, not through 
characteristics it guarantees. The origin gets its people-constituting 
power because it belongs to a field of meaning – i.e. a symbolic field –, 
not because it generates specific ontological features. 
 
With the indication that our body may have a role as symbol in the 
constitution of our (idea) of personhood and personal identity, I have 
pointed to the third of three differences between my account of 
personal identity and those of Olson, Snowdon, and Baker. By 
elaborating on these differences, I hope to both have made clear which 
actual roles of the body in the constitution of personal identity I will 
not consider, and have broadened the idea of the kinds of roles that the 
body could have in this constitution. In the next three chapters, I will 
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further analyze what can be the role in this constitution of the body, 
considered as material token, and examine how the nature of our 
imagination, and of material bodies, can makes us attribute such a role 
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CHAPTER 4:  
MATERIAL BODIES AND PERSONS AS 
PRIMARY PARTICULARS  
 
Now that I have determined my question as ‘what makes us still 
consider someone as numerically the same?’ (chapter 1) and have made 
plausible that this could be the continuation of one particular living 
organism that still generates consciousness (chapter 2) – indicating 
that this is not just the case because this organism preserves life, nor 
because it can produce consciousness, but also because it is materially 
continuous (chapter 3) –, I will examine which factors can help explain 




I. MATERIAL BODIES FUNCTION AS PRIMARY 
PARTICULARS 
 
For a first explanation of this role of the body, we can turn to the 
work of P.F. Strawson. In his Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive 
Metaphysics (1959), he demonstrates how, as far as re-identification is 
concerned, material bodies function as primary particulars in our 
conceptual scheme. My claim will be that, when material bodies 
generally help us to re-identify particulars, they can also help us to re-
identify a particular person – even when we think of this person as 
being more than his material body alone. To see how this works, let’s 
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first look at what Strawson attempted to discover and at his reasons 
for calling material bodies ‘primary particulars’ in our way of re-
identifying particulars. 
P.F. Strawson develops a descriptive metaphysics. In doing so, he 
intends to describe the actual structure of our thought.20 He seeks to 
determine what our understanding is of the world we live in, and of 
which concepts, ways of identifying, referring and predicating we 
make use in this understanding. It is not his objective to determine 
what is absolutely logically necessary in order to think in a particular 
way. Our way of, and means for, understanding may be contingent, yet 
actual. Nor is Strawson interested in providing a genealogy of our 
structure of thought. He does not examine at which moment in time, 
and for what reason, we started to use a particular concept. Strawson 
judges that the subject of his research is too fundamental for this. He 
is interested in highlighting those concepts that are so fundamental 
for the human understanding of the world we live in, that they do not 
seem to be historical.21 It would moreover be hard to imagine how a 
human understanding of the world would have looked like without our 
                                                 
20 “Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our 
thought about the world….” (Strawson 1959, p. 9) 
21 “The structure he seeks does not readily display itself on the surface of 
language, but lies submerged” (Strawson 1959, p. 10). 
“…there is a massive central core of human thinking which has no history – or 
none recorded in histories of thought; there are categories and concepts which, in 
their most fundamental character, change not at all…They are the commonplaces of 
the least refined thinking…It is with these, their interconnexions, and the structure 
that they form, that a descriptive metaphysics will be primarily concerned” 
(Strawson 1959, p. 10). 
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grasp and usage of these concepts. We may try to imagine such a 
scenario, but then we would again be thinking about a potential 
structure of thought that is not our current actual structure, and this 
is not what Strawson sets out to examine. 
Strawson starts from the observation that we live in a spatio-
temporal world: it is a fact that we perceive everything as happening 
at one particular time in space. He also observes that we frequently 
identify and re-identify particulars. We say of things and creatures 
that they are particular creatures and, when we see them again or 
speak about them, we identify them as those particulars that we 
encountered before. Because this identifying is so prominent in our 
thinking and speaking, and is what first allows us to live in a common 
world where we can identify and refer to the same things, Strawson 
decides to examine how we identify particulars. He concludes that 
material bodies are primary particulars in this process: they are 
particulars to which we need to refer in order to identify other 
particulars, while we do not need to refer to other particulars to 
identify them. 
Strawson concludes that material bodies are such primary 
particulars, after establishing that descriptions do not uniquely refer 
and hence cannot uniquely identify, or, in other words, pinpoint one 
specific particular. The possibility of massive reduplication prevents 
descriptions from doing so.  Even when a description describes an 
object in incredible detail and mentions a list of relations between the 
described object and other objects, the possibility remains that 
somewhere in the world there is a second object which has all the 
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details mentioned and maintains completely similar relations with 
other objects.22 
This problem of identification, or unique reference, is solved when 
our reference is indicative or demonstrative, instead of merely 
descriptive. In an indicative reference, you refer to something by 
pointing it out, just as you would point something out with your index 
finger. You show or demonstrate where something is. As we can see 
in our use of demonstratives, we need a point of reference to indicate 
something. We know what a speaker means with ‘this’ or ‘that’, ‘these’ 
or ‘those’, because we can locate the speaker, and so know which things 
are closer or further away from him. Here, the speaker functions as a 
point of reference from where we can follow his indication. An 
indicative reference from such point of reference always uniquely 
identifies. It cannot accidentally refer to two similar particulars of the 
same kind23 that find themselves within a similarly organized set of 
other particulars. For, however similar the patterns of particulars 
around two resembling particulars are, the spatial world, in which we 
                                                 
22 “However much one adds to the description of the sector one knows about – its 
internal detail and its external relations – this possibility of massive reduplication 
remains open. No extension of one’s knowledge of the world can eliminate this 
possibility. So, however extensive the speaker’s knowledge and however extensive 
the hearer’s, neither can know that the former’s identifying description in fact applies 
uniquely” (Strawson 1959, p. 20). 
23 I add ‘of the same kind’, because it is possible that we stand in the same spatial 
relationship to two particulars of a different kind. There can, for instance, be the 
same spatial relationship between me and a particular person, and between me and 
this particular person’s body. This body and this person are then two different 
particulars (even though they have some properties in common, they are of a 
different kind), which nevertheless find themselves at the same place. 
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live, does not allow that the respective spatial relations between a point 
of reference and two distinct particulars are the same.24 
When we identify or refer to particulars, we, of course, do not 
always use demonstratives, such as ‘this’ or ‘that’. We also use proper 
names, such as (a) ‘the U.S.A.’ or (b) ‘Charlotte’; (c) we use the calendar 
time to refer to a particular event; and (d) we often deduce who or what 
someone is talking about from the context of a story. Consequentially, 
we do not always notice that our identification of particulars is 
demonstrative in kind. Still, all our identifications ultimately depend 
on a demonstrative identification. (a) When we use a proper name to 
refer to a place, we only understand where this place is, when we 
understand where it is with regard to us, the reference point and point 
of orientation. The fact that Spain is to the south of France only means 
something to me, when I know what it would mean for me to move 
south. (b) Our reference to a person by means of a proper name equally 
counts as a demonstrative indication. A person’s name is not used as 
an abbreviated description of a particular character. I won’t stop 
calling a particular person ‘Charlotte’ when she evolves from being a 
difficult learner into a successful business woman. Instead, I use the 
name ‘Charlotte’ to refer to one particular person who came into 
                                                 
24 “For all particulars in space and time, it is not only plausible to claim, it is 
necessary to admit, that there is just such a system: the system of spatial and 
temporal relations, in which every particular is uniquely related to every other. The 
universe might be repetitive in various ways. But this fact is no obstacle in principle 
to supplying descriptions of the kind required. For by demonstrative identification 
we can determine a common reference point and common axes of spatial direction; 
and with these at our disposal we have also the theoretical possibility of a description 
of every other particular in space and time as uniquely related to our reference point. 
Perhaps not all particulars are in both time and space. But it is at least plausible to 
assume that every particular which is not, is uniquely related in some other way to 
one which is” (Strawson 1959, pp. 22-23). 
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existence at a certain moment, has since then always been at just one 
place at a time, and followed a continuous, i.e. non-interrupted, track 
through space.25 She never disappeared at one place to then pop up at 
a totally different place. (c) We can only meaningfully use calendar 
time to refer to a particular event, when we know how the time, now, 
relates to that time. There is only a ‘now’ for us – beings who can serve 
as their own point of reference. No notion of ‘now’ could be found in 
an unconscious system. (d) It is true that the context of a story often 
makes it clear to us, to whom the storyteller is referring. However, 
this does not mean that the reference to this person can depend on 
descriptions alone. It still involves some demonstrative indications. 
When someone says that he had dinner ‘with him’, the context of the 
story may make it obvious to me that this ‘him’ is his friend. Still, my 
understanding of who this friend is, does not only follow from the way 
in which this friend was once described to me, it also involves my 
understanding that this friend is one particular being who, as long as 
he exists, always finds himself at one particular place in space and can 
be encountered there by me or others. (e) Even supposedly ‘pure 
individuating descriptions,’ which start with phrases like ‘the only…’ 
or ‘the first…,’ do not refer to unique particulars all by themselves. 
They can only do so in combination with a demonstrative indication.26 
                                                 
25 This was already remarked by Kripke (1972, lecture 1). 
26 “Descriptions can be framed which begin with phrases like ‘the only…’ or ‘the 
first…’ and thus proclaim as it were, the uniqueness of their application. Let us call 
them ‘logically individuating descriptions’” (Strawson 1959, p. 26). “A pure 
individuating description, like any other logically individuating description, may fail 
of application not only when there are no candidates for the title, but also when there 
are two or more candidates with equally good and hence mutually destructive claims 
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For, a supposedly pure individuating description would fail to identify 
a unique individual, if there either is no individual, or if there are two 
individuals to which this description applies. This risk can only be 
avoided, if one knows, for a fact, that only one such individual exists, 
and this knowledge can only be provided by one’s exploration of the 
world. Since the latter requires that we start from, and take ourselves 
as, a reference point, so as to be able to determine what we did and did 
not yet explore, the supposedly pure individuating description never 
individuates by its mere description. And “[e]ven if it were possible to 
satisfy the formal conditions of particular-identification in a way which 
left the particular completely detached and cut off, as it were from the 
general unified framework of knowledge of particulars, the 
achievement would be a peculiarly useless one. So long as our 
knowledge of it retained this completely detached character, the 
particular would have no part to play in our general scheme of 
knowledge; we could for example, learn nothing new about it except 
by learning new general truths” (Strawson 1959, p. 28). 
The previous should have made clear that “the system of spatio-
temporal relations has a peculiar comprehensiveness and 
pervasiveness” (Ibid, p. 25), which, according to Strawson, qualifies “it 
uniquely to serve as the framework within which we can organize our 
                                                 
and no candidate with a better claim… The only safe way, in general, to elaborate 
the description sufficiently to eliminate the one risk, without increasing the other, 
would be to draw on our actual knowledge of stretches of the world and its history; 
but in so far as we do this, we can no longer sincerely claim to be unable to connect 
our description at any point with items belonging to the unified framework of our 
knowledge of particulars” (Ibid, pp. 27-28). 
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individuating thought about particulars. Every particular either has its 
place in this system, or is of a kind the members of which cannot in 
general be identified except by reference to particulars of other kinds 
which have their place in it” (Ibid, p. 25). 
Strawson then concludes that it is our spatio-temporal framework 
that allows us to live in a common world and identify and refer to the 
same things: “By means of identifying references, we fit other people’s 
reports and stories, along with our own, into the single story about 
empirical reality; and this fitting together this connexion, rests 
ultimately on relating the particulars which figure in the stories in the 
single spatio-temporal system which we ourselves occupy” (Ibid, p. 
29). Strawson grants that it may be possible for us to refer differently 
to particulars in another world, where our experiences would be 
different. He even explores if we could identify particulars in a world 
where there are only sounds (Ibid, pp. 59-86). Still, the bottom line for 
Strawson remains that it is not contingent, in our world, to identify 
particulars by situating them in a spatio-temporal framework. We 
perceive it as necessary or guaranteed that every particular has its 
place in this framework: 
“Suppose someone told of a thing of a certain kind, and of certain 
things that had happened to it; and, when asked where that thing 
had been, and when the events he recounted had occurred, said, not 
that he did not know, but that they did not belong at all to our 
spatio-temporal system, that they did not take place at any distance 
from here or at any distance of time from now. Then we should say 
and take him to be saying, that the events in question had not really 
occurred, that the thing in question did not really exist. In saying 
this we should show how we operate with the concept of reality… 
We are dealing here with something that conditions our whole way 
of talking and thinking, and it is for this reason that we feel it to be 
non-contingent” (Ibid, p. 29). 
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We do not only exploit our common spatio-temporal 
understanding of the world and history we live in, to identify, or point 
to, particulars. We also use it to re-identify them. Places are necessary 
to re-identify particulars. This must be so, to compensate for our 
interrupted observations. I can now point to a particular and say ‘this 
is X’, but I cannot count on my uninterrupted observation of X to re-
identify it as the same X at a later time. I move and sleep, and so my 
observation of X gets interrupted. Still, I will oftentimes re-identify X 
by re-identifying the place at which I last saw it. Children, for instance, 
re-identify their own handbook by assuming that the one laying at the 
same place where they last saw it, is theirs. Or, if it is no longer there, 
they imagine that someone must have moved it from the one place, to 
another place. They then suppose that it was constantly somewhere in 
adjacent places, not that it dropped out of existence at one place, and 
reappeared at another. To be able to re-identify places like these, we 
must, in turn, be able to re-identify physical bodies, for “… places are 
defined only by the relations of things…” (Ibid, p. 37). If “we were 
never willing to ascribe particular-identity …[t]hen we should, as it 
were, have the idea of a new, a different, spatial system for each new 
continuous stretch of observation. … Each new system would be 
wholly independent of every other” (Ibid, p. 33). 
A skeptic could point out that, if we re-identify particulars as the 
same when our observation of them is not continuous, we can never 
really be sure that they are in fact the same. Perhaps the object at time 
2, which looks like an object at time 1, finds itself at a place that looks 
like the place where the qualitatively identical object at time 1 found 
itself, but still is not the same object – it might just be a similarly 
looking object at a similarly looking place, but, in fact, be an object at 
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a different place. This is true. This possibility exists. Only, it does not 
show that there is a possibility for us to identify objects in a different, 
perhaps more secure way, which does not appeal to our common 
understanding and usage of a spatio-temporal framework to identify 
places and objects. For, as Strawson wittingly points out, even the 
skeptic does not escape from using this framework to doubt whether 
we always re-identify correctly. If we did not assume one spatio-
temporal framework, in which all particulars of the world have a place, 
“[t]here would be no question of doubt about the identity of an item 
in one system with an item in another. For such a doubt makes 
sense only if the two systems are not independent, if they are parts, 
in some way related, of a single system which includes them 
both….This gives us a more profound characterization of the 
skeptic’s position. He pretends to accept a conceptual scheme, but 
at the same time quietly rejects one of the conditions of its 
employment” (Ibid, p. 35). 
All of this makes clear that the spatio-temporal framework, in 
which we situate particulars plays a crucial role in particular 
identification. It is only of particulars, which could be situated in our 
spatio-temporal framework, that we are willing to say that they exist 
or have existed. Further, we can only uniquely identify those 
particulars that can be situated in such a framework. This unique 
identification, or reference, is ultimately indicative. Lastly, our re-
identification of particulars, depends on the spatio-temporal 
framework, in which we situate them. We re-identify them by 
determining both the place at which they first found themselves and 
the path along which they traveled. 
To this, Strawson adds that physical bodies function as basic 
particulars in our particular identification. They are the particulars to 
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which we ultimately need to refer, if we identify other particulars, and 
which do not, themselves, require a reference to another kind of 
particular to be identified.27 Strawson does not provide any logically 
sufficient argument that proves that only material bodies are able to 
take up this role as basic particulars. Instead, he illustrates which 
assets of material bodies – in contrast with properties of other 
particulars – make them the best particulars to function as basic 
particulars. Material bodies get the latter function because their (a) 
observability,28 (b) inter-individual diversity and “relatively fixed or 
regularly changing spatial relations” (Ibid, p. 53),  and (c) intra-
individual stability and endurance help us identify other particulars in 
reference to them, as well as make us identify places and so set up our 
spatio-temporal framework in which we can re-identify particulars.29 
(a) In the common framework, which we need to refer to the same 
things and talk about them, “[t]he minimum conditions of 
independent identifiability for a type of particulars [is] … that its 
members should be neither private nor unobservable” (Ibid, p. 53). 
With regard to this, three-dimensional material bodies have a clear 
                                                 
27 Cfr. Strawson 1959, pp. 38-39. 
28 “The minimum conditions of independent identifiability for a type of 
particulars were that its members should be neither private nor unobservable” 
(Strawson 1959, p. 53). 
29 “[These particulars] must be three-dimensional objects with some endurance 
through time. They must be accessible to such means of observation as we have; and, 
since those means are strictly limited in power they must collectively have enough 
diversity, richness, stability and endurance to make possible and natural just that 
conception of a single unitary framework which we possess. Of the categories of 
objects which we recognize, only those satisfy these requirements which are, or 
possess material bodies – in a broad sense of the expression. Material bodies 
constitute the framework. Hence, given a certain general feature of the conceptual 
scheme we possess, and given the character of the available major categories, things 
which are, or possess material bodies must be the basic particulars” (Strawson 1959, 
p. 39). 
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advantage over and against sensations (to which we can only uniquely 
refer, when we attribute them to a particular person) and abstract 
theoretical constructs (such as a strike, which we can only identify by 
referring to particular men, tools and factories30). (c) In contrast with 
events and processes, material bodies typically endure longer. This is 
why, when we want to refer to an event or process that we do not 
witness at the moment, we often refer “to a place at which it was 
audible or visible [and which we identify by objects or geographical 
features carved into material bodies31], or to a particular material 
object which was causally connected with it” (Ibid, p. 47). In short: 
material bodies have the necessary assets to give us the means to 
construct the spatio-temporal framework in which we find 
ourselves32,33 and to situate all particulars within this framework.34 
Again, it is true that it is not always immediately obvious that our 
identification of particulars ultimately depends on our identification of 
material objects. We do not always refer by naming such objects. Still, 
our frequent use of proper names hint at which role material bodies 
play in our particular-identification: “among particulars, the bearers 
par excellence of proper names are persons and places. It is a 
                                                 
30 Cfr. Strawson 1959, p. 44.  
31 Cfr. Strawson 1959, p. 53. 
32 “Given a certain general feature of the conceptual scheme we possess, and given 
the character of the available major categories, things which are, or possess material 
bodies must be the basic particulars” (Strawson 1959., p. 39). 
33  “The fact that identification in general has a temporal as well as a spatial aspect 
is no objection. For material bodies, or things which have them exhibit relations 
between themselves which have a temporal aspect. One thing replaces or begets 
another. Things pass through places” (Strawson 1959, p. 54). 
34 “Material bodies, in a broad sense of the word secure to us one single common 
and continuously extendable framework of reference, any constituent of which can 
be identifyingly referred to without reference to any particular of any other type” 
(Strawson 1959, p. 54). 
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conceptual truth, as we have seen that places are defined by the 
relations of material bodies; and it is also a conceptual truth…that 
persons have material bodies” (Ibid, p. 58). 
 
All of this together then, gives us a first explanation of what makes 
us identify and re-identify persons through their bodies, even when we 
consider mental characteristics to be necessary and typifying for 
persons. By giving us a location and orientation, the body can make us 
into a reference point that allows us to identify both ourselves and 
other particulars by their place and our own, and to re-identify them 
and ourselves by our respective plausible movements. As I mentioned 
in the second chapter, our material bodies are easier to identify than 
our thoughts and mental characteristics because material bodies are 
always publicly observable. They are easier to re-identify because they 
are always somewhere for as long as they exist. This means that, when 
our observation of these bodies was interrupted, we can still retrieve a 
particular body at the same place as we encountered it before or at a 
place which is thus located, that we can imagine that this body has 
moved there by now, by following a continuous track. 
It is true that there is always the possibility that we will misidentify 
a particular body. When our observation of a body was interrupted, we 
may reasonably expect that a certain body is the same as the one that 
we saw before, just because we now see it at a place close to where we 
saw it before. Still, it could be another qualitatively similar body. In 
spite of this possibility of misidentification, the distinction between 
material bodies and mental characters remains such that the re-
identification of the former is primordial, whereas the re-identification 
of the latter is not. We know what the conditions are for a material 
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body to count as the same numerical body we saw before: all its parts 
must either remain the same or have evolved from one another, and 
the body must have traveled through space along a continuous path. 
We do not have this with a mental character or someone’s personal set 
of mental thoughts. If we do not identify this character or particular 
set of thoughts by means of referring to another particular (such as the 
person who has them), then we cannot re-identify a character or set of 
thoughts as numerically the same. Character traits of a particular 
personality and thoughts of a particular person do not all evolve from 
one another: a person can have two very different thoughts without 
the one having sparked the other; he can also establish two different 
non-connected ways of behaving (e.g.: he can be talkative and a hard 
worker). Further, character traits are not continuously exhibited and 
thoughts are not uninterruptedly had. Together, this means that we 
can neither re-identify character traits or a set of thoughts as 
numerically the same by finding a causal or logical relation between 
them, nor by just following them through time. This is not just so 
because our observation is interrupted. It is impossible because the 
nature of a character or set of thoughts does not allow for it. The fact 
that there is no clear alternative for re-identifying a character or 
personal set of thoughts, apart from recognizing it by recognizing the 
person (another particular who has them), means that only material 
bodies (which can be re-identified by appealing to bodily 
characteristics only) are the particulars that function as basic 
particulars in our identification and re-identification of persons. This 
can, of course, only be so, if a body is had by the same subject (or 
person), who can have the mental characteristics which we fail to re-
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identify all by themselves. In the paragraph that now follows, I say 
more about how Strawson establishes that this is indeed the case. 
 
 
II. WE ASCRIBE CHARACTERISTICS TO A PERSON, NOT 
TO A BODY AND MIND, WHICH ONLY SUBSEQUENTLY 
CONSTITUTE A PERSON 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to explain why we oftentimes 
identify persons by their bodies, even when we judge that these bodies, 
as such, do not yet make them persons, as well as that a particular body 
is not what most typifies a particular personality. I just explained, with 
Strawson, that one of the reasons for this phenomenon is that bodies 
function as basic particulars in our way of identifying other particulars. 
Regardless of what we find important in other particulars, our 
identification of them ultimately depends on our identification of 
material bodies, which are basic particulars. 
Strawson analyzes another phenomenon that renders our way of 
identifying, in these cases, more intelligible. If mental characteristics 
belonged to a mental subject, while physical characteristics belonged 
to a distinct subject that could be described as a purely material body, 
then it would be illogical to identify someone who has mental 
characteristics through an entity that has no mental characteristics. 
Strawson shows that identifying a person through his body is not 
illogical in this regard, because persons are no assembly of a 
respectively mental and material subject. He contends that when we 
analyze our structure of thought and speaking about persons, we will 
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find that we do not think of them as embodied minds or animated 
bodies35. Instead, our concept of a person is ‘primitive’. 
“What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of 
entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness 
and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical 
situation &c. are equally applicable to a single individual of that 
single type….What I mean by saying that this concept is 
primitive…[is] that a necessary condition of states of 
consciousness being ascribed at all is that they should be ascribed 
to the very same things as certain corporeal characteristics, a 
certain physical situation &c” (Strawson 1959, pp.101-102).  
So, in the case of a person, we do not ascribe mental characteristics 
to a mental subject and physical ones to a bodily subject. We ascribe 
both characteristics to one and the same subject, i.e. a particular 
person. 
“We ascribe to ourselves actions and intentions (I am doing, did, 
shall do this); sensations (I am warm, in pain); thoughts and feelings 
(I think, wonder, want this, am angry disappointed, contended); 
perceptions and memories (I see this, hear the other, remember 
that). We ascribe to ourselves, in two senses, position: location (I 
am on the sofa) and attitude (I am lying down). And of course we 
ascribe to ourselves not only temporary conditions, states, 
situations like these but also relatively enduring characteristics, 
including physical characteristics like height, colouring, shape and 
weight” (Ibid, p. 89). 
Strawson admits that it is tempting to explain this phenomenon by 
referring to the special causal role of our body in our experiencing. 
Many of our experiences, of which we are aware or mindful, do indeed 
depend on, and are influenced by, the kind of body we have and its 
positioning. I only see something when my eyelids are open, when 
                                                 
35 Cfr. Strawson 1959, p. 103. 
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what I see is in my field of vision, and when, upon this particular 
something, my vision is focused (which is due to the positioning of my 
pupils, the shape of my eyeballs, and my overall mental state). One 
could then think that our body connects whom we are as a mental 
being with whom we are as a physical being, and so gives us the idea 
of being a psycho-physical entity. Yet, Strawson points out that this 
special causal role of a particular body in our experiencing at most 
explains why we are attached to a particular body or determine that if 
one body is ours, this must be it. It does not explain where our idea of 
being a self or person comes from, to which we subsequently ascribe 
predicates, and of whom we subsequently think that it has a body.36 
If not because of this special role of the body, why then is the 
concept of the person primitive? Why do we attribute experiences to 
a self, and why do we attribute physical and mental predicates to the 
same self? Strawson argues that this is necessary in our conceptual 
scheme. This becomes clear when thinking otherwise appears to be 
incoherent. A philosopher could try to contest the primitiveness of a 
self or person and say that there is no such thing as a person who keeps 
particular sets of experiences together. Yet, 
                                                 
36 “We may summarize such facts by saying that for each person there is one body 
which occupies a certain causal position in relation to that person’s perceptual 
experience, a causal position which in various ways is unique in relation to each of 
the various kinds of perceptual experience he has…” (Strawson 1959, p. 92). “They 
explain …why I feel peculiarly attached to what in fact I call my own body; they 
even might be said to explain why, granted that I am going to speak of one body as 
mine, I should speak of this body as mine. But they do not explain why I should have 
the concept of myself at all, why I should ascribe my thoughts and experiences to 
anything…. They do not explain the concept we have of a person” (Ibid, pp. 93-94). 
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“[w]hen he tries to state the contingent fact, which he thinks gives 
rise to the illusion of the ‘ego’, he has to state it in some such form 
as ‘All my experiences are …uniquely dependent on the state 
of…body B’. For … [t]he proposition that all experiences are 
causally dependent on the state of a single body B…is just false” 
(Ibid, pp. 96-97, my italics). 
Hence, 
“this account of the matter is not coherent…in that one who holds 
it is forced to make use of that sense of possession of which he denies 
the existence...” (Ibid, p. 96). “He must mean to be speaking of some 
class of experiences of the members of which it is in fact 
contingently true that they are all dependent on body B. The 
defining characteristic of this class is in fact that they are ‘my 
experiences’ or ‘the experiences of some person’, where the idea of 
possession expressed by ‘my’ and ‘of’ is the one he calls into 
question” (Ibid, p. 97). “States, or experiences, one might say, owe 
their identity as particulars to the identity of the person whose 
states or experiences they are” (Ibid, p. 97). “[T]he theorist could 
maintain his position only by denying that we could ever refer to 
particular states or experiences at all; and this position is ridiculous” 
(Ibid, p. 98). 
After establishing that experiences are always ascribed to a person, 
Strawson contends that I can only ascribe a predicate to myself as such 
a person, when I am also prepared to ascribe these predicates to a 
person who is not me. If the latter were not the case, then I would not 
be able to ascribe predicates to myself as a person either.37 Strawson 
does not explicitly explain why he is convinced that this is the case, 
                                                 
37 “There would be no question of ascribing one’s own states of consciousness, or 
experiences, to anything, unless one also ascribed, or were ready and able to ascribe, 
states of consciousness, or experiences, to other individual entities of the same logical 
type as that thing to which one ascribes one’s own states of consciousness. The 
condition of reckoning oneself as a subject of such predicates is that one should also 
reckon others as subject of such predicates” (Strawson 1959, p. 104). 
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but it seems likely that he reasons (1) in a Wittgensteinian manner 
that we must be following some kind of rule regarding the ascription 
of predicates to a subject, i.e. that we only ascribe predicates to a 
subject, when we judge on certain grounds that something is the case. 
To this, he may add that this rule, and the concept of ‘predicates’ and 
‘subjects’, only have meaning if we know when and how we can apply 
this rule again, and if we could re-identify other subjects.38 (2) He may 
reason that there cannot just be one subject in the world for us, because 
we would then not be able to individuate this subject from others.  If 
there is no individuation, then there is no subject or individual.39  
Once he established that I ascribe a particular set of predicates, i.e. 
mine, to a particular subject, i.e. me, and that we also recognize others 
as such subject, Strawson describes how we conceive of ourselves and 
others as similar subjects, even though our way of ascribing predicates 
to either one is different: we ascribe predicates to ourselves without 
external observation of ourselves, but we only ascribe particular 
                                                 
38  “… one should be able to distinguish from one another, to pick out or identify, 
different subjects of such predicates, i.e. different individuals of the type concerned” 
(Strawson 1959, p. 104). 
39 “It sometimes happens, with groups of human beings, that, as we say, their 
members think, feel and act ‘as one’. I suggest it is a condition for the existence of 
the concept of an individual person, that this should happen only sometimes.” 
(Strawson 1959, p. 114) “It is quite useless to say, at this point: ‘But all the same, 
even if it happened all the time, every member of the group would have an individual 
consciousness, would embody an individual subject of experience.’ For, once more, 
there is no sense in speaking of the individual consciousness just as such of the 
individual subject of experience just as such, there is no way of identifying such pure 
entities…as soon as we adopt the latter way of thinking, then we abandon the 
former” (Ibid, p. 115). 
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predicates to others after we observed them. Strawson uses this 
phenomenon to illustrate that we think of human subjects as psycho-
physical beings, and not just as essentially mind, or merely embodied 
minds.40 When we would say, of ourselves, that we are depressed, we 
would not do this on the basis of outer observation: we know 
immediately that we do not have energy, do not want to get out of bed, 
and feel burdened with fears. When we identify someone else as 
depressed, we do this on the basis of observation. We see that he is low 
in energy, scared, and does not want to get out of bed. What we see is 
not just a sign of his invisible depression. They are symptoms of this 
depression, i.e. they are elements that are part and parcel of what we 
                                                 
40 “One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them 
to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of 
experience. And one cannot identify others if one can identify them only as subjects 
of experience, possessors of states of consciousness” (Strawson 1959, p. 99-100). 
“The condition, in turn, of this being possible is that the individuals concerned, 
including oneself, should be of a certain unique type of a type, namely, such that to 
each individual of that type there must be ascribed, or ascribable, both states of 
consciousness and corporeal characteristics…” (Ibid, p. 105). 
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call depression.41 Apparently, the depression has characteristics that 
are both sensible and observable, both involving mind and body.42  
                                                 
41 “… one ascribes P-predicates to others on the strength of observation of their 
behavior;…the behavior-criteria one goes on are not just signs of the presence of 
what is meant by the P-predicate, but are criteria of logically adequate kind for the 
ascription of the P-predicate… The point is not that we must accept this conclusion 
in order to avoid skepticism, but that we must accept it in order to explain the 
existence of the conceptual scheme in terms of which the skeptical problem is stated” 
(Strawson 1959., p. 106). 
42 “…the ascribing phrases are used in just the same sense when the subject is 
another as when the subject is oneself…” (Strawson 1959, p. 99) “…there is a kind 
of predicate which is unambiguously and adequately ascribable both on the basis of 
observation of the subject of the predicate and not on this basis, i.e. independently of 
observation of the subject the second case is the case where the ascriber is also the 
subject” (Ibid, p. 108). 
e.g.: “in order for there to be such a concept as that of X’s depression, the 
depression which X has, the concept must cover both what is felt, but not observed, 
by X, and what may be observed but not felt, by others that X (for all values of X). 
But it is perhaps better to say: X’s depression is  something one and the same thing, 
which is felt, but not observed, by X and observed, but not felt, by others that X….To 
refuse to accept this is to refuse to accept the structure of the language in which we 
talk about depression” (Ibid, p. 109). 
“When we take the self-ascriptive aspect of the use of some P-predicates, say 
‘depressed’, as primary, then a logical gap seems to open between the criteria on the 
strength of which we say that another is depressed, and the actual state of being 
depressed. What we do not realize is that if this logical gap is allowed to open, then 
it swallows not only his depression, but our depression as well. For if the logical gap 
exists, then depressed behavior, however much there is of it, is no more than a sign 
of depression. But it can only become a sign of depression because of an observed 
correlation between it and depression. But whose depression? Only mine, one is 
tempted to say. But if only mine, then not mine at all” (Ibid, p. 109). 
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We can now summarize Strawson’s reasoning as follows. If we read 
Strawson with the main question of this chapter in mind, then we see 
how he, through an analysis of our conceptual scheme, explains why 
we can identify persons by means of their bodies, even when we think 
that persons have minds and that these are what typifies them most 
and what is most important to them. We do so because, in our world, 
which we experience as spatio-temporal, all individuation and re-
identification of particulars ultimately depends on the possibility of re-
identification of particular bodies. We can do so because we do not 
think of persons as assemblies of two different subjects (the mind and 
the body) but, instead, conceive of persons as subjects to whom 
physical, psychological, and psycho-physical predicates can be 
ascribed. This means that we can know where a person, as a complete 
                                                 
“we have to do with a class of predicates to the meaning of which it is essential 
that they should be both self-ascribable and other-ascribable to the same individual, 
where self-ascriptions are not made on the observational basis on which other-
ascriptions are made but on another basis. It is not that these predicates have two 
kinds of meaning. Rather, it is essential to the single kind of meaning that they do 
have, that both ways of ascribing them should be perfectly in order” (Ibid, p. 110). 
“If one is playing a game of cards, the distinctive markings of a certain card 
constitute a logically adequate criterion for calling it, say the Queen of Hearts; but 
in calling it this, in the context of the game, one is ascribing to it properties over and 
above the possession of these markings. The predicate gets its meaning from the 
whole structure of the game. So with the language in which we ascribe P-predicates. 
To say that the criteria on the strength of which we ascribe P-predicates to others 
are of a logically adequate kind for this ascription, is not to say that all there is to the 
ascriptive meaning of these predicates is these criteria. To say this is to forget that 
they are P-predicates, to forget the rest of the language-structure to which they 
belong” (Ibid, p. 110). 
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psycho-physical being, is, when we know where his body is. Strawson 
came to the conclusion that we conceive of persons as psycho-physical 
beings by discovering that we self-ascribe some predicates, and by 
inferring that we must ascribe these predicates to ourselves as a 
subject; that if we have a concept of ourselves as a subject, we must 
also think of others as subject; and that given that these others must 
be of the same logical type as we are, although we nevertheless ascribe 
predicates to them after external observation only, while we would 
self-ascribe them after merely feeling them, there must be personal 
predicates which can be both felt and externally observed. It is part of 
our conceptual scheme and language system that we can observe that 
a personal predicate applies either by feeling it, or by observing it in 
someone else. 
After this conceptual explanation, Strawson offers us some 
examples of phenomena that we describe with predicates referring 
both to intention and bodily movement. Strawson thinks of “such 
things as ‘going for a walk’, ‘coiling a rope’, ‘playing ball’, ‘writing a 
letter’”(Ibid, p. 111). We ascribe these predicates to others through 
observation, but exactly because these predicates refer to a substantial 
bodily movement, we are not tempted to say that this movement is just 
an indication of a mental subject who undergoes this. “[W]e see such 
movements as actions …” (Ibid, p. 112). Such natural phenomenon 
makes … it seem intelligible to us… that we have the conceptual 
scheme we have” (Ibid, p. 112). If there is observable behaviour that is 
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clearly intentional, then it is less strange that we use the same 
predicates for observable and intentional behaviour.43 
The fact that our concept of a person is primitive, and not just an 
assembly of the separate subjects ‘body’ and ‘mind’, does not prevent 
us from having a notion of a corpse (i.e. a soulless human body) or of a 
disembodied person. However, these two latter notions still depend on 
the primitive concept we have of the person. Our idea of a corpse is an 
idea of a person who no longer has a soul. To think of one’s 
“survival of bodily death…[o]ne has simply to think of oneself as 
having thoughts and memories as at present, visual and auditory 
experiences largely as at present, even, perhaps – though this 
involves certain complications – some quasi-tactual and organic 
sensations as at present, whilst (a) having no perceptions of a body 
related to one’s experience as one’s own body is, and (b) having no 
power of initiating changes in the physical condition of the 
                                                 
43 We ascribe many of these predicates, which indicate that we do not conceive of 
the body as if it is as external to a person as his clothes are. We do this by developing 
names for the (partly) bodily behaviour of persons that distinguish it from similar 
behaviour of unconscious bodies. For instance, we distinguish the raising of an arm 
from a spasm; kneeling from bending; and screaming from making noise. ‘Sleeping’, 
as well is a predicate that is attributed to a person, and not just to a body or mind. 
Sleeping is something that takes place over time. It is a specific physical state of an 
organism that has some duration. At the same time, it is a state that is only seen as 
this specific state, in reference to conscious states that must be had by the same 
subject in the past and in the future. If the being asleep now was not conscious in the 
past, it would just be a non-conscious being, not a sleeping being. If this sleeping 
being now would not become conscious in the future, it would not be asleep, but in 
an irreversible coma. The same holds for many other phenomena, such as raising 
one’s arm. It takes some time for a being to raise its arm, and it can only raise its 
arm, if it had the intent to raise its arm beforehand. If not, there would not be the 
raising of an arm, but merely a spasm. 
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world….Condition (a) must be expanded by adding that no one else 
exhibits reactions indicating that he perceives a body at the point 
which one’s body would be occupying if one were seeing and 
hearing in an embodied state from the point from which one is 
seeing and hearing in a disembodied state…” (Ibid, p. 116). 
However, there are two implications in the latter case. 
“The first is that the strictly disembodied individual is strictly 
solitary…The other, and less commonly noticed point, is that in 
order to retain his idea of himself as an individual, he must always 
think of himself as disembodied, as a former person….Since …he has 
…no personal life of his own to lead, he must live much in the 
memories of the personal life he did lead; or he might…achieve 
some kind of attenuated vicarious personal existence by taking a 
certain kind of interest in the human affairs of which he is a mute 
and invisible witness – much like that kind of spectator at a play 
who says to himself: ‘That’s what I should have done (or said)’” 
(Ibid, p. 116). 
The primitiveness of the person, with regard to the bodily, 
psychological, and psycho-physical predicates that can be ascribed to 
them, remains. So does the function of material bodies, as basic 
particulars, in our reidentification of particulars in general, and of 
persons in an application of this phenomenon. By elaborating on this 
finding, I have given a first explanation of why we, oftentimes, identify 
persons by means of their still numerical identical body. Bodies are 
basic particulars which allow us to identify other particulars, such as 
persons. And, given that a person is not a composite of a mental and 
physical subject, but one particular to which mental, physical and 
psycho-physical characteristics are ascribed, we can identify a being 
who has psychological characteristics through another of his 
constitutive elements, i.e. the body. In the two following chapters, I 
will provide further illustrations and explanations of why the material 
body which, at first sight, says nothing about a person’s personality, 
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can still have crucial role in the constitution of a person’s numerical 
identity. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS’S SOURCE IS NOT 
JUST INTERNAL 
 
I. INNER CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT THE SOLE SOURCE OF 
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
In the previous chapter, I let Strawson point out that we can neither 
identify, nor re-identify a particular mind without ultimately 
identifying a body, as well as a person to whom both this mind and 
body can be attributed: our identification of any particular depends on 
our identification and re-identification of material bodies, which 
function as basic particulars; and, in identifying a body, we can 
simultaneously identify a conscious person, because persons are 
subjects who have both a body and a mind and to whom physical, 
psycho-physical, and psychological characteristics can be ascribed. An 
opponent of this view may admit that we can only identify other 
conscious beings as particular conscious beings by means of re-
identifying their bodies, while he may simultaneously deny that the 
latter has any part in the constitution of the consciousness which I 
have of being a particular conscious being myself. He could argue that, 
since we do not have access to other minds, we can do nothing but rely 
on the assumption that particular conscious beings stay housed in 
respective particular bodies, and then identify these conscious beings 
through these bodies. At the same time, he could reason that we do 
have immediate access to our own minds, i.e. that our own mind 
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appears to provide full access to itself, and that it is consequently 
unnecessary for us to re-identify ourselves by means of re-identifying 
our body. I know that I feel something now, simply because I am 
feeling it, and not because I see that something happens to my body. 
Just like this, I can know that I was the one who did something in the 
past, merely because I remember it, and not because there is evidence 
that I was physically present at that event, at that time. 
I argue against the idea that self-consciousness is a pure 
consciousness of consciousness at which one only arrives by 
consulting one’s own consciousness. In this and the next chapter, I will 
demonstrate that many instances of our supposedly purely internal 
awareness of ourselves are in fact informed by something external to 
mere inner consciousness. This is the case for our experiential 
memory, as I will show in this chapter, and for our sensations and I-
thoughts, which I will discuss in the next chapter. It should become 
clear that what we often take to be consciousness of just our minds, 
only comes about because we also have the idea that we take up space 
in the world and that others can follow us throughout this space. Once 
we learn that self-consciousness and, so ultimately, selves are 
constituted thus, we will have another answer to the question 
previously posed. We will better understand why we can identify 
ourselves (whom we take to be conscious beings) by means of the body 
which these selves may just seem to inhabit. It will have become clear 
to us that becoming aware of and, a fortiori, tracing a supposedly pure 
mental self, involve a reference to something physical. 
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II. PRELIMINARY TERMINOLOGY: SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
VS. SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
 
I will make use of the terms ‘self-consciousness’ or ‘self-awareness’ 
on the one hand, and ‘self-knowledge’ on the other. I will define self-
consciousness as a consciousness of ourselves which has, as its object, 
merely our internal consciousness, and which we obtain solely through 
the medium of our inner consciousness. In contrast with this, I will 
define self-knowledge as the set or part of the set of information which 
we have about ourselves. This information is not limited to 
information about our internal consciousness and we can acquire this 
information by consulting other sources than our inner consciousness 
alone. 
According to a classical view on self-consciousness (which I will 
criticize) examples of self-consciousness as above defined are for 
example the sensation of pain, the realization that one is happy, and 
the memory of a thought one had earlier. In all these cases we appear 
to be conscious of something that belongs to our consciousness: 
respectively, the feeling of pain, the sentiment of happiness, and a 
thought. It also seems to be merely our own consciousness which gives 
us access to these instances of our consciousness. 
In contrast to this, an instance of the self-knowledge, as above 
defined, could be our knowledge that we were naughty as a child. For 
this to be self-knowledge, we need not remember this. It belongs to 
the information which we have about ourselves, but this information 
could come from what others, whom we trust, have told us about 
ourselves. 
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The definitions which I give of self-consciousness, on the one hand, 
and self-knowledge, on the other, are particular. They are neither 
meant to replace other existing definitions, nor to exhaust the meaning 
of self-consciousness and self-knowledge. I need, and merely use them, 
to argue that often when we, in my terminology, define something as 
self-consciousness, this in fact concerns, again in my terminology, an 
instance of self-knowledge: often when we think that we gained some 
information about ourselves through our inner consciousness, we in 
fact received this information through other channels than just that of 
our inner consciousness. 
 
 
III. EXPERIENTIAL MEMORY: A CONSCIOUSNESS OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS, OR OF MORE THAN THAT? 
 
Experiential memory is one example of a phenomenon which is, 
contrary to what is often thought, not an instance of consciousness of 
mere inner consciousness. Below, I will first illustrate what it means 
to think of experiential memory as if it were a consciousness of mere 
inner consciousness. This will simultaneously demonstrate that we are 
often tempted to think that it is just this. Secondly, I will enumerate 
factors that influence us to think thus. Thirdly, I will give examples of 
memories that are experiential, but are not instances of a 
consciousness of mere inner consciousness. Subsequently, I will 
explain what the former illustrations teach us about experiential 
memory and, more specifically, in which ways experiential memory 
proves not to be a consciousness of mere inner consciousness. I will 
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conclude with a note on what it means that experiential memory is, in 




1. Experiential memory is often thought to be a 
consciousness of consciousness 
 
Experiential memory is the memory we have of experiences we 
personally had. It is often distinguished from the semantic memory we 
may have of facts, as well as from habitual memory. My memory of 
having been on a week-long boat trip once, is an experiential memory. 
My memory of the fact that there are Mayan temples in Mexico is a 
semantic memory. It is a memory of a fact I did not witness, but once 
learned about. When I habitually remember something, I remember 
how to do something. For instance, when you jump on your bike and 
you immediately take off, you are able to do so, because you remember 
how to bike. Your memory of how to bike is a habitual memory. In this 
paragraph about memory, I will only be analyzing experiential 
memory. 
Experiential memory is often considered to be an instance of a 
consciousness of mere consciousness. It is then perceived as a 
representation of a past experience from the same perspective as the 
remembered event was perceived in the first place. Those who have 
this idea of what an experiential memory is, do not necessarily hold 
that we, in experientially remembering something, fully relive the 
original experience. They can recognize that we typically know when 
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we remember a past event and are not so absorbed by its representation, 
or fooled by the perspective of this representation, that we experience 
it as if it happens now. It is merely assumed that when we 
experientially remember something, and are aware of the fact that we 
remember it, we still represent it from the same perspective as we 
experienced it before. When I experientially remember how I once 
attended a Thanksgiving dinner, I am supposed to see a picture with 
my mind’s eye and see the room and dinner table from the same 
perspective as I did then; I am supposed to still smell the food and hear 
how the voices of my family members sounded. 
Those who think of experiential memory in this way, do so because 
they assume that we, in experientially remembering something, 
merely become conscious of our inner consciousness: I am assumed to 
have the just mentioned perspective and sensations in my experiential 
memory of the dinner, not because the dinner is still taking place, but 
because I am conscious now of what I was conscious then. The fact 
that I personally experienced something, makes one expect that I still 
have personal access to that experience. 
If this were the right way to conceive of experiential memory, then 
experiential memories would resemble retentions. Let’s think of our 
retention of a note. We can hear melodies, because we still retain the 
sound of the previous note when we hear the next note. The previous 
note no longer resounds. All we are still aware of, is the consciousness 
we just had of it. We can equally retain distinct sensations of a multi-
sensational event. Say you suddenly slip while playing tennis. You fall 
on the ground, feel a pain flash through your wrist, and you smell and 
taste the gravel. When you recover from the first shock, during which 
your consciousness seems to have been blocked for a moment, you can 
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experience how you retain all these sensations. You can feel how the 
second flash of pain in your wrist followed the first, how the smell of 
the gravel is still there, and how some of the gravel stays sticking to 
your lips. Here too, you are able to relate a subsequent experience to a 
previous one, because you are still conscious of the sensation (i.e. 
consciousness) which you had before. These retentions are similar to 
how many picture experiential memory. In both cases, the experienced 
event passed, but our consciousness is supposed to still give us access 
to the consciousness we had of it. According to those who think thus, 
the only difference is that (we are aware that) the retention takes place 
right after the experienced event, whereas (we are aware that) there is 
typically a bigger gap between the original experience of an event and 
our experiential memory of it. 
Some philosophers, who expressed that they conceived of 
experiential memory in this way, are Russell, Judson and Alexander of 
Aphrodisias. Russell wrote that 
“[i]t is obvious that we often remember what we have seen or heard 
or had otherwise present to our senses, and that in such cases we 
are still immediately aware of what we remember, in spite of the fact 
that it appears as past and not as present” (Russell 2001 [1912], p. 
26, my italics). 
I will take issue with Russell’s quick inference that when we 
remember something because we were acquainted by it, we are still 
immediately aware of it. Even when our own past experience allows us 
to remember something, we may no longer have an immediate 
awareness of this event. Our memory may present itself as a piece of 
propositional knowledge, rather than as a perceptual awareness of this 
event. This propositional knowledge does not have to be immediate. It 
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could be mediated by the story I started telling about the event, or by 
the new context in which I place it now. In such a scenario, I still only 
remember the event, because I was present at the event. Yet, the way 
that I remember it, is mediated by the way I started looking at it 
afterwards. 
Judson (1987-1988) slightly adjusts what Russell says. She agrees 
that in episodic memory we are presented with a picture of what we 
remember, but argues that this picture is not necessarily what we saw 
in front of our eyes when we first experienced this event: 
“If I am asked, ‘What colour was the sea that afternoon?’... I may 
find myself picturing the afternoon’s sea...and forming judgments 
on this basis; or I may, alternatively, get an image which ‘feels right’ 
as an answer to the question...The judgment...requires the 
image...but it is not based on it” (Judson 1987-1988, p. 68). 
I will admit that we can form a picture of what we experienced in 
experiential memory, and agree with Judson that this can be a newly 
generated picture, rather than the image we had access to when we 
first experienced the event. However, I will deny that an experiential 
memory requires an image. We can remember that we did something 
without visualizing it. 
Still, what Russell and Judson say is seconded by many others. Just 
as Judson, Alexander of Aphrodisias conceives of our memories as 
images. He assumes that they are similar to the images we create in 
fantasy: 
“Now what fancy or imagination is, we may explain as follows: We 
may conceive to be formed within us, from the operation of our 
senses about sensible objects, some impression, as it were, or picture 
in our original sensorium, being a relic of that motion caused within 
us by the external object; a relict, which, when the external object 
is no longer present, remains, and is still preserved, being as it were 
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its image, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes the cause of 
our having memory: Now such a sort of relict, and as it were 
impression, they call fancy or imagination” (Alexander of 
Aphrodisias 1765, Book 3 358 n3, p. 135). 
Don Locke, in his turn, agrees that when we remember something 
personally, we can still feel how we experienced the remembered event 
at first: 
“personal memory consists in bringing some previously 
experienced thing to mind, thinking about it again, and going over 
what it was like” (Locke, 1971, p. 76, my italics). 
 
 
2. Influences on our conception of experiential memory 
 
Different factors can lead up to the thought that experiential 
memory provides us with something like a picture or movie of a 
previous event, shot from the same place as we were at during our 
original experience of this event. I will enumerate some of these. They 
illustrate how our way of thinking about experiential memory can be 
influenced by our definition of this memory (1-3), as well as by the way 
we speak and by our visual culture (4-5). 
First, we judge that true experiential memories, in contrast to false 
ones, should sketch an accurate picture of what we experienced before. 
This can make us think that to truly remember a personal experience, 
we should remember it as we experienced it then. For what could be a 
more accurate depiction of this experience, than an exact repetition of 
the vision we once had? 
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Secondly, experiential memories are per definition personal 
memories. They are memories of something we experienced.44 This 
can make us assume that to have an experiential memory, is to be 
aware of our own consciousness, as well as that in experientially 
remembering a previous experience, we review it from the same 
perspective as we saw it before. For when we think about how our 
personal experience of an event differs from the experience that others 
may have of it, we may conclude that others can have similar feelings 
about the event as we do, but that they can never feel our feeling about 
it. We each have our own consciousness of the event. Further, others 
                                                 
44 It is true that Parfit (1984, p. 220-223) has challenged this and tried to convince 
us that memories could be seen as a sub-category of the larger category ‘quasi-
memory,’ under which, both personal memories could be subsumed, and something 
like personal memories, which are not, in fact, personal. However, even Parfit admits 
that this is just a logical construction meant to show that if memories are seen as 
part of a larger category, they do not have to be seen as necessarily personal. So, we 
could talk about human characteristics without using the concept of a person. In a 
personal conversation during the academic year of 2009-2010, Parfit stressed that 
real memories, memories as we factually have them, and which we are willing to call 
memories, are personal. His extra category of a phenomenon, which would be exactly 
like a memory, but then not personal, is not meant to replace our current category 
of memory. Instead, it is a category next to that of our category of memories. We 
then have a category of memories which are personal, and a category of something 
like (but not) memories which are not personal. Both of them then belong to the 
overarching category of quasi-memories. 
Memories are not necessarily personal. When you are unsure whether you 
remember something or have made it up, your criterion for it to count as a real 
memory is that you have really experienced what you now seem to remember. 
For an interesting discussion on why it is not even possible to conceive of a 
broader category that includes both memories and something just similar, but not 
personal, memories, cfr. Wiggins (2001, pp. 193-225). Wiggins establishes why 
Parfit’s attempt to define quasi-memories, in a no-identity-implying-way, fails. Parfit 
(1984, p. 220) defines a quasi-memory as a phenomenon, in which I seem to 
remember a past event, someone experienced this past event, and my memory is 
causally dependent, in the right way, on the past experience. Wiggins points to the 
fact that Parfit did not find a way to define this ‘causally dependent in the right way,’ 
in a way which does not imply identity. What we would normally regard as ‘causally 
dependent in the right way’ would be ‘caused by our original experience of this 
event’. 
CH 5: Self-Consciousness’s Source Is Not Just Internal 
[129] 
cannot have exactly the same perspective of things as we do. If they 
witness the same event, they see it from an at least slightly different 
angle. Having a memory of a personal experience may then seem to 
mean having a memory of the unique features of this experience that 
make it personal, i.e. our own sentiments of this event at the event and 
our own perspective on this event at this event. 
Related to this, it may just seem to be impossible to remember, in 
experiential memory, the remembered event from another perspective, 
than we originally experienced it – say from my friend’s perspective, 
in which I too would be visible in the picture. I could possibly envision 
such an image, but we would call that a fantasy or hallucination, rather 
than an experiential memory. 
Fourthly, our way of thinking of experiential memory may be 
influenced by (other than purely defining) ways, in which we talk about 
it. For instance, we say that ‘to recall a previous experience’ is ‘to call 
this previous experience to mind’. When we take this image literally, 
we will think of experientially remembering as letting an experience 
reappear, just as we can make a friend return by calling him.  We then 
think of a memory as a previous experience that appears again before 
our mind’s eye. 
Lastly, our visual culture can equally influence the way one thinks 
about experiential memory. Cartoonists mostly show that a character 
remembers something by drawing a thought-balloon above its head, 
with a depiction of the remembered event in it. Film-makers often 
depict memories as flash-backs: they film and show the remembered 
experience from the perspective from which the character is supposed 
to have seen it. For the artists, these are just two easy ways to depict 
memories, but seeing these artificial visualizations of memory 
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regularly can make us think that our own memories are exactly like 
this, i.e. that we, in experientially remembering something, see an 
exact copy of what we saw before. 
 
 
3. Experiential memories, in another guise 
 
While it is easy to see how this specific way of thinking about 
experiential memory may come about and be reinforced, it is also quite 
evident that it does not correspond to how our experiential memories 
generally present themselves to us.  I will now give a couple of 
examples of experiential memories in another guise than the one just 
discussed. I will analyze them in the subsequent paragraph. The 
instances of experiential memory that I will discuss are memories of 
personally experienced events. Yet, these events are (1) neither relived 
in a way similar to how they were originally experienced, (2) nor are 
they reviewed from the same perspective as they were initially seen. 
The examples are real and personal. My hypothesis is that your own 
experiential memories often present themselves to you in a similar 
way. 
(1) When I have an experiential memory, I do not typically relive 
it. When someone says ‘remember how funny that was’, I mostly 
remember that it was really funny and sometimes giggle about it 
again, without re-experiencing the fun I had then. Often, I even 
remember the event as funnier, or as less funny, than I originally 
judged it to be. 
(2) In most of my experiential memories I just remember that I 
experienced something. I do not always visually display the 
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remembered event and, when I do, I seldom review it from the same 
perspective, from which I originally observed it. For instance: I 
remember that I once climbed a rope and that it snapped. I remember 
that I suddenly crashed to the ground, without having foreseen this 
and that I felt the impact go through my body. I also remember that I 
had a headache afterwards, and that my mother felt responsible and 
sorry for the faulty rope. I remember all of this from experience, not 
from stories that others told me afterwards. Still, I do not remember 
what the garden looked like from the perspective I had then: I do not 
remember whether I, from the rope, first saw some poles or the 
trapezium. In fact my memory of this event does not at all present itself 
as some kind of image that I see from the same perspective as I saw it 
then. Nor do I remember how I felt the pain go through my body. Did 
it start from my lower back and then shoot up? Or did I immediately 
feel it in my head? Did I feel it at all in my neck or teeth? I could not 
say. I remember that I had pain, but I do not remember any details 
about the pain and, in remembering the pain, I definitely do not re-
experience it. I really just remember that all of this happened and some 
pictures flash through my mind of where this happened and with which 
kind of rope. But these pictures do not stem from that particular event. 
When I look at these pictures, I do not see them from the perspective 
I had just before the rope snapped. I just have them because the rope 
was there for years.  
I also remember how twice I searched for my mother, in vain. I 
remember how, in one case, I climbed onto the slide in the garden, to 
look over the neighbours’ wall, to see if my mom was there. The 
strange thing is that I, in remembering this, seem to picture myself. I 
seem to see what I wore: it was a white t-shirt with a Mickey Mouse 
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logo on it and I was not wearing any trousers. I see myself, standing 
on the slide and getting of it in a careful way because I was barefooted. 
Again, I do not just imagine this event after somebody told me about 
it. I remember it from experience. But, even though this is an 
experiential memory, I cannot be said to have the same perspective in 
remembering the event as I had it when I first experienced it: I now 
have some picture of me standing on the slide, whereas at the moment 
I was standing on the slide, I must have seen the neighbours’ garden. 
Of the other time I searched for my mother, I remember that my 
brother and I ended up crying in front of the big mirror of the hall. I 
also remember that my mother gave us a bonbon when she came home, 
and that we all sat in the living room for a while.  Still, while I 
remember this event and the quite exact places of where I then found 
myself (first in front of the mirror and then on the couch), I do not 
review the realms I was in, as I saw them at the time. I do not 
remember seeing my mirror-image in the mirror, and I do not 
remember seeing the living room from where I sat. I remember that I 
was located at a particular place, but, in my memory, I do not review 
the world as I saw it from that place. 
A last personal example: I remember, from experience, that as a 
child and teenager, I stood in front of the bathroom mirror a couple of 
times, and looked at myself intensively. I was trying to memorize the 
picture of myself. I wanted to find out whether it would be possible for 
me to later remember exactly how I looked at these different instances. 
I did not turn out to do so. Although I remember that I looked in the 
mirror and tried to memorize the mirror-image of myself, I no longer 
remember what this mirror-image looked like. I do not recall how my 
face must have stared back at me. 
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These examples of experiential memories are not meant to 
demonstrate that we never remember something from a similar 
perspective as we first experienced it. People do have flashbacks where 
this seems to be the case. We can also achieve to slowly and 
deliberately regain a past perspective of things45. My sole aim was to 
illustrate how an experiential memory does not always present itself 
as a re-experiencing or visualization of a past event, perceived from 
the same perspective, as it was perceived first. I expect that when you 
reflect on your own experiential memories, you will equally recognize 
that they often consist in the realization that you experienced 
something, rather than in a reliving of the experienced event or in 
reviewing it from the same exact perspective as you experienced it at 
first. 
Philosophical voices that agree with what I have contended, are 
those of Bernecker (2007) and Martin & Deutscher (1966). Bernecker 
bases himself on scientific research:  
“… the frequency of memory images varies greatly from one person 
to another (Nigro and Neisser, 1983). Some people report that their 
mental lives are replete with imagery as vivid and detailed as the 
actual scenes they recall. For others, imagery is uniformly vague, 
dim, and fleeting. And, for a final group, there seems to be no 
imagery at all” (Bernecker 2007, p. 138). Also: “… many 
                                                 
45 Sometimes you remember something, but have to retrace your steps to 
remember exactly what happened: something makes you think of an earlier event, 
but to bring this event fully to mind, you have to ask yourself some questions such 
as ‘where did this happen again, when, and with whom’? You may then be able to 
bring this event back to mind. But what you recall is already more than the memory 
you just had. You arrive at it by reconstructing a certain event, but this exact 
reconstruction was not necessary to remember the event in the first place. 
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autobiographical data are remembered by description” (Bernecker 
2007, p. 139). 
Martin and Deutscher argue for something among these lines. 
They acknowledge that many report to visualize, or hear again, what 
they remember (Martin and Deutscher 1966, p. 164-5), but they 
equally recognize, just as I will do, that experiential memories can also 
take the structure of semantic memory. About this case, Martin and 
Deutscher (1966, pp. 162-3) say that we remember that we personally 
experienced something without, in many cases, remembering much of 
the details of this experience. 
 
 
4. Experiential memory is more than consciousness of 
mere inner consciousness 
 
We have now seen that often, when someone experientially 
remembers something, a correct description of this memory is not that 
he still feels how he felt something, or sees how he saw something, but, 
instead, that he still knows that he experienced this.46 Translated into 
philosophical terms, one can say that the structure of experiential 
memory, in these cases, resembles that of semantic memory. In this 
experiential memory with semantic features, we think of the 
remembered fact as a third person could think of it: we do not re-live 
or review it as we originally did, but look at it from the outside, and 
                                                 
46 Of course, you may just seem to know something, but, in fact, be mistaken. It 
also happens that we are not exactly sure whether we remember something that 
actually happened, or whether we are just remembering the image that we created 
for ourselves after we were repeatedly told about or heard about a certain event. 
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can even picture how we looked at the time, instead of just seeing how 
the world around us looked from the viewpoint we had then. This is 
so, all the while we personally experienced the event and we remember 
it because we personally experienced it. Picturing this event is not 
even necessary. Just as I can semantically remember it being a fact that 
Hitler had a dog and may, in remembering this, either picture him and 
his dog or not, I can experientially remember that I was upset when 
our family dog was put to sleep and picture the whole scenery (myself 
included), or just remember this as having been the case. In contrast 
to the former experience, I personally – and so experientially – 
experienced the latter. Yet, both memories can present themselves in 
the form which one often solely associates with semantic memories. 
The semantic form which an experiential memory often takes, can 
be one of the factors that sometimes causes us to be confused about the 
origin of a particular memory. Sometimes we know of a past event in 
which we were involved, both because we personally experienced it, 
and because we heard about it afterwards. When we remember this 
event, we may fail to determine whether we experientially remember 
this event in a that-format, or rather semantically remember what 
someone told us about it. 
Still, when we experientially remember something, we typically 
know that what we remember really happened. How do we know this? 
With what we have seen so far, we can rule out two explanations. Both 
explanations work with the idea that we experience our personal 
memories as real and personal memories because our consciousness 
gives us a clearly personal access to it. The first explanation says that 
we assume that an experiential memory is a memory of our past 
because it has an intensity, which is faint enough not to be perceived 
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as a current experience, yet vivid enough to make us suppose that we 
experienced what we seem to remember, rather than having imagined 
it, or rather than thinking back of something someone told us about. 
According to the second explanation, we experience our experiential 
memory as a memory of something that we personally witnessed 
because the perspective that, in our memory, we have of the 
remembered event, is the perspective that the subject, who 
experienced this event, must have had; it is believed that we can only 
have this perspective now, if we personally experienced what we 
remember. These explanations can be excluded because our 
experiential memories present themselves with all kinds of vivacity 
(they are sometimes more and sometimes less intense than the original 
experience), and because we do not always look at a remembered event 
from the perspective, from which it was originally experienced. My 
alternative to these explanations is that, in remembering a personal 
experience, we know that we really experienced the remembered 
event, because we knew that we were really experiencing it at the 
moment of the original experience, and, at that moment, stored this 
information about the reality of being involved in the event. In the 
remainder of this paragraph, I will analyze this dispositional 
knowledge which we recall in experiential memory, as well as the 
framework that is required to do so. This should demonstrate that 
experiential memories are not merely instances of mere inner 
consciousness. 
When we return to the experiential memories, which I described in 
the previous paragraph, we can see that the following are some of the 
things that I remembered because I already knew that they were the 
case at the moment of the original experience: how I was a subject for 
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myself; how I was a subject for others; how I was a material object in 
space; and how my experience took place at one particular time. Take 
my remembrance of falling to the ground when the rope snapped: I 
remember that I was in pain, and so remember that I was a subject for 
myself; I remember that my mother was worried about me, and so 
remember that I was also a subject for others; I remember that I was 
in the back of the garden where I was visible to others and was subject 
to the rules of gravity, and so remember that I was a material object; 
and I remember that all of this was the case at one particular dry day, 
and so understand that it all happened at one particular point in time. 
This requires that I am aware of more than my inner consciousness 
alone – both at the time of my memory and at the time of my initial 
experience. (1) Firstly, I can only experience and remember this, if I 
do not just assume that my experiences take place in an inner time 
constituted by my own consciousness, but also in a time and space that 
I share with others. (2) Secondly, I can only experience and remember 
this, if I can imagine how what I experienced is seen from a second and 
third person’s perspective, rather than just from a first person’s 
perspective, which a mere consciousness of one’s own consciousness 
provides. 
(1) Let’s first zoom in on how, in the above described experiences 
and memories, I locate myself in time and space. I, there, locate myself 
both in an inner and in an intersubjectively shared time and space. An 
inner time and space can be constituted by my consciousness of my 
own consciousness alone. Intersubjectively shared space and time is a 
space and time in which both, I, and others like me, could locate me. 
For instance: when I fell down the rope, I located myself in an inner 
time and space when I felt how I suddenly had a pain that was not 
CH 5: Self-Consciousness’s Source Is Not Just Internal 
[138] 
there before, and when I felt how this pain flashed, i.e. how it started 
somewhere and then rose or descended through my body. To 
experience all this, I need not know that there is a time, which we 
divide into seconds, and in which we can so make appointments with 
others. Nor need I know that there is a space in which material objects 
can occupy a place. All I need to be conscious of is my own 
consciousness. The detection of change in this consciousness is what 
gives me the idea that there can be a before or after, as well as that 
there are distinct places at which I can sense things. I located myself 
in an intersubjectively shared space and time when I realized that it 
would take my mom some time to reach me: in estimating the distance 
between me and my mom, I located us in the same space; in thinking 
that she would reach me somewhat later, I situated us in the same time. 
The same is true for the situation in which I now find myself, and in 
which I remember my previous experience: I develop thoughts and 
perceptions that make me both locate myself in an inner and an 
intersubjectively shared space and time. 
The fact that I locate myself in this intersubjectively shared space 
influences my experience of experiential memories. When I 
experientially remember something, part of the characteristic of this 
memory is that I take the remembered event to have taken place at one 
particular moment in my life. I may not recall what this exact moment 
is, i.e. what the date was or whether it happened before or after another 
particular event. Still, I assume that this remembered event must have 
one particular place in the order of events that I experienced. I only 
assume this because I already have the idea that I live one particular 
life and only have one particular life-history, in which all experienced 
events must have their place. This very memory cannot, on its own, 
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give me this idea. Taken into isolation, the remembered event could 
have occurred at multiple times and even at multiple places at once. 
Nor can the totality of my consciousness of inner consciousness give 
me the idea that the remembered event must have had its particular 
place in my life-history. In my becoming conscious of consciousness, 
all kinds of conscious experiences come to mind. Some appear to be 
related, but whether there is any relationship between many others 
remains unclear: the content of consciousness does not inform us about 
a general order where all conscious experiences must have taken place, 
nor does the nature of consciousness determine that there must be such 
an order at all. We can have multiple conscious experiences at the same 
time and we can jump from a thought of being at one place, to a 
thought of being at a radically different place. So, as far as the nature 
of consciousness is concerned, there is no particular reason why one 
specific instance of consciousness should have its chronological place 
between two others. It is only because we already have the idea that we 
have just one particular history, in which we were always just at one 
place at a time, that we assume that a remembered event must have 
occurred at one particular moment in our history.  
Having this idea requires that we situate ourselves in a time and 
space that is not just inner, but intersubjectively shared. In being 
aware of our inner consciousness, we only situate those experiences in 
a time and space that reach as far as our retentions of experiences 
reach. In experiential memory, however, we assume that we 
experienced something at a particular moment in time and space, even 
when we no longer retain an uninterrupted series of events that we 
experienced between the remembrance of the event and the moment 
at which we first experienced the remembered event. We assume that 
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the event occurred at a particular moment and place in the time and 
space that we share with others. This is the time and space, in which 
we can all situate the same object that moves from one place to 
another, over a specific time-stretch. When I can no longer use 
elements of my inner consciousness to define when something I 
experientially remember occurred, I can still imagine and decide to 
trust that it occurred at one moment, to which one can refer in this 
intersubjective time and space in which we can all locate the same 
events. This is necessary for my experiential memory to get its specific 
character of having happened at an earlier moment in a time of which 
I no longer have any retention. When we understand this, we must 
conclude that an experiential memory is more than a consciousness of 
inner consciousness. As it appears, we locate many of the 
experientially remembered events, in a past, of which we would have 
no idea, if we were locked up in an inner consciousness, but, of which 
we can have a conception, because we also share a time and space with 
others in that we can locate the same events that could, in principle, 
always be witnessed by someone. 
The fact that we have a conception of an outer space where material 
objects and we, as psycho-physical realities, can have a place, does not 
only allow our experiential memory to have the specific character that 
it has in as far as it makes us locate the remembered event in an 
intersubjectively shared time. It also allows us to distinguish (a) real 
experiential memories from false ones, and (b) thoughts of current 
experiences from non-actual ones. Without these distinctions, we 
would not conceive of experiential memories as we actually do. 
(a) If I did not have the idea that there is a space that is not just 
constituted in, and by, my inner consciousness, I would miss a criterion 
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to distinguish between an experiential memory of witnessing an event 
and a memory of a mere (day)dream of witnessing this event. 
Herewith, my ability to experience an experiential memory as an 
experiential memory, i.e. as something I really experienced, would 
disappear. This, again, shows that when I do experience something as 
an experiential memory, more than a consciousness of my mere inner 
conscious is involved.  
(b) This ability to distinguish between an outer reality, in which I 
really find myself, and a reality that I only represent in consciousness, 
further helps me avoid getting completely absorbed by my memory. It 
facilitates distinguishing between something I just remember, or 
fantasize about, and something that I actually experience, now, (i.e. 
which also has its place in the time and space that we share with 
others). For instance: when I sit on the couch and look at the inclement 
weather outside, my realization that this is the real outer reality, in 
which I find myself, allows me to understand that the picture that I 
envision of green Italian hills is just a memory or fantasy of these hills. 
This contrasts what happens in my dreams. One of the reasons why I 
can think that I really experience what I dream is that I am, at that 
moment, no longer aware of the sleeping room where I really find 
myself. 
(2) So far, for the importance for experiential memory of my 
background knowledge that I live in a space and time which I do not 
just constitute by being conscious of my inner consciousness. I also 
mentioned that, in having an experiential memory, I can think of 
myself from a second and third person’s perspective, rather than just 
from a first person’s perspective, which a mere consciousness of one’s 
own consciousness provides. For instance: when I see myself standing 
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on the slide again, I see myself from a third person’s perspective – I 
see myself, just as somebody who stood behind me could have seen me, 
or as a camera could have registered me. When I remember how sad 
and miserable my brother and I looked, and which feeling this evoked 
in my mother, I remember us from a second person’s perspective: I 
remember how we looked to someone who cares about us and I seem 
to remember the feeling we triggered in her. I can only remember 
these experiences like this, when I am conscious of more than my inner 
consciousness alone. To have these remembrances, I should at the 
moment of my initial experience already have been aware of the fact 
that I am, amongst other things, a material object, at which one can 
look from different perspectives, and not only a subject for myself, but 
also for others who can feel for me. It is because I already had this 
awareness then, that I can now shift perspectives on the remembered 
event. So, for my experiential memories to present themselves as they 
do, I have to know, both at the moment of the initial experience, and 
at the moment of my memory of it, that there is a world outside my 
own consciousness, in which I have a place, and that there are subjects 
with a different consciousness than my own. 
 
Now that I have shown that our experiential memory – which may, 
at first instance, seem to be nothing more than an occurrence of 
consciousness of one’s inner consciousness – in fact involves the 
awareness that we are psycho-material entities that take up some space 
and can be seen and followed by others, it becomes, again, more 
comprehensible why we can identify a self through its body, even when 
we judge that our conscious experiences and self-consciousness are 
what is most essential to us. When the content of my experiences and 
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my thoughts of my experiences (e.g. my personal memories) are 
themselves partly constituted by my awareness of the fact that I, 
thanks to my body, take up one particular visible space, at one 
particular moment in time, then a conscious self appears to not just be 
a mental self. Many of its conscious experiences, and even of its self-
conscious experiences, are informed by its existence as an 
intersubjectively observable psycho-physical being. As a consequence, 
fully describing a diachronic self involves describing it as a physical 
being which, as long as it exists, takes up some space in time. A self 
can only be the diachronic being it is, even in consciousness, if it is also 
a physically observable being in an intersubjectively shared space and 
time, and can think of itself as such. 
 
 
5. Experiential memory as self-knowledge 
 
The fact that we, in experientially remembering something, situate 
the event at a particular (although perhaps undefined) moment in our 
life history, does not imply that, so as to experientially remember 
something, you first have to check, every time, if what you seem to 
remember can have happened in your life, given the places you have 
been at and the route you have followed between them. Our 
experiential memory is permeated by the background assumption that, 
once in our life, we experienced the remembered event, but explicitly 
checking whether the latter was the case is not a necessary component 
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of the genesis of our experiential memory.47 The assumptions that we 
must make to interpret memories as experiential memories, are just 
background assumptions. They determine the way we think about the 
world and ourselves. They are glasses through which we see things 
and, because of which, we can interpret memories as memories – but, 
they are not elements of which we first need to check the presence, to 
then determine that a certain thought is a memory. 
It is true that one’s statements about one’s own past are grounded 
in the assumption that one is bodily continuous with the person one is 
talking about: one was always where this person was. In this sense, I 
disagree with Shoemaker who says that 
“[o]ne’s statements about one’s own past, when made on the basis 
of memory, are not grounded on bodily identity, or spatiotemporal 
continuity, as a criterion of personal identity; they are not grounded 
on the knowledge of any physical relationship between one’s present 
body and a past one” (Shoemaker 1963, p. 34). 
I argued that, when we, in remembering, state something about our 
past, we assume that we experienced the remembered event at one 
particular time and at one particular place. This is so, even when we 
do not recall the exact time and space of the remembered event. We 
assume that we, being where we are now, were then at another 
                                                 
47 I say that it is not a necessary component in the genesis of this memory, because 
it can occasionally be a component of this memory. It, for instance, functions as such 
a component when a thought comes to mind, and you do not immediately know 
whether this is a thought of something you really experienced or a thought of a 
dream you just had. In this case, you can try to see if you remember other things, 
such as where you were the previous day, to see whether it is likely or implausible 
that you have really experienced this. It can then suddenly appear to you that you 
did, in fact, experience this. In this case, checking whether something really 
happened has a part in the genesis of an experiential memory of yours: it gives the 
thought of the supposedly experienced event the character of a memory, rather than 
that of a good or bad dream. 
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particular place. We only assume this, because we learned that we are 
continuous beings that take up some space in a material world and that 
we have always been at one particular place, at one particular time. 
The latter is part of our knowledge about the world and a prerequisite 
for it.  
Still, I agree with Shoemaker that 
“[i]t would be absurd to suggest that in order to be entitled to say 
‘I remember taking a walk last night’ I must first examine my body 
and satisfy myself that it is the same as some particular body that 
existed last night” (Shoemaker 1963, p. 34).  
It is, indeed, not so that in order to be entitled to say that you 
remember something, you must first have checked whether you were 
really once physically present at the event that you seem to remember. 
Although this must have been the case for this memory to be a true 
memory, and although you assume in remembering that this was the 
case, you do not have to check, every time, that this was the case, before 
you can say that you remember something. Still, if we would 
coincidentally find out that we were not physically present at the event 
that we seem to remember, we would conclude that what seemed to be 
a memory was not a memory after all. This means, after all, that our 
reliance on memories of our past depends on a physical criterion for 
personal identity. 
Shoemaker was convinced that this could not be the case. He 
thought he had the ultimate argument to prove that our reliance on 
memories precedes any testing on whether we were physically present 
at the event that we seem to remember, when he said that we can only 
test the latter by trying to find out, through memory, whether this was 
the case (Shoemaker 1963, p. 33, 35, 39). This is a fallacy. We could, 
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just as well, learn from others that we were not physically present at 
a particular event, or we could use our reason to conclude that we 
could not possibly have been at a certain place. 
By now, I hope to have shown that our experiential memory, 
sometimes thought of as a consciousness of our own inner conscious 
only, is, in fact, also informed by our idea of the spatio-temporal world 
we live in and the place which we have in this world. In the next 
chapter, I will illustrate how this is equally so for our sensations, and 
even for the thoughts that we have about ourselves qua mental selves. 
Together, this should illustrate how different instances of our 
supposed consciousness of inner consciousness are, in fact, not a 
consciousness of inner consciousness alone, but are equally influenced 
by our assumption that we take up a specific place in the spatio-
temporal world. This should help us understand why we can identify 
a person by his body, even if we judge that his psyche is what defines 
him most: even in experiencing himself as a mental being, a person 
equally assumes himself to be a physical being. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
ASCRIBING SENSATIONS AND THOUGHTS 
TO ONESELF 
 
What holds for experiential memories also holds for sensations and 
thoughts about myself qua psychological self: while, in having them, 






At first sight, we seem to access sensations through consciousness 
– if we would not have consciousness, we would not become aware of 
any sensations – and sensations seem to be nothing, but an awareness 
of a current conscious experience. Yet, just as is the case for 
experiential memories, these first ideas we may have about sensations 
do not account for their full phenomenal truth. I will show how the 
way we ascribe sensations to ourselves, and even the way we 
experience them, is informed by our idea that we live one continuous 
life, through one body. I will do so, (1) by demonstrating that we can 
only (self-)ascribe a particular sensation if we can attribute different 
sensations to the same located self, and, (2) by showing that how we 
experience a sensation depends on the image of the body we have. 
If I am successful in doing so, this will, again, help to explain why 
our re-identification of a particular body can make us recognize a self 
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as the same self, even when we consider this self’s consciousness as 
that, which is most essential to it. For, if the consciousness it has of 
being conscious is informed by the idea it has of living through a 
particular body, then fully recognizing it as a self-conscious being 
involves identifying it as a being, who has an idea of living through a 
particular body. Identifying someone by means of the body which has 
an important part in constituting her self-consciousness, does not, 
then, seem to be completely opposite to identifying her as a self-
conscious being. This explanation does not sketch how we start re-
identifying persons by their bodies. It merely shows why it is not 
absurd or irrational that we do so. Genealogically speaking, it at most 
explains why once we re-identify persons thus, we do not feel forced 
to stop re-identifying them in this manner. 
 
 
1. We can only (self-)ascribe a particular sensation if we 
can attribute different sensations to the same located 
self 
 
A first requirement for one to ascribe a particular sensation, as a 
particular sensation, is that one has, or has had, more than one 
sensation. The reason for this is twofold. (1) A particular sensation can 
only be isolated as a particular sensation, in the sense of being 
numerically or qualitatively individuated, if one can distinguish it from 
other sensations. (2) Sensations can only be distinguished from one 
another by a self who experiences all of these sensations. For one to be 
such self, one must have a sense of being a self.  And for one to develop 
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this sense of being a self, one must have more than one sensation. Let 
me elaborate on this a little further. 
(1) Since both individuation and meaning come about through 
diversification, a particular sensation can only be recognized as a 
particular sensation, and, thus, one among other sensations, if there are 
other sensations. We can only numerically individuate a particular 
sensation if we experience that there are other instances of similar or 
distinct sensations from which it can be distinguished; and we can only 
recognize that a sensation has a particular quality, when we are able 
to experience that there are sensations with other qualities. Imagine a 
being who is born in a state which we would call ‘pain’, but who does 
not have any other sensation. This being could not even imagine that 
there is something as relief from pain, and therefore not form a wish 
to escape this pain. He will not recognize that pain is one numerical 
instance of a sensation that can arise and disappear. As a consequence, 
he will not be able to individuate the experience, in which he is 
indulged, as a particular experience, and so he will not be able to self-
ascribe it: for him there is nothing (particular) that he can self-ascribe. 
(2) Sensations can only be distinguished from one another by a self 
who experiences them all. A sense of self, and so a self, only comes into 
being when this self distinguishes itself as experiencing subject from 
what is experienced. This, in its turn, can only happen when this self 
has more than one sensation, as was already remarked by Hume when 
he answered the following question negatively. 
“Suppose the mind to be reduc’d even below the life of an oyster. 
Suppose it to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. 
Consider it in that situation. Do you conceive anything but merely 
that perception? Have you any notion of self or substance?” (Hume 
1978, Appendix, p. 634) 
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The reasons why we do not conceive of anything more here are 
multiple. If there is only one sensation, the sensations lack which 
would allow a self to have any feelings about the present sensation, let 
alone to act on it. This means that there is no possibility for a self to 
develop a sense of character or agency. Further, if there would only be 
one sensation, and no other impressions, there would be no possibility 
for a subject to locate this sensation at a particular place: he would not 
know of any elements that could allow him to construct the idea of a 
space with different places. Hence, there would be no possibility for 
the ascription of feelings to someone who feels them at a particular 
place and must, thus, be at that particular place. The sensation would 
be everywhere and so there is no possibility for a subject to become a 
particular subject by being somewhere in particular. Lastly, the lack of 
multiple sensations would prevent anyone from ascribing the one 
sensation to the one who feels it, in contrast to the one who does not 
feel it. For, if there is only one sensation, one cannot even start to 
imagine that there is something, such as the ability to not feel it, and, 
so, neither that there could be someone who does not feel it (in contrast 
to someone who does feel it). 
To have the required more than one sensation, to be able to ascribe 
a particular sensation, a particular sensation has to be located in space 
and time. It cannot be constantly everywhere. For, if it was constant 
and everywhere, then we would again not be able to individuate it as a 
particular sensation. So, in being aware of a particular sensation, we are 
also conscious of it being felt at a particular place and time, and not at 
another place, at another time. 
As we already saw, our identification of place and time is never 
purely descriptive, but always, at least in part, indicative. As we also 
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saw, this requires that we have a consciousness of being at a particular 
place and time ourselves. It then becomes clear that to ascribe a 
particular sensation, we must have had different sensations, we must 
have been able to locate these sensations, and we must locate ourselves 
at a particular place and time. 
 
 
2. How we experience a sensation depends on our image 
of the body we have 
 
In the previous paragraph, I focused on the requirements for 
ascribing particular sensations. I concluded that one condition of the 
self-ascription of these particular sensations is that we can locate 
ourselves in space and time. Our self-ascription of particular 
sensations, thus, appeared to involve more than a consciousness of our 
mere inner consciousness. Now, I turn to our experience of sensations 
and show how our localization of these sensations is equally informed 
by more than our consciousness of consciousness alone. I will argue 
that sensations, on their own, do not make us localize them as we do, 
but that our localizing of these sensations is informed by a conception 
that we already have of the shape of our body. This is a fact, not a 
necessary requirement. It can be illustrated by thinking about a 
finding in neuroscience. 
Neuroscientists showed us that certain experiences that are 
normally provoked by our bodily interaction with the world can also 
be initiated by an immediate tampering of the brain. One famous 
example is that of the trembling of a finger. In normal circumstances, 
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one of your fingers may start trembling after lifting excessive weight, 
or when you are tired or nervous. Neuroscientists have shown that a 
similar trembling of the finger can be provoked when they 
immediately tamper with your brain, by means of placing, on your 
head, a special hat that sends magnetic impulses to parts of your brain. 
Given that this is possible, we can also imagine neuroscientists 
tampering with our brain in, such a way, that it would provoke a pain 
in our knee, similar to a pain we may feel there after a fall. The question 
is, whether the neuroscientist would also be able to make me locate 
this pain at the same place as I would normally do, if I did not have a 
prior conception of having a body. My hypothesis is that he would not 
be able to do this by merely invoking a particular sensation, and that I 
would only imagine this pain to be in my knee, when I already have an 
idea of what it is to have a knee.48 If I never before saw my body and 
did not learn that it is continuous, I would not be able to locate distinct 
flashes of pain in the same body part or, for that matter, at the same 
place. I would have no background knowledge that would allow me to 
                                                 
48 Gareth Evans (1982, p. 251) says something similar when he says that, as a 
brain in a vat, I could only imagine sitting on a bank with my knees bent, if I were 
embodied before and my experience of my own body and my perception of those of 
others taught me what it meant to sit on a bank with my legs bent. He reasons that 
our brain as an organ, in itself insensitive, cannot give us any sensation and that, if 
we never had these sensations, we could not think of how they would feel like: we 
cannot construct them in our fantasies. I go one step further. I say that even when a 
sensation could be provoked in a brain-in-a-vat by tampering with it, we would not 
be able to locate it and experience it as we normally do, if we never had a real 
experience of seeing what it is to have a shape and solidity. We would have no 
incentive or means to construct the idea of being shaped thus. 
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(re-)identify a place. I could, of course, always feel a pain close to where 
I feel an itch, but even that would not help me to localize this itch and 
pain: they could be felt together at different places. If I do not have an 
idea of having one continuous body with a certain shape and solidity, 
I cannot localize sensations at one particular place in space.49 Of 
course, I would be able to feel something when the neuroscientist 
tampered with my brain, in this way. My hypothesis, so far, is just that 
I would not locate it in my one knee, as I would normally do, if I do 
not receive more input than this particular provoked sensation alone. 
My second hypothesis, in this regard, is that my particular experience 
of the sensation will differ, depending on whether I can or cannot 
locate it in my knee. Something similar happens when you have an 
undefined tummy-ache and the doctor later tells you which organ 
exactly provokes this pain. The fact that you do not know where 
exactly to locate the pain in the first case, but you do know where to, 
in the second, will confine it in the latter case and give you a different 
experience of it.  It is, thus, not necessary for a sensation to be felt, that 
you locate it on or in your body, but given that we do so, because we 
have an idea of the shape of our body and thus of how it occupies space, 
our locating of this sensation does influence our experience of it. This 
means that our experience of sensations is influenced by more than our 
                                                 
49 It would not be relevant, in this context, to suggest that, as a brain-in-a-vat, 
we could still ascribe experiences to ourselves as a mental self, rather than as an 
embodied self. For, we set out to discover what is required of us to experience a 
sensation, which is, per definition, a located feeling. The question here is whether 
our ascription and experience of this located feeling only depend on our inner 
consciousness and inner constructed sense of space, or whether it depends on more 
than that. 
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inner consciousness alone: it also depends on the idea that we have of 
how our body looks like outside of an inner space. So, contrary to what 
at first may have seemed to be the case, both our ascriptions and 
experiences of sensations involve more than consciousness alone. 
 
 
II. THOUGHTS ABOUT MYSELF AS A MENTAL SELF 
 
What is true for sensations, is also true for thoughts we have about 
our psychological character, such as the thought ‘I am stupid.’ At first 
sight, these thoughts seem to fully consist in a consciousness of inner 
consciousness, arrived at through consciousness. Still, they only 
present themselves as they do, because we are aware of more than our 
inner consciousness alone and, more specifically, because we are aware 
of the fact that we are located in a space that we share with others. 
Before I demonstrate that this is the case, let me recognize why this, 
at first sight, may not seem to be so. When we think about ourselves 
as mental selves, we may, at first sight, not seem to think of ourselves 
as located beings, simply because these thoughts do not seem to 
concern something physical that is necessarily located. Sensations are 
different: feeling them on, or in, our body gives us information about 
our body. But the thought, ‘I am quite a character’, says nothing about 
my brain that produced it. 
Still, I-thoughts about one’s own mental character involve more 
than a consciousness of consciousness. Even in thinking of ourselves 
as mental beings, we think that we are somewhere. We attribute a 
place to this mental self in the physical space that we share with others. 
In his well-known essay ‘Where am I?’, Daniel Dennett (1998) argues 
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that this is so because we consider ourselves to be functional selves, 
and therefore locate ourselves where we receive and process input, as 
well as where we generate output. I will first highlight how Dennett 
illustrates this and then further elaborate upon his statement. 
In ‘Where am I?’ Dennett (1998, pp. 310-323) imagines a situation, 
in which scientists put his brain in a vat in a specific lab and send his 
body elsewhere. In a first scenario, the scientists connect Dennett’s 
brain with his body, by means of radio-links. In this way, his brain can 
still send commands to his body, and his body can still send received 
sensory information to his brain, just as they would do when nerves 
connected them to one another. In a second scenario, these links are 
severed and the former body of Dennett is left without sensations or 
capability of performing actions. In the lab, Dennett’s brain gets 
connected to a new body. In a third scenario, Dennett learns that 
scientists have developed a software program which makes a computer 
run exactly as Dennett’s mind would: if it receives the same input, it 
generates the same output. The computer that runs this program is a 
copy of the functional organism which Dennett’s brain is. The 
scientists have experimented with connecting Dennett’s former body 
to this computer, instead of to his brain. Dennett remained unaware of 
this while performing actions. He could not tell whether his actions 
were initiated by his brain, or by this computer program. 
Dennett wonders where he would consider himself to be in these 
respective scenarios. Would he consider himself to be in his brain, in 
the rest of his body, in both, or in neither? Dennett’s answer to this 
question shifts, depending on the scenario he imagines himself to be 
in, and the angle from which he looks at it. This can leave one with the 
impression that he does not give one final answer to the question of 
CH 6: Ascribing Sensations and Thoughts To Oneself 
[156] 
his essay’s title, and that he just does what the title of his essay bundle 
says: brainstorming. This would be the wrong conclusion. If I 
interpret Dennett’s essay correctly, then he holds that we conceive of 
ourselves as functional selves, who are able to both receive and process 
input, as well as to generate output; he also holds that we situate 
ourselves at the place of this functional organism. This would explain 
why Dennett takes himself to be simultaneously in the brain and the 
rest of the body, in the first scenario: the brain is where he receives and 
processes input and the rest of the body is where he generates output. 
My interpretation of Dennett’s answer to his question also explains 
why Dennett believes that he would continue to live through his own 
brain and new body, in the second scenario (where his brain gets 
connected to a new body), and why he would then still be the same 
person: he still functions in the same way. He has received the same 
input, continues to receive further input, processes it as he processed 
it before, and generates similar output, for similar input. Lastly, my 
interpretation of Dennett’s answer to his question ‘Where am I?’ fits 
what he says about the third scenario. It explains why he thinks that 
he would still be the same self when the computer program takes over 
the task that his previous brain fulfilled: considered as a functional 
organism, the computer-body-whole is identical to the brain-body-
whole. 
Dennett has a point: we are functional selves and perceive ourselves 
as such. We see mental selves in, and conceive of mental selves as, 
beings who can receive information, process it, and generate an output 
in response to it. In doing so, we physically locate these selves. We see 
them where they listen to us, smell, speak, or act. For instance, we 
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understand the will of a mental self to work longer, when we see how 
she programs her alarm clock earlier for the next morning.  
However, Dennett is too quick in inferring that the fact that mental 
selves are functional organisms implies that a mental self can stay the 
same self, even if her ‘hardware’, which she needs to receive input, 
process it, and generate output, is replaced by distinct non-continuous 
matter. I expect that most of us will equally be reluctant to accept this 
inference. To have been a particular self, one must have experienced 
what this self experienced. Dennett assumes that we can say that the 
computer experienced the same as Dennett did, and is hence the same 
self, because scientists provide it at a later moment with all the input 
Dennett once received. I contest that the computer here receives the 
same input as Dennett did. Dennett will have some memories of past 
events, whereas the computer will merely have information about 
these events. 
 
I have used Dennett’s essay, ‘Where am I?’, as a starting point, to 
illustrate how the functional character of mental selves makes us locate 
them physically. I have also argued that this does not imply that a 
mental self can be downloaded and uploaded in any distinct kind of 
material. I will now further elaborate on where the functional character 
of a mental self makes us locate it. 
(1) A first place is our body, through which we often produce 
output. 
(a) The body is a place where we give expression to our mentality. 
While others may not typically perceive our brain and while they think 
of our mental character, rather than of some neuro-physical processes, 
when they think of us, they still get much of who we mentally are by 
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looking at what we physically express. They get this from our facial 
expressions and bodily behaviour. They also address us as mental 
beings via our body: they look us in the eye when they want to address 
us, and they caress our body when they want to comfort us. From this, 
we ought not to conclude that our mental character is something 
hidden inside us, and that others can only guess, on the basis of our 
bodily behaviour, what our mental character is really like. Part of our 
mental character is just how we visibly behave, and part of our 
psychological interaction with others involves communication 
through touch. 
 (b) The body is also that with which we act on intentions. This 
makes Dennett more tempted to locate himself, in certain situations, 
in the remaining part of his body, rather than in his brain, which is 
nevertheless necessary for the production of his intentions: “How 
could I be in the vat and not about to go anywhere, when I was so 
obviously outside the vat looking in and beginning to make guilty 
plans to return to my room for a substantial lunch?” (Dennett 1998, p. 
313) Dennett’s example goes to show that, as mental selves who are 
functional, we are, among other things, agents, and find ourselves at 
the place of execution of our actions. There, we can establish full 
agency. 
(2) Secondly, as functional, mental selves, we also locate ourselves 
there, where we process our thoughts. It is true, that we do not have 
any proprioceptive feelings of our brain, nor typically see how our 
brain processes our thoughts. Still, we assume that we, as mental 
selves, cannot be but where our respective particular brains are. This 
becomes clear, in thought-experiments about brain-transfers, when we 
judge that we will be where our former brain, rather than where our 
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former body, is. We have learned from experience and testimony, and 
so have, as background knowledge, that one stops thinking, when the 
brain one had lacks oxygen; that one starts thinking again, when there 
is a quick renewed blood flow through this brain; and that no-one 
suddenly feels that he is where another brain than he was using before 
is. 
Let me demonstrate the role that this kind of background 
knowledge can have for the localization of ourselves as mental selves, 
by means of three illustrations. 
(a) In ‘Where am I?’, Dennett (1998) writes about how he would 
experience himself to be catapulted back to a vat in a lab, when the 
radio-links between his brain and body would be severed and he would 
no longer see, hear, smell, or feel with this body. He would not have 
this expectation if proprioceptive feelings, alone, could make him 
locate himself at a particular place: the brain in the vat, where he 
localizes himself in this situation, still does not have any 
proprioceptive sensation. Dennett only forms the idea that he will be 
in the vat in the lab again, because he previously learned where his 
brain was located (scientists showed it to him), and because he 
previously learned that this brain is what gives him consciousness 
(scientists demonstrated this by switching the connection between his 
brain and body on and off). 
(b) It occurs that the words, in which we capture a thought about a 
mental aspect of ours, do not immediately make it apparent that we 
localize ourselves in having this thought, while the specific meaning, 
which this sentence has for us, shows that we do. It can then be our 
background knowledge of our localization that makes us localize 
ourselves when we have this thought. For example, I can have the 
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thought ‘my English is poor.’ Someone could understand the meaning 
of these words, without thinking that I localize myself when I have 
this thought. Still, I might just be doing that. I could have this thought 
and mean that my English is worse than the English I heard, or even 
mastered, when I lived in the United States. This would mean that 
when I think ‘my English is really poor,’ I am also aware that I am, 
now, at a specific place, rather than at another. It is my background 
knowledge of having a particular life-history during which I was at 
particular places, and of knowing that I can only be at one place at one 
moment, that makes that my thought ‘my English is really poor’ can 
mean ‘the English produced by the woman sitting here, trying to type 
out her dissertation in the library, is very poor;’ ‘I write quicker and 
speak more fluent than I did before I lived in the U.S.A., but I’m 
definitely not so skilled anymore as I was while I was in the U.S.A;’ as 
well as ‘what a pity that time and distance prevent me from being in 
the U.S.A. right now.’ I then do not think ‘what a pity that I cannot 
mentally be in the U.S.A. right now’. I think ‘what a pity that the 
U.S.A. is too far for me to (physically) be there right now’. So, a 
thought that, at first sight, may seem to be just about myself as a 
mental being can, in fact, be tied to, and informed by, thoughts about 
the physical being that I am as well. 
 (c) I may daydream about staying in bed and having the 
opportunity to sleep in, rather than having to sit upright at the office. 
It can seem as if, in my conscious activity of day dreaming, I consider 
myself only as a mental being, i.e. as a fantasizing mental being. This 
is not entirely true: here, I only consider myself to be a fantasizing 
mental being, because I simultaneously have the background 
knowledge that I am also a physical being, and cannot really be in the 
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bedroom, while I am in the office. I also only have the idea that the 
bedroom really exists and is a couple of miles away from me now, 
because I know that I could physically go there, rather than just 
mentally imagine myself there. Here, my background knowledge 
about being a physical self allows me to understand in which kind of 
mental thinking activity I am involved, i.e. daydreaming about 
something that really exists, rather than a current experience of 
something, or a wild fantasy about a non-existing world. Again, a 
thought that may have seemed to be a thought about myself, as a 
purely mental being, appears to simultaneously be a thought about 
myself, as a physical being. 
All these illustrations should have established that our notion of 
ourselves as a functional self, together with our background 
knowledge of how we function in this world, makes us locate ourselves 
as mental selves, even if mentality, at first sight, seems to be radically 
distinct from anything material and localizable. 
 
 
III. SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND LOCATING ONESELF 
 
Now, I have argued that, often, when we are first inclined to think 
that a specific instance of self-consciousness consists in a 
consciousness of mere inner consciousness, this consciousness is, in 
fact, equally informed by our knowledge of our diachronic physical 
existence. (a) We saw that a mere sensation does not give us a sense of 
self, and that we already have to have an idea of being a diachronically 
existing self with an integrated body, before we can individuate a 
sensation as a particular sensation. (b) We also saw that many 
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thoughts, that at first seem to concern our mental self only, in fact, 
also say something about us as diachronically existing physical 
entities. 
However, it is not because we assume our diachronic and physical 
existence in these cases, that we are also always consciously and 
actively aware of this existence. It is as Evans says about someone’s 
awareness of being in front of a house: 
“Certainly what he perceives comprises no element corresponding 
to ‘I’ in the judgement ‘I am in front of a house’: he is simply aware 
of a house. But if we are to interpret a judgement made upon this 
basis as having the content ‘I am in front of a house’, we must have 
reason to suppose that the subject regards himself as recognizing 
the existence of a state of affairs of precisely the same kind as 
obtains when, for instance, a car is in front of a house. So what he 
envisages, or judges, certainly comprises two elements spatially 
related, although what he sees does not. (This only goes to show 
that it is not a good idea, in attempting to determine the content of 
a person’s judgement, to examine nothing but the content of the 
perceptions which can legitimately give rise to it)” (Evans 1982, pp. 
232-233). 
As I mentioned above, one should not conceive of the background 
knowledge here in play as a true belief which we explicitly justified. It 
is not the case that we first experience the world and subsequently 
infer that we must be diachronically existing physical beings. To state 
things thus, would give the impression that we already individuate 
ourselves as mental selves before we perceive ourselves as being 
housed in a physical body. I have shown in multiple ways how our 
initial consciousness of being one mental self is already informed by 
our knowledge of being one physical creature. Our knowledge, that we 
are diachronically existing physical creatures, is experiential 
knowledge: it stems from our experience in and of the world, but is not 
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arrived at by inferring something from this experience. Our 
assumption that we are diachronically existing physical beings always 
already shapes our experience of the world we live in. 
 
 
IV. IMMUNITY  TO  ERROR  THROUGH  MISIDENTIFICATION 
 
There is yet another occasion at which my self-consciousness may, 
at first sight, seem to be a mere consciousness of inner consciousness, 
but, upon further examination, involves more than that. This is so, 
when my reference to myself is immune to an error through 
misidentification. This reference to myself is such, that there is no way 
I could have been mistaken and referred to someone else when I said 
or thought ‘I’. 
There are two main reasons to think that our consciousness, which 
make us refer in this way, is merely a consciousness of our inner 
consciousness. 
A first reason comes to light when one looks at Sydney Shoemaker’s 
interpretation of these self-references which are immune to error 
through misidentification. Shoemaker holds that these self-references 
occur when my affirmation of the instantiation of a property is 
immediately an affirmation of the fact that I have this property 
(Shoemaker 1968, p. 565). This is, for instance, the case when I feel a 
pain: when I feel a pain, I am immediately aware that I am in pain; I do 
not have to infer this.50 The opposite is true for the instantiation of the 
                                                 
50 “There is no difference between believing that one is in pain and being in pain, 
so there can be no question of explaining how it ‘happens’ that one believes that one 
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property of bleeding. When two people are fighting, one of them could 
think ‘I am bleeding,’ because he sees, in a glass window, that he has 
blood on his forehead. This person could be mistaken. The blood on 
his forehead could be the blood of the person with whom he is fighting. 
Here, the person’s affirmation of the instantiation ‘is bleeding’ is not 
immediately identical to his affirmation ‘I am bleeding.’ The person 
infers that the latter is the case, because he saw that the former was 
the case and because the context of the fight makes it likely, yet not 
certain, that this blood would be his. Philosophers have assumed that 
self-references that are immune to an error through misidentification 
must be references in which we ascribe psychological properties to 
ourselves, because it is easier to find examples of an awareness of a 
mental property, which is at the same time an awareness of the fact 
that I have this property, than it is to find an illustration of cases in 
which the awareness of a physical property is also an awareness that I 
have this property. The thought that our psychological properties are 
properties of which we have an immediate awareness through our 
inner consciousness, consequently made philosophers think that a self-
reference that is immune to error through misidentification must be a 
reference that we make on the basis of a specific inner consciousness 
of a property. 
                                                 
is in pain only when in fact one is in pain” (Shoemaker 1963, p. 219). “…when I say 
‘I am in pain,’ what I am acquainted with, or directly aware of, is just the pain itself, 
or just the fact of my being in pain. It is this direct awareness that justifies me in 
saying ‘I am in pain.’ If by ‘criterion for saying that I am in pain’ is meant something 
from which it can be inferred that I am in pain, then of course I use no criterion; but 
if by this is meant something that shows that I am in pain, then I do have a criterion; 
the pain, or the fact of my being in pain, is itself the criterion…” (Ibid). 
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Secondly, it is held that when we refer to ourselves in a way immune 
to error through misidentification, we refer to a formal self.  Referring 
to a formal self is referring to a self, without thereby envisioning which 
character traits this self has. For instance, I refer to myself in such a 
way, that when I say in a conversation ‘I think so and so,’ I have 
correctly referred to myself (and not incidentally to my neighbour), 
without first having thought about which character I have, how I look 
like, or where I am. The fact that no image of myself comes to mind in 
this self-reference, has made philosophers assume that rules governing 
the use of ‘I,’51 here make us refer to the subject of speech (who could 
have any character), rather than to a specific person, in a specific body. 
We have lesser of an image of subjects of speech than we have of 
specific personalities or characters: a spoken word can be specific, but 
any subject could pronounce it; whereas a personality, or character, is 
recognized by specific features. The self of this self-reference is called 
‘formal,’ because the reference is formal (it is rule-based), and because 
this self is in a way empty (we have no specific image of it). One still 
conceives of this self as a mental self because it is supposed to be the 
subject of speech. Philosophers then hold that our inner consciousness 
alone can make us refer to this subject, because our inner 
consciousness alone can make us aware of the fact that we speak; we 
do not have to see in a mirror that we speak, to know that we speak. 
However, in spite of these first ideas that we may have of self-
reference that is immune to error through misidentification, we, in fact, 
                                                 
51 “One can choose whether or not to use the word 'I', but the rules governing the 
use of this word determine once and for all what its reference is to be on any given 
occasion of its use, namely, that its reference is to the speaker, and leave no latitude 
to the speaker's intentions in the determination of its reference” (Shoemaker 1968, p. 
559). See also Campbell (1994, pp. 101-102). 
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often refer to more in this reference than to what we can become aware 
of through solely consulting our inner consciousness. In the following 
two paragraphs, I will first show how there are also self-references that 
are immune to error through misidentification and refer to ourselves 
as an embodied subject. Subsequently, I will show that, even in cases 
where the self-reference that is immune to error through 
misidentification seems to refer to a mere mental subject, we can only 
refer to this subject, if we also assume that we have a diachronic and 
physical existence in a physical world. 
 
 
1.  An IEM self-reference to an embodied self  
 
When Wittgenstein and Shoemaker first discovered the 
phenomenon of self-reference that is immune to error through 
misidentification, they described it as a phenomenon that merely (in 
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Wittgenstein’s case52) or primarily (in Shoemaker’s case53) concerned 
the self-ascription of psychological properties. At first sight, this seems 
                                                 
52 “In the Blue Book Wittgenstein distinguished ‘two different uses of the word 
'I' (or 'my'),’ which he calls ‘the use as object’ and ‘the use as subject.’ As examples of 
the first of these he gives such sentences as ‘My arm is broken’ and ‘I have grown 
six inches.’ As examples of the second he gives ‘I see so and so,’ ‘I try to lift my arm,’ 
‘I think it will rain,’ and ‘I have toothache.’ He goes on to say: ‘One can point to the 
differences between these two categories by saying: The cases of the first category 
involved the recognition of a particular person, and there is in these cases the 
possibility of an error, or as I should rather put it: the possibility of an error has been 
provided for.... On the other hand, there is no question of recognizing a person when 
I say I have tooth-ache. To ask 'are you sure it is you who have pains?' would be 
nonsensical’” (Shoemaker 1968, p. 556; quotes within quote from Wittgenstein 1958, 
pp. 66-67). 
53 Shoemaker is slightly more nuanced than Wittgenstein. From the fact that 
some self-references are immune to error through a misidentification, Shoemaker 
does not immediately conclude that these must be references to a self as subject, 
which is, at the same time, a self to whom psychological properties are ascribed. He 
is aware of the fact that there have been some problems with the idea that a purely 
mental subject would be the subject of thought, and that the postulation of such a 
self does, therefore, not immediately explain to whom a self-reference, which is 
immune to error through misidentification, refers: “The most commonly drawn 
conclusion, of course, is that one's self, what one ‘calls 'I',’ cannot be any of the 
physical or material things one finds in the world. But as is well known to readers of 
Hume and Kant, among others, it is also widely denied that any immaterial object of 
experience could be the subject of thought and experience. These views lead 
naturally to the conclusion that 'I' does not refer, that there is no self, or that the self 
is somehow not ‘in the world’” (Shoemaker 1968, p. 560). Shoemaker further 
considers the possibility that “my ‘self’ [as] a flesh-and-blood person”, “could be 
accessible to me (itself) in a way in which it is not accessible to others, so that in 
knowing that what is presented to me is presented in this special way – from the 
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inside, as it were – I would know that it can be nothing other than myself” 
(Shoemaker 1968, p. 562). So, Shoemaker considers that a reference to oneself, as a 
bodily self, is immune to an error through misidentification. 
Still, Shoemaker concludes that the primary self-reference, which is immune to 
an error through misidentification, is a reference to a self, considered as mental self. 
This is also the kind of self-reference he gives the most examples of – his preferred 
example being that of the self-reference in memory: “But the appropriate way of 
expressing the retained (memory) knowledge that at the time of its acquisition was 
expressed by the sentence ‘I see a canary’ is to utter the past-tense version of that 
sentence, namely, ‘I saw a canary.’ This, if said on the basis of memory, does not 
involve an identification and is not subject to error through misidentification” 
(Shoemaker 1968, p. 560). For an elaboration on the same theme, see also 
(Shoemaker, 1963, ch.4) and (Shoemaker 1970). Shoemaker reasons that this 
reference to a self, considered as mental self is the most fundamental form of self-
reference that is immune to an error through misidentification, because other self-
references could not take place if this kind of self-reference was not possible.  “There, 
I think, is an important sense in which the ‘use as subject’ of the first-person pronoun 
is more fundamental than their ‘use as object’” (Shoemaker 1968, p. 566). “Now there 
are M-predicates, e.g., ‘is facing a table,’ which can in some circumstances be self-
ascribed without identification. But in order to describe the circumstances in which 
such self-ascriptions could occur and in order to formulate the grounds of such self-
ascriptions, it would be necessary to employ predicates, P*-predicates ... The speaker 
of this language would have to learn to self-ascribe such M-predicates as 'is facing a 
table' under just those circumstances in which he would be entitled to self-ascribe 
certain P*-predicates, e.g., 'sees a table in the center of one's field of vision’” 
(Shoemaker 1968, p. 566). Also: “[I]f asked what it means to call a body ‘my body’ I 
could say something like this: ‘My body is the body from whose eyes I see, the body 
whose mouth emits sounds when I speak, the body whose arm goes up when I raise 
my arm, the body that has something pressing against it when I feel pressure, and 
so on.’ All the uses of 'I' that occur in this explanation of the meaning of the phrase 
'my body', which in turn can be used to explicate the use ‘as object’ of the first-person 
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like a fair judgment. When I think ‘I am happy’, I may decide 
afterwards that I was, in fact, not really happy, but just content. 
However, it is implausible that I, in this reference, did not really refer 
to myself, but to another person. With ‘I,’ I refer to the subject of my 
thought and experience. More errors seem to be possible in ascribing 
a physical property to oneself. I first discovered that one can 
misidentify oneself in such a situation, when I once looked in the rear-
view mirror of the car I was in, and thought that I was the girl with 
the short hair, whose image was reflected in the mirror. Shortly after, 
I realized that the reflection of the girl in the mirror was not a 
reflection of me, but of a friend, who was sitting next to me in the 
packed car. When I refer to myself as a material object, the chance of 
misidentification seems to be always there, just as it is always there 
when I identify other material objects. In this second case of self-
identification, the possibility for misidentification was there, because I 
had to derive the conclusion that I am identical to the girl in the mirror 
from certain elements. I knew I had short hair for the first time in a 
long time, and that this made my face look slightly different than 
before. This is why, when I saw the girl with the short hair, I thought 
I saw myself. I identified the girl as myself on the grounds of several 
assumptions: namely, that I had short hair and looked slightly different 
than I looked before. In contrast, there was no room for me to 
misidentify myself, in the first case. I did not infer the thought ‘I am 
happy’ from some other assumptions and present factors. The thought 
and feeling, itself, immediately made me refer to myself. 
                                                 
pronouns in the self-ascription of M-predicates, are themselves uses ‘as 
subject’”(Shoemaker 1968, p. 567). 
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In spite of this obvious difference between two kinds of self-
ascriptions which could explain why the first is always, and the second 
never completely immune to error through misidentification, Gareth 
Evans (1982) and Quassim Cassam (1997) argued that a self-ascription 
of physical properties can equally be immune to error through 
misidentification.  
Evans (1982, pp. 218-220) explains that we often do not realize this 
because we think of immunity to error through misidentification as 
something that applies to propositions. If this were so, then statements 
about our own body would, indeed, not be immune to error through 
misidentification. When I say ‘I have goose bumps,’ this proposition is 
not immune to error through misidentification. I could be looking at a 
picture of three girls sitting with their back to the photographer, seem 
to recognize that I am one of the girls, and derive from this 
identification that I had goose bumps there. I might be right about this, 
but it is also possible that the girl in the picture was not me, but just 
happens to look like me, sitting at a place where I once sat, in a similar 
bikini. In such a case, I would have mistakenly misidentified myself as 
the girl with goose bumps. Since this is possible, the proposition about 
my own body ‘I have goose bumps’ is not immune to error through 
misidentification. 
Still, Evans would argue that the statement ‘I have goose bumps’ 
could be immune to error through misidentification. It is IEM when 
the utterance ‘I have goose bumps’ is not just a proposition, but also a 
judgment that came about through a specific channel we use to gain 
knowledge. Evans holds that when someone says ‘I have goose bumps’ 
and does so because he has the sensation of having goose bumps, this 
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judgment would be immune to error through misidentification.54  He 
argues that this would be so, because, for me, there is no difference 
between feeling (and so knowing) that goose bumps are instantiated, 
and feeling (and so knowing) that I have goose bumps. This is just like 
there is no difference between the feeling (and so knowledge) that the 
property of pain is instantiated and the feeling (and so knowledge) that 
I am in a state of pain. According to Evans, then, immunity to error 
through misidentification applies to utterances about our own body, 
when these utterances are judgments and when we use specific ways 
of gaining knowledge to arrive at these judgments. So, utterances 
about our physical condition are not always immune to error through 
misidentification, but this does not exclude that they are, sometimes 
(namely, when we arrive at them through specific ways of gaining 
knowledge).55 
                                                 
54 Evans gives a slightly different but, comparable example: “There is a way of 
knowing that the property of ξ’s hair being blown by the wind is currently 
instantiated, such that when the first component expresses knowledge gained in this 
way, the utterance ‘The wind is blowing someone’s hair, but is it my hair that the 
wind is blowing?’ will not make sense” (Evans 1982, p. 218). 
55 “Wittgenstein’s discussion does not take sufficient account of the fact that the 
property of being immune to error through misidentification is not one which applies 
to propositions simpliciter, but one which applies to judgements made upon this or 
that basis. Once we appreciate this relativity to a basis, which arguably must be taken 
into account in the case of mental self-ascription as well, the fact that there are cases 
involving the self-ascription of physical predicates in which ‘the possibility of error 
has been provided for’ will be seen not to impugn the fact that there are cases in 
which it just as clearly has not” (Evans 1982, pp. 218-219). 
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Evans discusses “two ways we have of gaining knowledge of our 
physical states and properties, both of which give rise to the 
phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification” (Evans 
1982, p. 220). We just dealt with one instance of the first way. Our 
ability to feel our goose bumps belongs to what Evans describes as our 
“general capacity to perceive our own bodies” (Ibid). This capacity 
includes “our proprioceptive sense, our sense of balance, of heat and 
cold, and of pressure” (Ibid). As I just explained, Evans argues that it 
gives us knowledge because 
“[t]here just does not appear to be a gap between the subject’s 
having information (or appearing to have information), in the 
appropriate way, that the property of being F is instantiated, and 
his having information (or appearing to have information) that he 
is f; for him to have, or to appear to have, the information that the 
property is instantiated just for it to appear to him that he is F” 
(Evans 1982, p. 221). 
Secondly, there is the “way in which we are able to know our 
position, orientation, and relation to other objects in the world upon 
the basis of our perceptions of the world. Included here are such things 
as: knowing that one is in one’s bedroom by perceiving and 
recognizing the room and its contents; knowing that one is moving in 
a train by seeing the world slide by (…) Once again, none of the 
following utterances appears to make sense when the first component 
expresses knowledge gained in this way: ‘Someone is in my bedroom, 
but is it I?’; ‘Someone is moving, but is it I?’” (Evans 1982, p. 222) 
Quassim Cassam seconds this. He argues that, while a self-reference 
that is immune to error through misidentification is always a self-
reference of a subject to itself as subject, this subject can still be a 
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bodily self. Cassam gives the same examples as Evans to demonstrate 
when this is the case: 
“This is so when a subject is aware of his sensations. One example 
of a sensation is the feeling of being solid. A subject for instance 
experiences its own solidity when it experiences the solidity of 
another object: Solidity can be either seen or felt, and an extremely 
important aspect of the perception of solidity by touch is the way in 
which it is bound up with a sense of the solidity of the perceiver. 
Solidity is typically felt as an impediment to one’s movements, and 
to experience a solid object as an ‘obstructive something’ 
(O’Shaughnessy 1989, p. 41) is at the same time to be sensibly or 
intuitively aware of that which is obstructed – the subject of tactile 
perception – as something solid” (Cassam 1997, p. 52). 
So, when a subject perceives that his body is solid, he does not just 
perceive that his body qua object (which he inhabits as a pilot) is solid. 
Instead, he feels how he qua subject is solid. In being aware of solidity, 
he feels the solidity of that, which is aware of solidity. This awareness 
of oneself as solid and, thus, as a body is immune to error through 
misidentification, for the same reason as the awareness of other 
sensations is; “if you feel a sensation, it is yours” (Cassam 1997, p. 64). 
This is also why “[t]hought-experiments according to which I would 
feel someone else’s limb and thus wrongly say that I feel pain in this 
limb, don’t prove that my self-ascriptions of pain are not immune to 
error through misidentification” (Ibid). You may be mistaken when 
you think you have a limb, but you cannot be mistaken about the fact 
that you feel that you have the sensation of having a pain in a limb. 
With regard to the self-awareness that sensations give us, Cassam 
also points to something we saw before. When we have a sensation, 
we do not just locate it at the exact spot where we feel it. We are also 
aware that this spot has its place on a larger body. “[I]ndividual limbs 
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or body-parts are experienced as parts of an integrated totality” 
(Cassam 1997, p. 64). For “a limb with which one is not materially 
united cannot be a part of one” (Ibid, p. 65). This means that when we 
have a sensation “it is the bodily self rather than individual body-parts 
which is the presented subject of perception” (Ibid, p. 66). 
A subject also refers to herself as a bodily self, in a way that is 
immune to error through misidentification, when she locates things in 
the her surrounding world. To locate where a specific object is, she has 
to know where she is, and so, where the object is, in reference to her. 
She cannot just locate objects by determining their place in reference 
to the place of other objects. In Cassam’s words: 
“in egocentric spatial perception the objects of perception are 
experienced as standing in … spatial relations to the perceiver … 
[I]n experiencing objects as spatially related to one, one literally 
experiences the bodily self as located in the perceived world” 
(Cassam 1997, p. 53). 
To be located, we must have some shape and solidity, by which we 
take up space. This is why, in locating other things and so also 
ourselves, we conceive of ourselves as bodily selves. If you think that 
you, as a bodily self, are where your point of view is, and refer to 
yourself in accordance with this, this reference is IEM. This is so 
because you do not infer, from certain perceptions, where you are, but 
your perceptions, instead, immediately instantiate you as a perceiving, 
perspective-having, and so located, subject. 
In contrast to Shoemaker, Evans holds that judgments that are 
immune to error through misidentification are still expressions of 
knowledge.  Shoemaker would deny that this is the case, since 
knowledge, for him, is a justified, true belief, and statements that are 
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IEM are not based on any criteria and, thus, not justified. Here, he is 
inspired by Wittgenstein, who defended that in order to identify 
something, the possibility of misidentifying this thing (i.e. mistakenly 
thinking that some identifying criteria are in place) should have 
existed. According to Shoemaker, there is no knowledge if there is no 
inference, just as, according to Wittgenstein, there is no identification 
if there is no process to be followed that can also lead to 
misidentification. Evans, on the other hand, explicates that our I-
thoughts do represent a form of knowledge: they are expressions of 
some of our practical knowledge. Just as thoughts about the here and 
now, thoughts about ourselves give expression to “an element 
involving sensitivity of thoughts to certain information, and an 
element involving the way in which thoughts are manifested in an 
action” (Evans 1982, p. 207). For example, if I sense that I have a pain, 
I have access to the information that I have a body, of which one part 
now hurts, and this will typically result in me trying to remedy this 
pain.  
This knowledge can be dispositional.56 A certain pain may be so 
overwhelming, that we only seem to feel the pain without 
                                                 
56 “Just as it is not necessary, if a subject is to be thinking about a place as ‘here’, 
that he actually have any information deriving from it, so it seems not to be 
necessary, if a subject is to think about himself self-consciously, that he actually have 
any information about himself. A subject may be amnesiac and anaesthetized, and his 
senses may be prevented from functioning; yet he may still be able to think about 
himself, wondering, for example, why he is not receiving information in the usual 
ways. But it would be (…) wrong to conclude from this that self-consciousness can 
be explained without reference to the various ways that subjects have of gaining 
knowledge about themselves (…). It is essential, if a subject is to be thinking about 
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instantaneously being able to locate it. Still, if the physician would ask 
us to locate this pain, we would understand his question. Similarly, we 
may not always be able to react to a pain, but if someone asks us what 
we wanted to do when we were inhibited from reacting to the pain, we 
would typically have an answer to this. 
Evans rightfully observed that this knowledge that informs our 
IEM-judgments shows that IEM-judgments are not made in a 
solipsistic mind, as some may, at first, have thought. 
“(…) our thoughts about ourselves are about objects – elements of 
reality. (…) we are able to conceive of endless states of affairs 
involving ourselves, and what we conceive is not necessarily what 
it is like for us, or what it will be like for us, to be aware of, or be in 
a position to know the existence of, such a state of affairs. Therefore 
we are not Idealists about ourselves, and this means that we can and 
must think of ourselves as elements of the objective order. All the 
peculiarities we have noticed about ‘I”-thoughts are consistent with, 
                                                 
himself self-consciously, that he be disposed to have such thinking controlled by 
information which may become available to him in each of the relevant ways.” (Evans 
1982, pp.215- 216) 
Also: “I have emphasized that a subject’s Idea of himself does not require him to 
have a current conception of himself; what is required, in the exceptional 
circumstances in which the various avenues of self-knowledge are blocked, is that 
the subject be disposed to accept any information accessible in those ways as 
germane to the thoughts we regard as manifesting self-consciousness. But in the 
normal situation, of course, these dispositions are exercised, and he has an evolving 
conception of himself, embodying information derived in the various ways, and 
partly retained in memory, which informs his thoughts about himself. As with other 
thoughts which are information-based, there is a presupposition that there is just one 
thing from which the various elements of the conception derive.” (Evans 1982, p. 
249) 
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and, indeed, at points encourage, the idea that there is a living 
human being which those thoughts concern” (Evans 1982, p. 256). 
Evans concludes that because “many philosophers give the quite 
mistaken impression that it is only our knowledge of our satisfaction 
of mental properties which gives rise to judgments exhibiting 
immunity to error through misidentification” (Ibid, p. 217), they get 
“the impression that in thinking of oneself self-consciously, one is 
paradigmatically thinking about oneself as the bearer of mental 
properties, or as a mind – so that our ‘I’- thoughts leave it open, as a 
possibility, that we are perhaps nothing but a mind” (Ibid). He argues 
that if we would see that “our self-conscious thoughts about ourselves 
also rest upon various ways we have of gaining knowledge of ourselves 
as physical things” (Ibid, p. 213), we would also see that “[o]ur 
thoughts about ourselves are in no way hospitable to Cartesianism. 
Our customary use of ‘I’ simply spans the gap between the mental and 
the physical, and is no more intimately connected with one aspect of 
our self-conception than the other” (Ibid, p. 256). 
While Sydney Shoemaker contributed significantly to our 
understanding of self-reference, Evans better covered, distinct 
occasions at which this self-reference is also an expression of self-
knowledge that is immune to error through misidentification. Evans 
also elaborated more extensively upon the nature of this self-
knowledge. Shoemaker taught us that we can refer to ourselves, 
without thereby envisioning properties which characterize us, and that 
this self-reference is immune to error through misidentification. Evans 
additionally clarified that it is not because this self-reference is without 
criteria, that it is not made possible in the first place by previously-
acquired knowledge about ourselves and the world in which we live. 
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He also added that part of this knowledge may be knowledge about 
ourselves as physical objects, and that there are cases, in which our 
self-reference is immune to error through misidentification, even when 
we refer to ourselves as embodied subjects. This taught us that a self-
conscious thought, of which, at first sight, we may think that it is about 
our inner consciousness and only reached by consulting this 
consciousness, in fact, can be about ourselves as embodied subjects, 
and only come about because we gained knowledge about, among 
other things, being a physical object in a physical world. 
 
 
2. Some references that are IEM seem to refer to a 
mental self, but, in fact, refer to a physical self 
 
Apart from the just discussed self-references which obviously refer 
to an embodied self, there are also self-references which are immune to 
error through misidentification and which, at first sight, may seem to 
refer to a mental self, but in fact refer to an embodied self. The self-
reference in memories is one such reference. I will demonstrate this 
through an examination of Shoemaker’s analysis of the self-reference 
in memory. 
With regard to memories, Shoemaker holds that “one does not use 
bodily identity as a criterion of personal identity in making memory 
statements about one’s own past” (Shoemaker 1963, p. 207). He argues 
that this is so “not because one uses something else as a criterion but 
rather because one uses no criterion at all” (Ibid). When we refer to 
ourselves in memory, we do not first check whether certain elements 
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are in place, to then conclude that we must be the person we have 
memories about.57 We immediately assume that the latter is the case. 
In Shoemaker’s words: 
“What ‘shows’ a person that he is identical with someone who 
existed in the past is not, on this view, his consciousness of some 
fact, or set of facts, that is criteria evidence of his identity with that 
person; it is consciousness of that identity itself” (Shoemaker 1963, 
p. 39). Or again: “If what he remembers is that he broke the front 
window, then for him the question ‘Am I the person who broke the 
front window?’ cannot arise” (Ibid, p. 135). 
This is also why Shoemaker takes our self-reference in memory to 
be immune to error through misidentification: according to Shoemaker 
the self-reference in memory is immune to error through 
misidentification, because it does not involve an identification in the 
first place. 
Still, Shoemaker’s analysis of memory can be seen as a first step in 
discovering that our self-reference in memory is a reference to an 
embodied self, even when this reference is immune to error through 
misidentification. Shoemaker argues that “no one can imagine 
remembering, or knows ‘what it would be like’ to remember … a 
migratory past” (Shoemaker 1963, p. 208). To this, he adds that he is 
“doubtful whether it makes sense to say even that one can imagine 
seeming to remember, or having apparent memories of, such a past” 
(Ibid). For, 
                                                 
57 “I shall argue that while one does not use bodily identity as a criterion of 
personal identity when one says on the basis of memory that one did a certain thing 
in the past, this is not because one uses something else (some nonphysical fact) as a 
criterion, but is rather because one uses no criterion of identity at all” (Shoemaker 
1963, p. 124). 
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“[i]f one thinks that one can imagine remembering (or seeming to 
remember) having actually been in Paris, New York, and Moscow 
in rapid succession, one is perhaps thinking that remembering this 
would be something like remembering such a series of pictures. But 
a memory of a glimpse of what looked like the Kremlin cannot be 
called a memory, not even an apparent memory, of seeing the 
Kremlin unless the other memories associated with it, e.g., the 
memories of what happened before and after the glimpse, are 
compatible with the proposition that one was in Moscow at the time 
at which the remembered glimpse occurred or is remembered as 
occurring” (Ibid). 
In our world, these memories will only appear as compatible when 
it is physically possible that I have been at the places, represented by 
the distinct memories in the time-span, during which the remembered 
experiences took place. 
So, even though Shoemaker explicitly denied that, in memory, we 
refer to ourselves as traceable physical objects and reasoned that, since 
our memories immediately present themselves as being about our own 
past lives, we do not conclude this by checking whether we were really 
physically present at the event that we seem to remember, he 
simultaneously admits that for our memories to function as they do, in 
practice, we cannot have a migratory past. Specifically, this means that 
we cannot just switch bodies all the time and so be at one place in one 
moment and at a totally different place in the next. Shoemaker argues 
for this by saying that our memories should fit in a coherent context. 
If I remember having seen the Kremlin, it should also fit in my life-
story that I saw the red square and once flew to Moscow. Again, if we 
were not embodied and did not live in the world in which we factually 
live, this required coherency may have consisted in something else. 
Maybe in another kind of life, we could have been at the Kremlin in 
one second and on Table Mountain in South-Africa in the next. If we 
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were not embodied, and we seemed to have been at Table Mountain 
seconds after we were at the Kremlin, this would make sense and be 
coherent. The only reason for Shoemaker to assume that we will only 
perceive memories as memories, if they are coherent in the sense that 
they do not reflect a migratory past, is his presupposition that, 
factually, we live in this world through one body. 
When we take this into account, it appears that we can have a 
memory of something we did, without, therefore, first having to 
examine whether we were physically present at that occasion, all the 
while the perception of this memory, as a memory, still depends on our 
assumption that we are embodied in just one body. If experiential 
memory does not allow for a migratory past, every instance of 
experiential memory should be of an event that took place at one 
particular moment, at one particular place, in one particular life.  
 
 
V. OUR OBJECTIVE PHYSICAL PLACES GIVES US A 
SUBJECTIVE POINT OF VIEW 
 
In the previous paragraphs, I highlighted some ways in which our 
bodies, perhaps unexpectedly, have a part in how we identify and refer 
to ourselves. Before closing this chapter, it is worthwhile to mention a 
more obvious factor that can make us identify and re-identify selves, 
through their bodies, even when we judge that their consciousness is 
what is most essential, or important to them. It is the element that P.F. 
Strawson chooses not to touch upon in his Individuals (1959): our body 
CH 6: Ascribing Sensations and Thoughts To Oneself 
[182] 
determines our point of view and thereby makes us so localize 
ourselves both as a physical object and as a conscious subject.  
Whenever we perceive something, we perceive it from a specific 
point of view. We see and hear something from a particular angle and 
distance. Which point of view we perceive things from depends on the 
localization and orientation of our body. So, our body determines the 
content of our conscious experience. It fixes what we perceive of our 
object of perception. It also constitutes our awareness of the shape we 
have and the space we take up. For instance, the place where I am 
sitting and the direction my face is turned determines which part, and 
how much, I see of the hallway. I notice that when I walk around, I can 
see more of the hallway and that when I turn my face away, I see less 
of it. This makes me aware of both the fact that, in sitting somewhere, 
I do not sit everywhere (I take up a limited place in space), and of the 
fact that I have a backside, from which I perceive nothing. 
Naomi Eilan has argued that this limited point of view, which we 
have at any moment, and which makes us realize that we are also 
physical objects which are localized at one particular place in space, at 
one particular time, is also what makes us localize ourselves over time:  
“when we have such a primitive theory of self location in play, we 
can draw a distinction between how things seem to the subject and 
how they objectively are, where how things seem to a subject over 
time just is the extended point of view, the subjective route” (Eilan 
1995, p. 339). 
Here, Eilan points out, that we judge that we have been at all those 
places from where we perceived the world. We always observed this 
world, from a specific angle, and so never saw everything in its 
entirety, yet, at the same time, we know that, objectively speaking, 
there are things in front of us that we do not see, such as the back of 
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the table or the rest of the hallway. In judging that we have been at 
those places, from where we have observed the world, we both judge 
that we were where we were conscious and that we were where we 
were physically speaking; we were at the places where our physical 
positioning made us observe the world from a particular point of view. 
This is one other reason that can make us judge that, as conscious beings, 
we were where our bodies were; the placing and mobility of our bodies 
makes us simultaneously aware of the fact that we have a subjective 
perspective on the world and that this perspective is determined by 
our objective place in an intersubjectively shared space and time. 
There would be no subjective viewpoints, if we did not also take up 
one particular place in the world of solid objects. Our bodies are, thus, 
constitutive of our subjectivity and determine where we are, and have 





The aim of the last three chapters was to determine some of the 
factors that explain why our body can have the role it has in our 
ascription of numerical identity to selves. 
I recognized that it may seem strange that we identify selves in this 
way, given that we often identify ourselves more with the way we 
think, than with the particular body we inhabit. Our ability to be 
conscious of our consciousness and the specific contents of our 
consciousness oftentimes seems more essential to us than the body 
that produces this consciousness. It seems to say more about who we 
are as specific persons. 
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I then highlighted how our body can have a part in the identification 
or reference to mental selves. With Strawson, I demonstrated that 
material bodies function as basic particulars, which are needed to re-
identify particulars, and that our own bodies can help us to re-identify 
particular persons, given that our bodily characteristics are ascribed to 
the same entity as our more mental characteristics are. Our bodily and 
mental characteristics are both ascribed to persons and not to 
respective bodies and mental entities. I also demonstrated how, often, 
when we think that we are conscious of ourselves as mere conscious 
beings, this consciousness is, in fact, informed by our knowledge that 
we are physical beings, as well: this is so when we experientially 
remember something we did or thought; when we ascribe sensations 
to ourselves or experience them in the particular way we do; when we 
have thoughts about our mental character; and even when we refer to 
ourselves, without explicitly identifying ourselves. 
Not to forget the more obvious, I subsequently sketched how our 
point of view, which is always determined by our bodily positioning, 
equally makes it the case that in thinking about our subjective route 
through time, we also assume that, in fact, we were always, for the time 
of our existence, somewhere physically in an intersubjectively shared 
spatial world. 
In the next and last chapter, I will discuss which image of the self 
we adhere to, when we identify a self through the particular body it 
inhabits. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
WHICH IMAGE OF THE SELF 
CORRESPONDS TO OUR ASCRIPTION OF 
DIACHRONIC PERSONAL IDENTITY? 
 
By now, I have shown that, in many circumstances, we identify 
someone as numerically identical as long as he has the same (in the 
sense of ‘materially continuous’) body. I have also elaborated on how 
the properties of a physical body allow for this. In this final chapter, I 
analyze which kind of self is constituted by our practice of identifying 
a self as numerically the same, as long as he lives through the same 
continuous body. I will argue that this self remains formal to an 
important extent, yet add that it is equally crucial for the constitution 
of our more substantial character and moral being. 
 
 
I. A MINIMAL SENSE OF BEING A DIACHRONIC SELF 
 
The self whom we consider to be numerically identical as long as 
he is materially continuous, is a formal self. This is a self which is not 
kept together by any intrinsic, meaningful, important and internally 
coherent characteristics. It is solely unified by an element that is 
external to it and that does not say anything about its specific 
character, i.e. the material continuity of a physical body. This self is 
formal in the double-sense (1) that our way of ascribing numerical 
identity to it is rule-based or formal (we ascribe it when material 
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continuity is in place) and (2) that the notion of this self is rather empty 
or formal (ascribing numerical identity to it does not require that we 
know anything about its character, and it being numerically identical 
does not guarantee anything about its character: it can develop itself 
in all kinds of directions). Let me give some instances of when this self 
appears, to clarify this. 
There are moments we are aware of the fact that we have a past or 
a future, without simultaneously being aware of how we were, or will 
be then. These illustrate well that we can have a minimal or formal 
sense of being a diachronic self. One such example is when we wonder 
what will become of us. We then assume that we have one future, in 
which we will make some choices and will develop one particular life. 
We know that our life can only take a certain number of directions, 
because we can only be at one place at one time and because our life-
span is limited. But this is as specific as it gets. We do not, and need 
not, know exactly how we will develop. That is exactly what we 
wonder about. Hence, it is not a concrete imagination of being a 
particular character that gives us the idea that we will be a specific self. 
We have the idea that we will continue to exist, but this idea of 
ourselves, as a future self, can be formal. It can remain rather empty: 
we do not have to imagine how we will be like, to imagine that we will 
still be there. 
We have the same idea about other persons. For instance, we can 
wish the best for a baby and so demonstrate that we foresee that it will 
have one particular future, without binding this future to a particular 
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character.58 Here, we do not wish a particular character the best, but a 
self – whichever character it may later develop. 
Something similar holds for how we can think about our past. This 
is perhaps the clearest with amnesic patients, but we can all think this 
way. It may happen, that an amnesic patient starts answering the 
question about what she did earlier that day or that week, but then 
realizes that she cannot remember this. She then knows that she has a 
past while she does not recall anything particular about it. This, in fact, 
happens quite often: many Alzheimer patients know of their forgetting 
and are frustrated about it. An amnesic patient may also demonstrate 
that she assumes that she has a future by expressing the wish to start 
driving again or to die soon. She may also wish a granddaughter well 
on her travels – even if she forgets soon after this that her 
granddaughter is traveling at all. These examples rebut an existing 
misconception as, for instance, expressed by Revonsuo when he 
declares the following: 
“Amnesic patients who cannot form new memories are doomed to 
live in a permanent present moment. They have lost the awareness 
of self as a temporally continuous being who has traveled a long 
road from the past to the here and now, to this very moment of 
present conscious experience, and who will be heading towards the 
future” (2010, p. 137). 
Amnesic patients may fail to remember what they did in the past, 
as well as fail to execute certain of their intentions, but still have and 
work with the idea that they have a past and future. 
 
                                                 
58 Cfr. Breeur and Burms (2008, p. 141). 
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This minimal idea that we can have of being a self provides us with 
an alternative to the reductionist account of personal identity that 
Sartre (1996) and Parfit (1984) offer. It also provides an alternative to 
Daniel Dennett’s (1998) theory of personal identity as a narrative 
construct. 
Reductionists start from the idea that what we typically call an 
identity or self, in fact, constantly changes. They often add that these 
changes cannot indeterminately be kept together by an overarching 
consciousness or memory, because there are too many gaps within our 
consciousness, to do so. From this, they conclude that what we call a 
person is not one, but can be reduced to a stream of changing mental 
instances and characteristics.  
Daniel Dennett equally observes that there is no real entity such as 
‘self,’ in the world, but only disjointed streams of consciousness and 
changing character traits. As we saw in the previous chapter, Dennett 
reduced this self, in ‘Where am I?’ (1998), to a functional organism, 
which is, at no place other than, where its functioning takes place, i.e. 
where it is receiving and processing input and producing output. 
Dennett takes his analysis one step further in ‘Why everyone is a 
novelist’59 (1988). There, he points out that the reducibility of selves 
does not prevent us from narratively constructing them. According to 
Dennett, we get a sense of being one particular self by creating a story 
about ourselves that makes it seem as if different streams of 
consciousness still belong to one unified whole. 
                                                 
59 This text was published 10 years after ‘Where am I’. I refer to the 1998-version 
of ‘Where am I,’ but it was originally published in 1978. 
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I propose the alternative view that we can say of persons that they 
are diachronic selves, which can each be seen as a particular unity, even 
though they can develop themselves in all kinds of directions and they 
are not kept together by an uninterrupted consciousness. This self is 
not a specific coherent character, neither is it a narrative construct that 
turns something, perhaps at first sight incoherent, into something 
coherent. Rather, it is a unity, of which we imagine nothing, but that 
it has one past and one future only. We can refer to this self as a 
particular self, without knowing narrative particularities about the life 
of this self. It is the kind of self that – as Kripke (1972, p. 96) correctly 
pointed out – does not give or lose its proper name, depending on the 
characteristics he establishes, yet that we would not identify with a 
being that is made up of completely distinct and non-continuous 
material. Although our notion of this self is very minimal and rather 
empty, it is still meaningful – it refers to a diachronic unity, and has 
real effects, upon which I will now elaborate. 
 
 
II. OUR MINIMAL IDEA OF BEING A DIACHRONIC SELF IS 
CONSTITUTIVE OF US AS MORE SUBSTANTIAL SELVES 
 
The formality of the self I just described does not prevent it from 
functioning in our idea about, and attitudes towards, the more 
substantial self or character, which we equally take ourselves to be. On 
the contrary, its unity constitutes meaning. Below, I will first sketch 
how this formal self, as anchor of our identity, is presupposed in how 
we perceive and conceive of people as particular personalities or 
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characters, as well as in our interest in, and concern about, ourselves 
and others. In a second move, I show how our anchored identity also 
gives us freedom and flexibility in contemplating and shaping it. I 
conclude, by relating these points, and illustrate how the nature of the 
formal self explains the simultaneous feeling one can have of being 
both associated with, and dissociated from, a certain body or character. 
 
 
1. The formal self, as anchor point of our identity, 
constitutes meaning and value 
 
1.1 The intertwinement of us as a diachronically existing 
formal self and as a particular personality 
 
Our existence as a particular personality, who is known to have a 
particular character, is not independent of our existence as a formal 
self, which remains merely numerically identical. It is intertwined with 
it and presupposes it. This becomes clear when we look at the causal 
links between our thoughts and behaviour, and at the way in which 
these links shape our character. 
Neither (1) our numerical identity, nor (2) our character, are simply 
constituted by a chain of mental events that are connected to one 
another in a linear way, i.e. merely because mental event 1 causes 
mental event 2, which, in its turn, causes mental event 3 to occur. (1) 
To see why a chain of thoughts, which is connected because these 
thoughts diachronically caused one another, does not automatically 
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constitute one numerically identical self, consider the following. An 
expression of a provocative thought can cause someone to be 
provoked, which, in its turn, can cause someone to be scared of this 
provoked person. We then have three causally linked mental events (a 
provocative thought caused the feeling of being provoked, which then 
caused a feeling of fear), all the while the provoker, provoked and 
scared are not the same person. (2) Neither are merely causally linked 
mental events sufficiently interrelated to constitute the character of a 
particular person. The fact that a particular mental event causes 
another mental event is not constitutive of a personality, in as far as it 
is part of a chain with linear causal connections between its mental 
thought-buckles. A causal link between mental events only becomes 
part of the constitution of a person with a particular character, when, 
and, in as far as, the past of a particular person makes it understandable 
that this causal link is there, as well as when, and, in as far as, the 
occurrence of this causal link does not just describe a relation between 
two mental events, but says something about the person, in whose life 
the first mental event (and his past history) caused the second thought 
or established the second behaviour.60 Say, for instance, that a 
                                                 
60 Cfr. Richard Wollheim (1980): “Mental connectedness is not just any two-term 
relation between mental events that belong to one and the same person. Mental 
connectedness is that, but it also satisfies the two following conditions. One: the 
earlier of the two mental events that it relates causes the later of the two events. And 
two: the later mental event is caused by the earlier mental event in such a way that 
it – the later event, that is – then passes on to the whole person the causal influence 
of the earlier mental event” (p. 304). “…the underlying structure is that of a three-
term relation, relating mental event, mental event, and the psychology of the person” 
(ibid, p. 305) “…it is this second occurrence of causality, the onward transmission of 
a causal influence once generated, that is simultaneously the key feature of mental 
connectedness as far as personal identity is concerned and that feature of mental 
connectedness which it advocates have failed to recognize” (Ibid, p. 305). 
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particular realization causes one to cry and that this crying causes 
someone to think that he should do something to dispel the reason for 
crying. Then the mere causal links between the respectively first and 
second, and second and third mental event do not yet constitute a 
particular person or character. They are only part of such a 
constitution when the past of a person can say something about why 
this realization could make this person cry, and, in as far as, a person’s 
willingness to do something about the reason for crying does not just 
say that crying caused this eagerness, but also characterizes the person 
with this will as, for instance, resilient. 
This demonstrates the dependence of our existence as a particular 
character on our existence as a more formal, merely diachronically 
existing self. Phenomena such as the causal link between mental 
events are only indicative of a certain character, when they take place 
in one person’s life, and when one can interpret their occurrence, in the 
light of this person’s past, as well as assess what it additionally teaches 
us about the character of this person. So, the mere idea that a person 
has a past and future (and, hence, an extended numerical identity), is 
one of the conditions to interpret mental events as part of and 
constitutive of a character. Different character traits or causally 
related thoughts do not first constitute our idea of the diachronic 
existence of a self on merely other grounds. We must have the idea 
that we have a past (whatever its character), to turn to this past to 
interpret mental events as being part of, and further constitutive of a 
particular character. Of course, this past will mostly have a particular 
character that will help us see how it is exactly related to other events 
in a person’s life. Yet, if we did not already have the idea that a person 
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has a particular past, we would not start to relate events, in this way 
and, even when we did, we would not know, to which character we 
should turn first, to explain the next causally related event. Different 
characters might explain it equally well. Our assumption of having one 
particular past and future is (at least) one factor which makes that we 
interpret characters, by means of the mentioned particular causal links. 
 
 
1.2 Being interested in, and concerned for ourselves and 
others 
 
Our (idea of our) existence as formal diachronic selves also has a 
part in the constitution of our interest in, and concern for ourselves 
and others. This may seem strange, at first. Our interest in others can 
seem to be merely generated by their peculiar personality, and our 
concern for ourselves may often seem to be a concern for one of our 
specific characteristics (we may want to change them or hope not to 
lose them). Still, there are aspects of the formality of our existence as 
formal selves, which constitute particular interests and concerns that 
we have about ourselves.  
 
 
1.2.1 Our curiosity about what will happen to us 
 
In the case of our interest in ourselves and others, these aspects are 
that we expect that we all have one diachronic existence, while we also 
know that this does not determine which kind of characteristics we 
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will develop; we could develop different ones, but we will only develop 
particular ones. Together, this stimulates our curiosity about 
ourselves and others: just as our curiosity about the ending of a 
particular movie or book is aroused because we know that books and 
movies could have a whole range of different endings, although they, 
in fact, only have one ending, so we are curious about what may 
become of us or others because we realize that we could all develop 
ourselves in many different ways, while we also know that, in the end, 
we will each just have lived one particular life.61 Here, our interest in 
ourselves is not guided by any particular imagination of how we will 
be like. We are just interested in what we will be like, because we 




1.2.2 Our concern about what will happen to us 
 
A reference to ourselves as formal selves is also needed to describe 
particular concerns that we have about ourselves. I referred to one 
such concern in my discussion of Parfit in the first chapter. Parfit 
(1984, pp. 215, 216, 217, 224-225, 241, 245, 255, 273-275; 1995 29, 33, 
34, 44; 2007 passim) argued that when we seem to be concerned about 
our own future or survival, we are solely concerned about ourselves as 
qualitative beings, who can realize certain projects, thanks to these 
qualities. From this, Parfit concluded that our apparent concern for 
                                                 
61 This precise example has been given by Arnold Burms at several of his lectures 
at the KU Leuven (2006-2012) 
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our own future or survival is not really a concern for our future or 
survival. He reasons that, as soon as we realize that we care about 
ourselves as qualitative beings, who can accomplish some projects, we 
should admit that it is immaterial to us whether we survive, or whether 
someone else with our qualities finishes off the projects we set up. 
Against Parfit, I argued, with Williams (cfr. chapter 1), that our 
concern for our own future can be about us as merely numerically 
identical beings (i.e. minimal, formal selves), rather than as replaceable 
qualitative beings: even when one tells us that we would lose our 
memories and change our character, we would still worry about what 
would happen to us after this (Williams 1973b). This is, for example, 
what happens when one expresses the wish to no longer live after a 
certain stage of Alzheimer’s. Though, in that case, we will have 
forgotten who we were before, and, even though we will have changed 
our character, this is not a wish for murder. It is the wish to then die 
oneself. I can, thus, be concerned for a self, of whom I formally 




1.2.3 Our desire to accomplish projects ourselves 
 
Perry (1976) offers another good counterargument against Parfit’s 
vision: we do not only have the wish to accomplish our projects, but 
also to personally accomplish them. Perry hypothesizes that the 
importance that we here attach to identity is derivative. He suggests 
that we came to attach this importance to identity because it proved to 
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be evolutionary beneficial to do so; human kind found that persons 
tend to get the return of investment of what they personally do. I 
support this hypothesis, as long as the satisfaction and pleasure we can 
derive from how others recognize, esteem, and remember us are taken 
up as elements in the return of investment. However, this 
derivativeness of the importance of identity does not make it so that 
we can, here, reduce the object of our concern to someone or 
something, of whom the numerical identity is immaterial to us. While 
the importance that we attribute to this identity may be motivated by 
other factors than this identity itself (such as its evolutionary benefit 
or the pleasurable feeling of being esteemed), it is still us, qua 
numerically identical being, whom we are concerned about, and not 
someone who, say, has similar feelings of pleasure as we do. So, there 
is an aspect to our concern for ourselves that is a concern for ourselves 
qua formal selves, i.e. qua merely numerically identical selves. 
 
 
1.2.4 An incentive to shape ourselves as liable (moral) characters 
 
A last aspect of our formal self that has an effect on our concern 
about ourselves, is the fact that its physical existence is never 
interrupted. Our diachronic identity is bound up in our physical 
continuation. This means that we never go temporarily out of 
existence and that we are always observable. The impossibility for us 
to temporarily disappear can enhance62 our concern for what we 
                                                 
62 I say ‘enhance’ because the body, alone, does not create this concern. I can only 
have this concern when I am also gifted with a self-consciousness that is 
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should try to be like. If we were not always there, or were not always 
observable, we would not have to be concerned about what we are like 
or how we appear to others. We could choose to retreat from being 
any particular person, for some time, and be happy with that prospect. 
But given that we are always identified with whichever personality is 
living through one particular material body, and will always be 
remembered as this personality, most of us are concerned about this 
personality and try to shape it into one that will be appreciated and 
one that we would like to be remembered as. This is often a reliable, 
and so, more or less coherent one. So, our assumption of, among other 
things, being a diachronic material entity has an influence on a concern 
that we have about ourselves, and on the shaping of our (moral) 
character. 
Just like this, the realization that one has a limited lifespan and can 
only be at one place, at one time, has an influence on the character one 
develops. It makes one realize that one will have to make choices about 
where one wants to be and in what one wants to engage oneself. 
 
  
                                                 
sophisticated enough to allow me to think of myself as a diachronically existing 
being, who has a certain capacity to determine how he is, who appears in a certain 
way to others, and who can become a more or less desirable subject. The body can 
enhance this concern because it really confronts me with the fact that I can never 
temporarily disappear, as well as that my history stretches further than my memory 
does, and that I can even be held accountable, and so feel accountable, for what I do 
not remember. 
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1.3 Promise and desire 
 
In the previous paragraphs, we saw how the formal self serves as an 
anchor point that allows for the development of a character, as well as 
it can make us esteem a particular life, in a particular way, i.e. generate 
our particular curiosity and concern for it. It makes us concerned for 
one particular life rather than another; want to finish projects ourselves; 
and feel responsible for what we do during our lifetime. I will now 
elaborate on the phenomenon of promising, another aspect of our 
moral behaviour of which the formal self, as anchor point of our 
identity, is constitutive. 
When we promise something, we are expected to keep this promise, 
even when our desires change. That is the nature of a promise: to bind 
yourself to do something and not invoke excuses not to do so. When 
someone promises us something, we expect him to keep his promise, 
regardless of how his desires or character change. So, in the promise, 
we assume that someone can stay the same, regardless of changes in 
his character or desires. We thus work with the idea of being formal 
selves; i.e. selves who have a diachronic identity that does not depend 
upon a specific set of character traits. 
This presupposes the formal self that I have described, and 
distinguishes my view, once more, from that of Sartre (1961, 1996, 
2005). Just like Sartre, I have recognized that our consciousness is free. 
We cannot guard it with a particular personality. All kinds of thoughts 
may occur to us. However, contrary to Sartre, I do not conclude from 
this that we are no particular ego. While Sartre argues that your 
current mental state and actions constantly redefine yourself and that 
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you can never truthfully be someone in particular just because of your 
past actions, I hold that past actions do constitute our history and 
identity and argue that this is, for instance, shown in how we can be 
held accountable for our promises. Without the formal self I described, 
our concept of a promise could not exist. 
 
What holds for promises does not hold for desires. We are not 
typically bound to them. Still, as became clear in the previous 
paragraph about promise, we can remain the same person, even if our 
desires change. When a later desire conflicts with a previous one, there 
are typically two choices. (a) When the first desire did not place me 
under any moral or legal obligation by promising something to 
someone or signing a contract, my later desires will most typically 
overrule my earlier desires in their quest for being respected.63 Say, for 
instance, that someone, at one point in his life, expresses the wish to 
have euthanasia performed on him, if he were ever to suffer from a 
specific medical condition, but once in this condition, revokes this 
desire. Then, we would not hold him to his previous desire. This is 
why in Belgium, where euthanasia is allowed if the patient suffers 
unbearably, the patient is asked to restate his euthanasia desire twice, 
if his condition still allows him to do so. (b) One can feel justified in 
accommodating a previous desire rather than a later one, if the desiring 
subject, at one point, expressed that he considers this previous desire 
to be of a higher order than a potential contradicting later one. So, 
someone can feel justified in not providing a man with a cigarette when 
                                                 
63 For the same statement in relation to the noble man case of Derek Parfit, which 
I will criticize shortly, see Christin Korsgaard in Marshall 2012. 
CH 7: Which Image of the Self Corresponds To Our Ascription of 
Diachronic Personal Identity? 
 
[200] 
asked for it, if this man said earlier that, even if he would at one point 
desire a cigarette and ask for it, he’d wish that others would not give 
it to him, thereby helping him to quit smoking. Our respect for 
respectively the later or earlier desire in case (a) and (b) does not stem 
from our consideration that the contradicting desires come from 
distinct persons and that one of these persons, for some reason, 
deserves more respect than the other. Instead, we respect a hierarchy 
of a set of desires that one person can have throughout his life-span. 
The previous explains why Parfit’s conclusion in his famous 
nobleman case is drawn too quickly. Parfit (1984, pp. 327-329) 
imagines a Russian nobleman who wishes to leave his entire 
inheritance to the peasants, but is afraid that he might become less of 
a socialist later on in life and then might revoke this wish. To prevent 
this from happening, he makes his wife promise that she will, in this 
case, not listen to his later self, but instead respect the wish he 
currently has. He considers this wish as essential to him and tries to 
convince her that he would no longer be the same person without this 
wish. When the wife acts accordingly, Parfit concludes that she does 
this because she loves her late husband who expressed this wish, and 
because the remaining man with another desire is not, in fact, the 
nobleman, but his inheritor who is not in a position to decide what 
happens with his inheritance. 
Parfit correctly judges that if we feel that, not the later, but the 
earlier man’s wish should be respected, we, in fact, consider the later 
man as the inheritor of this earlier man, rather than as this man 
himself. Ignoring the later man’s wish is only legitimate in this case. 
As we saw, we would not let the earlier wish overrule the later one, if 
CH 7: Which Image of the Self Corresponds To Our Ascription of 
Diachronic Personal Identity? 
 
[201] 
the man were still the same, for this is not an addiction case, in which 
a desired hierarchy of desires would apply. However, Parfit is too quick 
to conclude that, if someone, at one point, changes a desire he 
considered to be essential to him, this means that he dies and then 
merely becomes his own inheritor. He could change this desire without 
losing his identity. As we saw, we would, in this case, mostly consider 
the later desire as the one to be respected, except if he is under a moral 
or legal obligation that forbids us to do so. We would also make an 
exception, if his first desire functions as a higher order desire over his 
later desire. 
Apart from this, Parfit’s treatment of the noble man case 
contradicts his own treatise on personal identity. In his section on 
personal identity in Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) argues that we 
should rid ourselves of all concerns related to personal identity, given 
that there are no entities with such guaranteed identity, but just 
gradually ever changing beings. Yet, the noble man fully identifies 
with one image of himself – a generous socialist – and has worries, 
which he would not have if he did not think of himself as being one 
such specific character. To accept this worry as legitimate and use it 
as a starting point for one of his arguments goes against for what Parfit 
otherwise argues. 
Contrary to what Parfit actually concludes about the noble man, 
but in line with what he otherwise contends, I argue that there is an 
illusion to how Parfit’s noble man thinks about his identity. It is wrong 
of him to identify with one image of himself. As Parfit contends, I think 
he is subject to changes. However, from this, I do not infer, as Parfit 
does, that all ideas of being a particular identity are illusionary. I draw 
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a distinction, which Parfit does not draw, between imaginary 
identification which is illusionary and formal identification which 
corresponds to a reality in the intersubjective world in which we 
factually live. It is illusionary to identify yourself with one image of 
yourself, because you can, in fact, change and still remain the same. 
Yet, you are justified in having the feeling that you are one diachronic 
identity with one history and one future, all the while not knowing 
more about the character of this entity. These two forms of 
identification are radically different. In the first case, we can explicate 
exactly what we think our identity consists of; in the second case, there 
is not so much to say about it, because the identification remains 
formal. Further, the first form of identification does not allow for 
considerable or radical changes in character, while the second does. 
With what went before, I hope to have shown that the effects of the 
formal self as the anchor point of our identity, and, so, the formal self, 
are real. In the next section, I will shift attention to the flexibility of 
the development of our identity, for which this formal self allows. 
 
 
2. The formal self gives us freedom in thinking about 
and effectively changing ourselves 
 
Apart from functioning as an anchor point of our identity, or more 
precisely, because it functions as an anchor point of our identity, our 
formal self also gives us freedom and flexibility in thinking about and 
effectively changing ourselves. The minimal idea of being a particular, 
numerically identical entity, about which nothing definitive is known, 
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except that it is diachronic, is presupposed in the thought about and 
effective changing of ourselves. We can dream about becoming 
different – not just slightly, but radically. I can, for instance, think 
about how great it would be to get rid of my laziness and food cravings; 
to be athletic, tall and thin, instead of small and chubby; and to be witty 
and social, rather than shy and inhibited. I then think that this would 
be great, because I would be like this, not because someone else would 
be like this. This ‘I’ is a minimal self. I have no other idea about it, 
except that I would be it. I do not tie it to any specific set of character 
traits. 
One could object that I do not, in this fantasy, really dream about 
acquiring different characteristics, but about becoming another 
person. Or one could object that, even if I do not dream about becoming 
another person in this fantasy, I would in fact cease to exist and another 
person would be born, if this fantasy materialized. This would 
undermine my statement that a formal self is involved, here, and is 
what makes this phenomenon possible. Against this conclusion, I 
argue that the two latter phenomena differ radically from the one I 
described. An elaboration upon this difference will not only confirm 
that a minimal self is presupposed in the imagination I first described. 
It will also shed more light upon the nature of this formal self. 
 
To counter the first objection and to distinguish fantasizing about 
being a different person from imagining acquiring a radically different 
character yourself, it is necessary to first determine what it means to 
fantasize about being a different person. This can mean different 
things, depending on which kind of fantasy you embark upon. I will 
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look at three. The first is that of a child watching a television-series, 
screaming ‘that’s me,’ and then starting to act as this particular 
character. The second is that of an adult who imagines what he would 
do, if he were someone else. The third is that of someone who imagines 
being someone else and experiencing everything from his perspective. 
I will demonstrate that, in none of these cases, we imagine to really be 
someone else. This demonstration will highlight the differences 
between imagining being someone else and imagining changing 
drastically. The apparent impossibility of the former imagination will 
also take away the likeliness that imagining becoming endowed with 
different character traits amounts to imagining that one becomes 
someone else. 
I will first argue that neither the child, nor the adult, who imagines 
what he would do if he were someone else, thinks of himself as really 
being this other character. The child just demonstrates, and the adult 
just thinks about, what he would do if he had certain characteristics of 
this other character and encountered a situation like they encounter. 
In doing so, the child plays a role, like actors do. He can do this with a 
lot of passion and even forget about himself, but he does not think that 
he really is this character. He just enjoys the imagined powers and 
environment, in which he places himself for a moment. Something 
similar holds for the adult who wonders what he would do instead of 
someone else. In distinction with the child, this adult does not exactly 
act like an actor in a play, but more like an actor preparing his role. He 
tries to imagine what the character would do in certain circumstances 
given his history, hopes for the future and surrounding people. To 
make this more realistic, the adult thinks about the choices he would 
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make in similar circumstances. These might be slightly different than 
those of the character, in whose shoes he tries to place himself. If our 
adult were confronted with a particular situation, his proper character 
traits might make him take different decisions: he could, for instance, 
be more averse to risk than the character about whom he fantasizes. 
This generates the difficulty we always have when someone asks ‘what 
would you do if you were me’. We are then asked to give advice, with 
respect to another person’s life, and so try to envision the specifics of 
his life, character, and desires for the future, as well as we can. At the 
same time, we are asked to say what we would do if we were him. In 
order to give a well-thought answer, we also ponder whether what we 
think is desirable: we consult our own inclinations. Imagining what 
you would do if you were someone else is thus not fantasizing about 
really becoming this person, but rather attempting to find out what 
you, an empirical character with certain developed responses, would 
do when placed in a particular situation, in which you would have a 
different history, set of relations, and also some diverging 
characteristics and desires. You remain aware of the fact that you are 
not the person to whom you try to give advice. You base your advice 
on your thoughts about his situation, not on an imagination of really 
being him. 
We can, thus, discard of the previous two fantasies. Contrary to 
what may, at first, seem to be the case, they are not truly fantasies of 
being someone else. A third kind of imagination is more promising. 
This is the participatory imagination of being someone else, in which 
someone imagines that he experiences the world from this other 
person’s perspective. This participatory imagination has been the 
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object of philosophical investigation for Bernard Williams (1973a), 
and Zeno Vendler (1984). 
In his ‘Imagination and the Self,’ Williams demonstrates how, even 
in such participatory imagining, we do not truly imagine that we are 
someone else. Again, we are just role-playing. Although he does not 
explicitly say which kind of role-playing involves participatory 
imagining, Williams could, here, think of an empathic way of acting, 
in which actors do not just apply a particular technique to make the 
audience understand which emotion his character has, but in which the 
actor evokes those emotions in himself that he imagines he would feel 
if he were this personality, so as to credibly represent them. We can 
further think of this actor as forgetting about the public that watches 
him and just seeing the surrounding scenery as he imagines his 
character would, or must have seen it. 
While role-playing does not amount to imagining really being 
someone else, we can show how this last kind of imagination, which 
we may, at times, possibly call an imagination of being someone else, 
differs radically from imagining that one’s character drastically 
changes. In the latter case, a formal self is involved: in imagining how 
most, or all, of your character traits would change, you get an image 
of an attenuated self, which persists in spite of these changes. But there 
is no role for such a self in participatory imagining that you are 
someone else. For, as Williams explains, there are only two selves that 
have a function in this role-play: the empirical self that imagines, and 
the self of the character that he imagines being and that has a 
CH 7: Which Image of the Self Corresponds To Our Ascription of 
Diachronic Personal Identity? 
 
[207] 
particular view of the world.64 When I imagine being this character, I 
imagine experiencing everything from their shoes and my imagination 
can be so lively that I actually sense what this character could sense. 
It is, however my empirical self that senses this: I hear what I hear 
through my auditory system, and sense what I sense through my 
nervous system and metabolism. I am not, nor imagine that I am the 
same attenuated self, now, with different characteristics, as the 
character I play.65 
Zeno Vendler understands this participatory imagination 
differently. According to Vendler (1984), we can imagine that we could 
really have been someone else. We can, for instance, imagine that we 
would have been born elsewhere, at another time, in another body, 
demonstrating other talents and inclinations. What would remain the 
same – and what is enough for Vendler to conclude that I could have 
been this person – is the framework that allows for something like 
human consciousness, i.e. the fact that the consciousness is both 
synchronically unified and diachronic. This allows for someone to be a 
self: his integrated experience can give him the sense of being at one 
particular place and of being one subject who has distinct sensations, 
just as his sense of temporality allows him to feel that he is one subject 
which had, has and probably will have experiences. Inspired by Kant, 
                                                 
64 “… what I am doing, in fantasy, is something like playing the role of Napoleon” 
(Williams 1973a, p. 44). “In the description of this activity, only two people need 
figure: the real me and Napoleon. There is no place for a third item, the Cartesian ‘I’, 
regarding which I imagine that it might have belonged to Napoleon” (Williams 
1973a, p. 44). 
65 “ … the fact that I can, in the only way that arouses my interest, imagine being 
Napoleon has no tendency at all to show that I can conceive, as a logical possibility, 
that I might have been Napoleon” (Williams 1973a, p. 45) 
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Vendler calls the subject who can have this kind of unified and 
diachronic experience ‘the transcendental self’. He then argues that I 
would have been this person if my transcendental self were his 
transcendental self. Vendler concludes this from the following 
reasoning. 
“…in performing transference, i.e. in imagining being someone else, 
the object of the exercise cannot be fancying me (Z.V.) being 
identical with that person. In imagining, for instance, being Ronald 
Reagan, I cannot be imagining the identity of Z.V. with R.R., for it 
is patently impossible for these two men to be one and the same, 
and the patently impossible cannot be imagined. Therefore … being 
R.R. must simply consist in fancying being in a certain possible 
state, without involving Z.V. in the object of the exercise” (Vendler 
1984, p. 105). 
But what, then, with the ‘I’ who still seems to have a function in this 
imagination? 
“In imagining being R.R. I conjure up something which is not the 
case. What is not the case? That I am in fact R.R. Now this ‘I’ cannot 
mean Z.V., since in doing this transference I do not imagine Z.V. to 
be R.R. Therefore, it seems, ‘I’, the subject of this act, is not identical 
with Z.V.” (Vendler 1984, Ibid). 
It is my transcendental self: 
“…nothing will be left beyond the ‘conditions all experience 
preserving the ‘format’ of the unity of consciousness” (Vendler 
1984, p. 106-107). “[This] transcendental ‘I’ is not a thing, it has 
no content; it is a frame into which any content may fit, or, better, 
a ‘format’ or a ‘schema’ into which any content may be cast” 
(Vendler 1984, p. 107). 
Vendler’s conclusion is false and puzzling. It is false because the 
phenomenon of the transcendental self cannot serve as an identifying 
criterion for particular persons and, hence, not determine that I would 
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be a particular personality; i.e. that it would really be me who is a 
particular personality. It is puzzling because Vendler admits this, and 
so highlights a remark that Kant – from whom he got the idea of the 
transcendental self – already made. 
“The identity of the consciousness of Myself in different times…is 
only a formal condition of my thoughts and their connection, but it 
does not prove at all the numerical identity of my subject, in which 
– despite the logical identity of the I – a change can go on that does 
not allow it to keep its identity…” (Kant 1998, A363) “[The] 
identity of person in no way follows from the identity of the identity 
of the I in the consciousness of all the time in which I cognize 
myself” (Kant 1998, A365). 
Hence, being a transcendental self can never determine that I am a 
particular personality, such as Ronald Reagan, as Vendler strangely 
admits himself: 
“ ‘Am I entitled, then, to my own little transcendental self, distinct 
from yours, which has the same kind of access to my mind as yours 
does to yours?’ No, you are not, I reply, but nor am I. I have a mind, 
but I do not ‘have’ a transcendental self: the ultimate subject cannot 
be had….how, in the first place, could there be many contentless 
beings, not located in space and time either? How would they differ 
from one another? ‘By the relations they bear to this and that 
individual mind’, you suggest. If so, I reply, then ‘my’ 
transcendental self would be essentially tied to me, thus, once more, 
transference would be impossible: I could not imagine Ronald 
Reagan, because I could not be in the state of being he. But I can” 
(Vendler 1984, p. 109). 
Moreover, it cannot even determine that I am, or remain, a 
particular ‘I’. 
“For we cannot judge even from our own consciousness whether as 
soul we are persisting or not, because we ascribe to our identical 
Self only that of which we are conscious; and so we must necessarily 
judge that we are the very same in the whole of that time of which 
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we are conscious. But from the standpoint of someone else we 
cannot declare this to be valid because, since in the soul we 
encounter no persisting appearance other than the representation 
‘I’ which accompanies and connects all of them, we can never make 
out whether this I (a mere thought) does not flow as well as all the 
other thoughts that are linked to one another through it” (Kant 
1984, A364). 
It is with the transcendental ‘I,’ as with the feeling of mineness, to 
which I referred before. It is a function of everyone’s consciousness, 
and gives one the feeling of being an ‘I’, but the personal experience of 
being a self, which we get from this, does not render us numerically 
identical with one specific substance, over another. 
With this, yet another interpretation of what it could mean to 
imagine being someone else appears not, in fact, to refer to an 
imagination of really being someone else. We have now seen many 
interpretations of what imagining being someone else could amount 
to. None were able to demonstrate that I can conceive, as a logical 
possibility that I might really have been or become someone else.66 A 
fortiori, none can prove that ‘imagining to change drastically’ is in fact 
‘imagining to be someone else’. 
Yet, even when the phrase of ‘imagining to be someone else’ does 
not exactly run the gamut, the previous analysis of what it can mean 
to imagine to be someone else tells us something about the distinction 
between this phenomenon and imagining to change drastically in 
                                                 
66 Neither does our imagination of being someone else need to have this tendency: 
“the fact that I can, in the only way that arouses my interest, imagine being Napoleon 
has no tendency at all to show that I can conceive, as a logical possibility, that I 
might have been Napoleon” (Williams 1973a, p. 45). I can just enjoy thinking about 
what to do in certain scenarios, as well as about what it would feel like to be put in 
such a situation. 
CH 7: Which Image of the Self Corresponds To Our Ascription of 
Diachronic Personal Identity? 
 
[211] 
character. In the latter case, one self is presupposed: you imagine that 
you will get other character traits; i.e. that you would be very different, 
but still numerically the same. As we saw, no such self is presupposed 
in imagining being someone else. It is not required. I can just role-play 
as an empirical self and think about an empirical self who existed or 
could exist. Moreover, such a numerically identical self can neither be 
there in the form of an empirical self, nor in the form of a 
transcendental self. An empirical self, born in a certain place, at a 
certain time, and in a certain body cannot be numerically identical with 
an empirical self, born at another place, time, or in another body. A 
transcendental self, in its turn, is not a substance to which certain (re-
)identification rules apply. 
So, the distinction between these two kinds of imagination tells us 
more about the formal self, with whom we identify when we either 
merely fantasize about how nice it would be to be attributed some 
different character traits, or when we really try to shape ourselves by 
changing some of our most persisting characteristics. This formal self 
is tied to a more substantial self: it can be attributed many different 
character traits, but never really live the life of someone else. While 
this attenuated self is rather empty and formal, it is not a current 
framework for consciousness as the transcendental self is. Instead, it 
has one particular history, which is the history of a particular person 
and coincides with his physical history. It could not have come into 
existence at another place and time than it actually has. 
 
There’s another reflection on imagination that can help us 
understand how our idea of the formal self functions. It is that of the 
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distinction between conceiving and visualizing and was, for instance, 
drawn by Bernard Williams (1973) in his ‘Imagination and the Self’. 
There, Williams addresses the question whether one could imagine an 
unseen tree. One might be reluctant to admit that this is possible and 
argue that to imagine an unseen tree is to visualize it, which makes it 
into a seen tree, rather than an unseen one. Williams demonstrates 
how this thought is invalid. I can conceive of something without 
visualizing it, and even when I visualize it in imagination, what is 
visualized is not necessarily the imagined.67 So, we can conceive of an 
unseen tree without visualizing it, and just think of the possibility that 
there is an entity somewhere of which we do not know the exact shape, 
but which can be called ‘tree,’ and is unseen by anyone. In doing so, 
pictures of a tree in a desert may come to mind, but this does not imply 
that this visualized tree is also what I am really imagining. I can be 
aware of the fact that the trees I currently visualize are not the unseen 
tree, of which I conceive the possibility. Besides, my visualization of a 
tree in my imagination does not make it seen: “in visualization nothing 
is really seen”68 (Williams 1973, p. 37, my italics). 
In working with the idea of the formal self, we equally conceive of, 
rather than visualize it. This allows us not to tie the formal self to any 
of the specific characteristics that are always represented in 
                                                 
67 “… for certain purposes at least, and for certain applications of ‘imagine’, we 
can properly make the determinant of what he imagined his imaginative project, and 
not what he visualized, if the visualized anything” (Williams 1973a, p. 33). 
68 “…even if visualizing is in some sense thinking of myself seeing, and what is 
visualized is presented as it were from a perceptual point of view, there can be no 
reason at all for insisting that that point of view is of one within the world of what is 
visualized; any more than our view of Othello is a view had by one in Othello’s 
context, or the cinematic point of view is necessarily that of one stealing around the 
characters” (Williams 1973a, p. 37). 
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visualization. It also offers an alternative for an impersonal account of 
personal identity. Someone may claim that you should not identify 
yourself with a current image of yourself, because you will gradually 
evolve. He may then conclude that you should not identify yourself 
with any entity, at all, because you never stay exactly like this entity. 
If the formal self is a self of which we conceive that it remains 
numerically identical, the previous is not a necessary conclusion: my 
conception of myself as one numerical entity, is then, in any case, not 
tied to any specific image of what this entity should resemble.  
 
 
III. THE ELUSIVENESS OF THE SELF 
 
Together, this formality of the self, about which I spoke in the first 
section of this chapter, as well as its both anchoring and flexibility 
allowing function, which I just described, can give us a new 
explanation of the elusiveness of the self. Who or what we really are 
often seems to escape us. Some maintain that we can get rid of this 
elusiveness by discovering who we really are, i.e. by discovering what 
our inner essence is, which character we really have, what we really 
want. Some philosophers choose to explain this elusiveness by arguing 
that there is no self, i.e. that it is just a fiction (Hume 1978), a to other 
relations reducible entity (Parfit 1984), or a narrative construct 
(Dennett 1988). Contrary to this, my understanding is that we 
experience the self as elusive because the consciousness-producing 
continuous body, which is crucial for its constitution, makes that, while 
it can be followed, it can never be fully appropriated. The continuous 
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body allows us to follow a self through space and time. It makes it 
easier for us to see a character develop, and hold someone responsible. 
At the same time, the body does not tell us much about who we are. It 
functions as the words in a poem. Just as a poem would not be without 
its words, and its meaning and beauty cannot be abstracted from them, 
all the while the letters of these words are not the content of the poem, 
so we can only discover a rich character, by following someone 
through his body, all the while this body as such neither is, says, nor 
guarantees much concerning this character. Moreover, just as a poem 
is, but can never be replaced by how someone interpreted it, so we 
cannot fully detach ourselves from what others see in us, while, at the 
same time, we never fully coincide with the existing images of us. We 
are just what we do and exhibit. There is no inner meaning without 
medium. At the same time, images that we, and others, have of us 
remain external to us and are snapshots that never bring together 
everything we are or will be. 
The above also explains why we can sometimes feel discomfort 
when we are associated with a certain self. We are born into it and 
have no real say in how it is followed. Our existence, as diachronic 
numerically identical entities, allows us to develop a substantial 
personality that can be recognized and loved, but it is never a 
guarantee for any coherency or continuation of the qualities we further 
develop. We can be seen and numerically identified, while, at the same 
time, we can be uncertain about what the qualitative link is between 
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